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Paper 128

# **Upping the PACE? An evaluation of the recommendations of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry on stops and searches**

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### **Policing and Reducing Crime Unit: Police Research Series**

The Policing and Reducing Crime Unit (PRC Unit) is part of the Research, Development and Statistics Directorate of the Home Office. The PRC Unit carries out and commissions research in the social and management sciences on policing and crime reduction.

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*"The views expressed in this report are those of the author, not necessarily those of the Home Office (nor do they reflect Government policy)."*

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## Foreword

This is the second report produced from a programme of research on stops and searches carried out by the Home Office's Policing and Reducing Crime Unit (Research, Development and Statistics Directorate). This programme was developed following the Report of the Inquiry into the Death of Stephen Lawrence. That report highlighted minority ethnic communities' lack of trust and confidence in the use of stops and searches and recommended that the police should make a record of all stops and all searches of the public.

This study describes the results of a national pilot of this recommendation. The evaluation of the pilot draws on interviews with police officers, an extensive period of observation of police patrol, public views and police statistics of recorded stops and searches.

The study highlights significant under-recording, particularly of stops, which places in doubt the accuracy of the picture produced from police statistics. It was clear that the level of under-recording was due, in part, to the difficulty of precisely defining a police stop. Still, some officers were recording selectively. The study suggests that the recommendations may have important symbolic value in highlighting to officers the significance of stop and search encounters for the public and the consequent need for thought and care in conducting them.

Members of the public interviewed for this study saw benefit in receiving written information about the reason for the stop, the name of the officer who stopped them, their rights and police powers. It was clear though that public trust and confidence is primarily based on being treated fairly and with respect and being given a good reason for the stop, rather than on changes in procedure.

The study concludes that the positive impact of the recommendations is still unlikely, on its own, to tackle sufficiently fairness and public confidence in stops and searches. Changes in procedures need to be accompanied by improved fairness in the application of the procedures by the police if public confidence is to improve.

**CAROLE F. WILLIS**

*Head of Policing and Reducing Crime Unit  
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### The Authors

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## Executive summary

The Report of the Inquiry into the Matters Arising from the Death of Stephen Lawrence highlighted minority ethnic communities' lack of trust and confidence in the police, particularly in relation to stops and searches. The Report thus recommended that the police should make a record of all stops and all searches of the public. The record should be given to the person stopped and should include the reason and outcome of the stop and how the person described their ethnic background. The Policing and Reducing Crime Unit (PRC) in the Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate was commissioned to pilot this recommendation and evaluate its viability. This report describes the pilot and presents the results of the evaluation.

Some stops culminate in a search; others do not. Throughout the report, for clarity, any stops that include searches are termed 'searches' and all other stops are termed 'stops'.

### The pilot

To ensure that the proposed recommendations were tested across a range of policing environments, the pilot was conducted across five police areas in four police forces: Leicestershire Constabulary, the Metropolitan Police Service, Suffolk Constabulary and West Yorkshire Police. The sites covered urban and rural areas, with different mixes of ethnic population. The pilot ran for at least six months across all sites and finished at the end of May 2000. All the sites are continuing with the changes until a decision is made by the Home Office about any national implementation.

A definition of a 'stop' with detailed guidance was developed for the purposes of the pilot: it set out the types of encounter that should be recorded by the police as stops. The definition included any encounter where a person was 'called to account' for their actions or presence.

The pilot also tested the use of two different designs of stop form. One design was used simply for recording stops and searches. The other design combined this stop record with two existing traffic forms: the HO/RT1 (which requires a driver to produce their traffic documents at a police station within seven days), and the VDRS (which is used to record illegal vehicle defects and requires the driver to provide proof at a police station that they have been mended).

Two different ways of recording a person's self-described ethnic origin were also tested: one using an open question, the other using the set of fixed categories to be used in the 2001 census.

## The evaluation

The evaluation comprised four elements:

- interviews with over 100 operational police officers, supervisors and managers at the beginning and end of the pilot;
- over 340 hours of observations of routine patrol work across all sites;
- in-depth interviews with 55 people stopped or searched during the pilot and 12 discussion groups with 104 people from the pilot sites; and
- statistics produced from the police records made during the pilot.

The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report (sometimes referred to as the Macpherson Report) did not specify the intended impact of the piloted changes though it did point to the need to increase public trust and confidence in the police, particularly that of ethnic minorities, through openness and accountability. Based on this, and drawing from research which identifies continuing problems with the regulation of searches, the research focused on evaluating the impact of the changes in three main areas:

- monitoring and accountability of stops and searches;
- public trust and confidence in police use of stops and searches; and
- officers' practice in terms of stops and searches.

The evaluation did not aim simply to identify whether specific outcomes had resulted from the changes but also sought to explain how and why these outcomes were produced.

### Results: monitoring and accountability

Each site developed and maintained databases to record the information from the new stop forms. This information was also sent to the researchers for the purposes of the evaluation. Data capture and management was resource intensive for both the researchers and the pilot sites. The most significant costs for the pilot forces related to printing new stop forms and additional clerical support to input the information from the forms onto a database.

The data collected centrally provided the basis for an assessment of the viability of the new records as a basis for monitoring and accountability. This showed there were difficulties in producing statistical measures of the reasons and outcomes of stops or searches. Reasons and outcomes tended to be recorded by officers using written text which precluded easy coding for statistical purposes. The record of the specific article sought by an officer (the object of a search) was most easily presented.

The evaluation examined how written explanations might, nonetheless, still be useful for monitoring by supervisors, or as a basis for accountability to the person stopped. Although the quality of the written explanations by officers varied widely, some records provided a clear and fairly detailed explanation; others were less clear, too brief and used ambiguous police jargon. It was clear that recording this information in a way that is useful for monitoring purposes might make it less useful for public accountability.

### **Recording practices**

The researchers observed 138 encounters that should have been recorded by officers. A form was completed fully at the time in under a quarter of all cases. A form was at least started (but finished later) in a further 4% of cases. Recording under the provisions of recommendation 61 was thus complied with (or attempted) in 27% of the encounters observed. There was no evidence that a form was fully completed in 70% of cases.

Forms were more often completed for searches than for stops. Twenty searches were observed but in over half (13) of them forms were completed (or started) at the time; this was the case for only 21% of the stops we observed. A form was not filled in (or started but not completed) for three of the searches we observed; for stops, the figure was 79%.

There were many reasons for the under-recording, primarily related to:

- **Definitional/practical difficulties**

The evaluation highlighted the inherent difficulty in developing any definition to cover the range and variation of stop encounters. The definition and guidance developed for the pilot did not, in practice, provide absolute clarity about what constituted a stop. Some officers were unsure of the recording rules; a minority had clearly misunderstood them. Under-recording was highest for stops where 'calling to account' was a secondary or more minor element of the process. In many of these cases, officers appeared not to realise they should be recorded. Still, under a third of the 'typical' suspicion-led stops observed (for which calling to account is the primary purpose) were recorded.

- **Managing intrusion**

Officers were more likely not to record 'fleeting' encounters where they quickly saw no need, for their purposes, to extend them. Most officers had also experienced people's desire to end a stop quickly. Specifically, stops lasting less than five minutes, not involving an identity check on the Police National Computer (PNC), and

contacts regarded as routine by officers were less likely to be recorded. It was likely that this was due, at least in part, to officers seeking not to extend the intrusiveness of such stops.

- **Officer discretion**

It was clear that many officers used their discretion to record stops selectively. Officers gave a number of reasons for so doing, including only recording those of intelligence value, and not making a record where they wanted to maintain the informality of the encounter. Some officers explicitly stated that recording practices during the pilot meant that the statistics would not give an accurate representation of all stops or searches.

*Recording self-defined ethnicity*

There were also difficulties with recording a person's description of their ethnic origin. For most officers, the question tended not to be problematic, particularly if they explained the reason for it. But most officers were still likely to have encountered problematic reactions, some actively hostile. This led most officers to feel at least uncomfortable about asking the question and a small minority, at least at the beginning of the pilot, had not asked it at all.

The evaluation allowed comparison in Chapeltown and Ipswich of the officer-perceived ethnic coding (based on PNC codes) and the self-defined coding based on the 2001 census. Data from sites with different demographics may well have produced somewhat different findings. Officers' classification of White Europeans was most accurate, most of whom described themselves as White-British. A difference between White-British and White-Irish, for example, might well come out more strongly in certain areas of London. There was far more variation among those placed by officers in the Dark European category. The African Caribbean category had the largest proportion (at least a fifth) of people declining to self-classify or where the information was classed as missing. Comparisons for the Asian category indicated some inaccuracies in officer coding.

Members of the public interviewed for the evaluation tended not to mind being asked this question. It was viewed as a common occurrence in other contexts. Some felt strongly that it was important that they could describe their own ethnicity rather than it being decided by someone else based on how they looked.

**Results: officer practice**

Examination of the statistics on searches and arrests, across sites, did not indicate that the pilot had obviously affected the number of searches conducted or their

effectiveness, as measured by arrest rate. Interviews with individual officers did, however, suggest some changes, at least in the way stops and searches were carried out by some officers. For some officers in all sites, the changes prompted some change in their 'mind-set'. Officers were more likely to at least 'think twice' about stops and searches, and provide more explanation and information during any stop or search. This suggests that recommendation 61 may have, at least, symbolic value: the requirement to record at the time highlighting the significance of searches (and perhaps also stops) to officers and the need for thought and care in conducting them.

The most frequently cited change was that officers would give more thought in advance of stopping someone and give more of an explanation to someone they did stop. Many officers were positive about giving more information to the public, particularly about their powers to stop and search. It was felt that this would help show people they were being stopped legitimately. Some thought that providing this information would have wider benefits for police-community relations generally.

Some officers saw the changes as an imposition, with only negative implications for how they police. The provision of information to the public was not regarded as always positive. Some officers expressed anxiety that the information would encourage complaints. From this perspective the form was thought to be most useful as a safeguard. There were other concerns about giving information to criminals; officers thought this would be used against them.

Officers admitted that searches had not always been conducted legally in the past, and some felt that the changes made them think harder about their grounds for a search. Some officers, particularly in London, said they conducted fewer stops, though the reasons they gave for this tended not to relate to the piloted changes. A few officers made clear that the form had not, and would not, change the way they did things.

### **Results: public trust and confidence**

Research with members of the public in the pilot sites, again highlighted concerns about the way police officers dealt with people they stopped or searched. Interviewees gave examples where they felt officers had not treated them properly and had not explained why they had been stopped. Some had experienced multiple stops in short periods. There were also examples of police officers dealing with people very well. But interviewees were clear that their bad experiences had greater impact on them. Black respondents were far less likely to recall positive experiences than white or Asian respondents.

Those who had been stopped during the pilot were asked about their experience. It was clear that most had not received an explanation of the pilot and the new form from the officer who had stopped them. This had limited their understanding of the purpose and usefulness of the form. In interview, however, they had more time to reflect on the form and were generally supportive of receiving such a record.

The key benefit they perceived was to have information in writing about:

- the reason for the stop;
- the name of the officer in case they wanted to complain; and
- the explanation of police powers and public rights.

In terms of increasing their trust and confidence in the police, however, people were clear that officers' attitudes and the way they dealt with people was more important than the formal procedure they followed.

### **Conclusions and recommendations**

Principal conclusions and recommendations are presented below and described fully in Chapter 8.

- The level of under-recording found in the pilot places in doubt the accuracy of any statistical picture produced. It is likely that the figures produced during the pilot represent, at best, a third of the encounters that should have been recorded. The accuracy of data on searches is likely to be better than the data on stops, but remains less than perfect.
- The evaluation did not show conclusively that the pilot had improved the recording of searches. Interviews with officers suggested that more (but not all) searches, including so-called voluntary searches, were recorded than before the pilot. Levels of recorded searches on the sites, however, showed little obvious change.
- The pilot made completion of search records at the time more likely. As a result, it is highly likely that more people received a record when searched compared to before the pilot.
- Stops were far less likely to be recorded than searches. The definition and guidance developed for the pilot did not, in practice, provide absolute clarity about what constituted a stop. The lack of clarity was greater for pedestrian stops than for vehicle stops. The pilot highlighted the inherent difficulty of developing

a definition to cover the range and variation of police-public encounters, and which could be easily applied in practice. It is difficult to see how this could be overcome to ensure full recording.

- The collection of self-defined ethnic data is possible but not unproblematic. The question could, on occasion, produce difficult or hostile reactions from members of the public. The evidence indicates that negative reactions were minimised when officers provided, in advance, a clear explanation for the question.
- The results of the pilot suggest that the new coding provides some basis for enhanced ethnic monitoring. However, the proportion of missing data on self-defined ethnicity for people classified as African Caribbean would be problematic if replicated in any national monitoring system. This points to the need to retain the officer-based classification system in parallel with any new self-defined monitoring.
- Members of the public interviewed for the study welcomed the use of the new form and saw it as a useful basis for accountability. They were critical, however, of the police jargon printed on the form and written by officers. The use of jargon limited their understanding of the information on the form and thus its usefulness as a basis for accountability. The information on police powers received strong support.
- The views expressed in interview suggest that, among some officers in all sites, the changes have prompted some change in their 'mind-set'. Officers were more likely to at least 'think twice' about stops and searches, and provide more explanation and information during any stop or search. Many of these officers saw tangible benefits in the changes.
- This suggests that recommendation 61 may have some important symbolic value: the requirement to give a record at the time highlighting to officers the significance of stop and search encounters for the public and the consequent need for thought and care in conducting them.
- However, there were other officers for whom the recording requirements were an imposition, with only negative implications for how they police. Changes in their policing practice as a result of the pilot was thus far less likely.
- Members of the public interviewed for this study saw benefit in receiving written information about the reason for the stop, the name of the officer who stopped them, their rights and police powers. It was clear, however, that public trust and

confidence is primarily based on being treated fairly and with respect and being given a good reason for the stop, rather than on changes in procedure.

- Despite the efforts of the pilot sites to publicise the changes, it was clear that public awareness was low. This meant that many people stopped by the police were uninformed or confused about the purpose of the form. This was particularly the case when officers did not provide an explanation at the time.

Overall, it is clear that the recommendations of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, on their own, are unlikely to produce sufficiently positive outcomes in relation to fairness and community confidence in stops and searches. The findings and conclusions of the research in the rest of PRC's programme should help to identify other necessary measures.

#### *Recommendations*

- Officers should be required to make a record at the time for all searches covered by PACE Code A, including so-called voluntary searches. The record should be offered to the person searched.
- Despite the problems highlighted by the pilot, further consideration should still be given to the difficult issue of recording of police stops. This study has confirmed that the public welcome receiving a written record of such encounters.
- The search record should include information about all police search powers and associated public rights. Information should also be provided explaining how a member of the public can register a complaint. The information on the form should be presented in a way that is easily understood.
- With regard to recommendation 63, the Home Office and the Association of Police Authorities should consider how best to raise wider public awareness about police powers and duties in relation to stops and searches. One possibility, currently in use in some forces, is a widely available pamphlet describing police powers and public rights in relation to stops and searches.

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## 1. Introduction

Police use of powers to search members of the public on the street has long been a source of debate. Attention has focused on the frequency of searches by the police of people from ethnic minorities, particularly black people. In 1981, the Scarman Report pointed to the intensive and discriminate use of searches as a factor in the Brixton disorder of that year. Research around that time and since has also highlighted this difference (for example, Willis, 1983; Smith and Gray, 1985; Young 1994; Bucke, 1997). Police search statistics for England and Wales published by the Home Office since 1996, under section 95 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991, have consistently shown that black people are on average at least five times more likely to be searched by the police than white people<sup>1</sup>. Debate about the reasons for this differential rate has been vigorous and has tended to focus on claims of police discrimination, differential offending and the impact of broader demographic and cultural differences.

Research also indicates other, more general problems with police use of searches. This has focused on the impact of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) and *PACE 1984 (s66): Code of practice (A) on stop and search (1999)* (hereafter referred to as PACE Code A), which provide the basis for its regulation. A Home Office review of this research (Brown, 1997) concluded that it was doubtful that searches were always based on reasonable suspicion; so-called voluntary searches were rarely based on informed consent and often not officially recorded, and formal recording of searches with a power was patchy. Some police forces have recently introduced or piloted specific initiatives in a renewed attempt to tackle such problems (see Fitzgerald, 1999a, 1999b, for an account of the work by the Metropolitan Police).

Criticisms of the use of stops and searches were most recently highlighted by the Report of the Inquiry into the Matters Arising from the Death of Stephen Lawrence (1999). Part II of the Inquiry, which involved public hearings in London, Manchester, Bradford, Bristol and Birmingham, looked beyond the specific case of the murder of Stephen Lawrence to the investigation and prosecution of racially motivated crimes in general. This process highlighted to the inquiry minority ethnic communities' general lack of trust and confidence in the police, the Report noting particularly that "if there was one area of complaint that was universal it was the issue of 'stop and search'" (para. 45.8).

The Report went on further to say:

*The need to re-establish trust between minority ethnic communities and the police is paramount. Such distrust and loss of confidence is particularly evident in the widely held view that junior officers discriminate in practice at operational level,*

<sup>1</sup> The most recent results, for year 1998/99, indicated that black people were six times more likely to be searched than white people. The use of search powers for all ethnic groups varied widely across forces (Home Office, 1999a).

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*and that they support each other in such discrimination. We have referred (Para 45.8) to the primary problem of 'stop and search', including those stops which are unrecorded within the present statistics. The minority communities' views and perceptions are formed by their experiences of all 'stops' by the police. They do not perceive any difference between a 'stop' under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act from one under the Road Traffic Act whilst driving a vehicle. It is essential to obtain a true picture of the interactions between the police and minority ethnic communities in this context. All 'stops' need to be recorded, and related self-defined 'ethnic data' compiled. (para. 46.31)*

As a result, the Report made four recommendations (60-63) in relation to stops and searches:

*Rec. 60: That the powers of the police under current legislation are required for the prevention and detection of crime and should remain unchanged.*

*Rec. 61: That the Home Secretary, in consultation with Police Services, should ensure that a record is made by police officers of all 'stops' and 'stops and searches' made under any legislative provision (not just the Police and Criminal Evidence Act). Non-statutory or so-called 'voluntary' stops must also be recorded. The record to include the reason for the stop, the outcome, and the self-defined ethnic identity of the person stopped. A copy of the record shall be given to the person stopped.*

*Rec. 62: That these records should be monitored and analysed by Police Services and Police Authorities, and reviewed by HMIC on inspections. The information and analysis should be published.*

*Rec. 63: That Police Authorities be given the duty to undertake publicity campaigns to ensure that the public is aware of 'stop and search' provisions and the right to receive a record in all circumstances.*

In response to the Report, the Government published the Home Secretary's Action Plan (Home Office, 1999b) which set out how it proposed all 70 recommendations to be taken forward. In relation to stops and searches, recommendation 60 was accepted and the others were to be assessed through pilot projects. The Policing and Reducing Crime Unit (PRC) in the Home Office's Research, Development and Statistics Directorate was commissioned to pilot the recommendations and evaluate their viability.

This report describes the design and conduct of the pilot and presents the results

from the evaluation. The pilot focused on the changes to the recording of stops and searches proposed in recommendation 61. The monitoring and analysis of these records (rec. 62) and the issue of public awareness (rec. 63) were to be covered in the evaluation.

### **The context of the study**

This study forms part of a broader research programme on stops and searches conducted by PRC following the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, and will refer readers to the findings from other projects in the programme where these provide more detail. The programme comprises the following elements:

#### *1. Assessing the impact on crime and the community*

This report takes a balanced look at stops and searches both as crime-fighting tools and in terms of their broader impact on the community. In particular, it focuses on the following questions:

- What role do stops and searches have in policing?
- Are searches effective at tackling crime problems?
- Under what circumstances are they most effective?
- How do they impact on public perceptions of the police?
- How can negative impacts be minimised?

What, therefore, are the implications for best practice in relation to stops and searches? This work is reported in Miller, et al. (2000).

#### *2. An evaluation of the Inquiry's recommendations for stops and searches*

This work is reported here.

#### *3. Public views on stops and searches*

As part of the evaluation of the pilot, the British Market Research Bureau (BMRB) carried out a large-scale qualitative research project. They were asked to gather views from people who have experienced stops and searches and community members more generally, drawing on the experiences and opinions of people across different ethnic backgrounds. This is reported in Stone and Pettigrew (2000).

#### *4. Police stops, decision-making and practice*

This project takes a detailed look at the factors which underlie police decision making in relation to stops and searches, and the risks that these may pose. It also attempts to identify what makes a 'good stop'. This relates both to treating members

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of the public fairly, and to identifying circumstances when a stop or search encounter is more likely to be effective and legal. The findings of this research are presented in Quinton, et al. (2000).

### *5. Profiling populations 'available' for stops and searches*

A key issue in understanding the reasons for the disproportionate use of stops and searches against minority ethnic communities is the make-up of the population 'available' to be stopped and searched. This refers to people who are present in public places and at times that stops and searches tend to occur. This research provides a detailed profile of those available in this way from the sites involved in the pilot of recommendation 61 and compares this profile with resident populations and those actually stopped or searched. The findings of this research are presented in MVA (2000).

### *6. Interventions to improve the management of searches*

This study examines a range of initiatives being developed by a selection of forces which aim to make their use of searches more fair and effective. Interventions focus on improvements to:

- managerial effectiveness;
- operational effectiveness;
- recording practices;
- officers' knowledge of search powers; and
- community confidence.

The first phase of this research has been reported in Quinton and Bland (1999) and the final results are presented in Bland, et al. (2000).

It is planned to bring together the key results from all this work in an extended briefing note which draws overall lessons from the programme.

### **The report**

This study presents the results from the pilot and evaluation. It describes how the specific changes proposed in recommendation 61 of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report (sometimes referred to as the Macpherson Report) operated in practice, assesses whether they are workable and examines their impact. The evaluation focuses not only on the issue of public trust and confidence raised by the Report but also examines the impact on other areas, specifically monitoring and accountability and changes to officer practice.

Chapter 2 provides some background context to this work by further discussing previous research on stops and searches, specifically the literature assessing the impact of PACE. Drawing on this, we end the chapter by considering carefully the aim of the Inquiry's recommendations.

Chapter 3 describes the development of the pilot and the design of the evaluation, outlining the methods used.

In Chapter 4 we begin to present the results of the evaluation. First, we examine whether the recording changes introduced in the pilot provide a basis for improved monitoring and accountability of police stops and searches. Statistics based on the new records are presented. We assess their accuracy in relation to officers recording practices.

Chapter 5 explores the recording of people's self defined ethnicity and discusses the new stop record as a 'vehicle' for improved accountability.

We explore whether and how the pilot led to changes in officer practice in Chapter 6. We begin by examining whether overall levels of searches, arrests and crime on the sites changed over the pilot period and in comparison with before the pilot. Drawing on interview and observational data, we then look closely at whether the pilot had led officers to change how they used and recorded stops and searches.

Chapter 7 begins by discussing the public views and experiences of stops and searches, drawing specifically on results from the work by BMRB. This provides a context for an examination of the impact of the piloted changes on public trust and confidence in the police, particularly in their conduct of stops and searches.

In Chapter 8 we draw conclusions from the results of the evaluation and consider the viability of implementing the recommendations across the police service.

### **Terminology**

When we talked to police officers during this research, they tended not to make a clear distinction between stops which involve searches and those that do not, referring to both simply as 'stops'. This distinction is also sometimes blurred in the literature (e.g. Young, 1994). In this report, for clarity, we refer to stops with searches as simply 'searches' and all other stops without searches as 'stops'.

## 2. Regulating police stops and searches

This chapter provides some important context about the regulation of police stops and searches prior to the discussion of the pilot and evaluation in the coming chapters. Specifically, we:

- review the introduction of PACE and research on its impact;
- examine the range of police stops;
- summarise research on the broader issue of police practice and regulation; and
- consider the aims of the Inquiry's recommendations.

### Historical context and introduction of PACE

#### *Pre-PACE*

Prior to the introduction of PACE, search powers existed within a variety of local and national legislation (Willis, 1983; Brown, 1997). While there were general powers to search people for drugs and firearms, powers to search for stolen goods were only found in local legislation, for example under s66 of the Metropolitan Police Act 1839 which applied only in London.

Pre-PACE research by Willis (1983) and Smith and Gray (1985) both provide evidence of problems with police use of stops and searches, specifically:

- young people and black people are disproportionately targeted by the police; and
- no reasonable grounds of suspicion are present in a substantial proportion of searches.

The 1981 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (RCCP) recommended a consolidated power of stop and search for all of England and Wales to replace the range of local powers. In practice this was an extension of powers (Willis, 1993). The RCCP recognised the need to balance this extension with safeguards to protect the public from random, arbitrary and discriminatory searches<sup>2</sup>. But the RCCP was unable to develop precise standards to judge reasonable suspicion. Its recommendations thus also included the requirement for an officer to give the reasons for a search, to record those reasons and for that record to be made available on request. As a further check, the RCCP suggested supervising officers should have a duty to collect and scrutinise figures on searches and their results. The 1981 Scarman Report explicitly endorsed the RCCP recommendations.

#### *The provisions of PACE*

PACE followed the RCCP. It granted new powers applying to searches of persons and vehicles for stolen or prohibited articles. These were designed to be clear and to apply nationally (see Miller, et al., 2000 for more detail).

<sup>2</sup> See Dixon (1997) for a discussion of problems with this notion of 'balance'.

PACE did not affect officers' existing right to carry out voluntary searches. Guidance in the Code, however, highlighted that they should be carried out in a clear and transparent way:

*In these circumstances, an officer should always make it clear that he is seeking the consent of the person concerned to the search being carried out by telling the person that he need not consent and that without his consent he will not be searched (Note for Guidance 1D (b)).*

Research has pointed to the difficulty, in practice, of making a clear distinction between PACE searches and those involving consent. An early evaluation of the impact of PACE in one force (Bottomley, et al., 1991) highlighted confusion about the distinction at both policy and operational level. There was evidence that some officers used consent to avoid the requirements of PACE for reasonable suspicion and that public consent was often given when ignorant of the right to refuse (see also Dixon, 1997: ch. 3).

The three principles of fairness, openness and workability informed the development of this regulatory framework. The aim was to balance the need for adequate powers for the police with safeguards to protect the rights of the public. These included the requirement for reasonable suspicion, the provision of reasons for police actions, the completion of a written record - a copy of which was made available to the person stopped - and the publication of search statistics.

Given the proposals in recommendation 61, the requirements in PACE Code A (1999) are worthy of closer attention. The following three extracts from the Code set out the requirement for an officer to make a record of the search and to inform the person searched of their rights to the record:

*Unless it appears to the officer that it will not be practicable to make a record of the search, he must also inform the person to be searched... that he is entitled to a copy of the record of the search if he asks for it within a year. If the person wishes to have a copy and is not given one on the spot, he shall be advised to which police station he should apply (para. 2.6).*

*An officer who has carried out a search must make a written record unless it is not practicable to do so, on account of the numbers to be searched or for some other operational reason, e.g. in situations involving public disorder (para. 4.1).*

*The record must be completed as soon as practicable - on the spot unless circumstances (e.g. other immediate duties or very bad weather) make this impracticable (para. 4.2).*

There has been a significant body of research that has considered the impact of PACE since its introduction (for summaries see, for example, Reiner, 1997; Dixon, 1997). A Home Office review of this research (Brown, 1997) pointed to a number of outstanding areas of concern with police searches:

- Doubts that police officers always carry out searches on the basis of reasonable suspicion. The inadequate completion of search records makes it difficult for supervisors to monitor whether this requirement has been met.
- Many searches are carried out with the consent of the person stopped, although it is likely that such consent is rarely informed<sup>3</sup>. Searches carried out with consent are often not officially recorded.
- PACE may have had limited impact on police search practice.

<sup>3</sup> The Metropolitan Police have recently sought to discourage the use of voluntary searches.

### Police stops

There is a much wider range of police-initiated contacts with members of the public which do not involve searches and may be described simply as stops. They occur for a variety of reasons, including where:

- An officer stops someone with a view to a search, but has their suspicions allayed after a conversation - this may often involve detaining the person under PACE powers.
- An officer stops a vehicle under Section 163 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (RTA). This section gives a uniformed officer the power to stop any "mechanically propelled vehicle" or bicycle being driven on the road. There is no requirement for an officer using this power to suspect the driver of having committed any offence. There is also no associated requirement to make any record of the stop. Section 164 of the RTA gives an officer the power to require the driver of a motor vehicle to produce their driving license. If the driver does not have the documents present at the time, they may be required to present them at a police station within seven days of the stop. Failure to do so is an offence. An officer enforces the requirement by issuing an HO/RT1 form<sup>4</sup>.
- An officer stops a vehicle that has committed a moving traffic offence or has a vehicle defect (this can also involve a breathalyser).
- An officer stops somebody on a voluntary basis, perhaps because they have some suspicions about the person (although not necessarily grounds for a search), or because they think the person may have some useful information.

<sup>4</sup> Home Office Road Traffic 1 form (HO/RT1) is issued by officers to specify which documents the driver must produce (commonly license, insurance and MOT) within seven days at a police station specified by the driver.

In highlighting minority ethnic communities' concerns about police stops, the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report made particular reference to vehicle stops under the Road Traffic Act (see extract in introduction). It is thus significant to note the lack of any existing recording requirement associated with this power to stop vehicles. Such a requirement in relation to the power to search was regarded as a central element of the public safeguards embodied in PACE.

The above discussion highlights that the Inquiry's recommendations for stops and searches should be understood, in part, as additions to existing requirements under PACE. Research on the impact of PACE has suggested there continues to be significant problems with officers' compliance with these requirements. For searches, recommendation 61 can be seen as an attempt to strengthen the PACE provision that a person has a right to a record of a search if asked for within 12 months. It places the onus on the officer to provide a record at the time of the search. Recommendation 61 extends this recording requirement to also include "statutory and non-statutory" stops such as those under section 163 of the RTA for which there is no existing recording requirement.

### **Regulating police practice**

Research has also considered how rules impact on police practice more generally.

An important 'discovery' in early studies of the police was that discretion is greatest at the lowest level (the police constable) and that decisions taken by police officers when dealing with members of the public are marked by 'low visibility', and are thus invisible to supervisors and effectively 'unreviewable'. This is particularly true of decisions not to enforce the law. This discovery will be well recognised by the modern police manager. Yet it remains an enduring problem at the heart of any attempt to regulate how officers behave on the street, and specifically in their use and conduct of stops and searches.

The relationship between policing practice and legal rules has been explored most recently, and comprehensively, by Dixon (1997). From literature and debates on policing, he identifies three principal perspectives on what impacts on police practice relating to:

- the law;
- police culture; and
- broader structural factors.

### *The law*

From this perspective, the law is regarded as the major determinant of police activity. Problems with police practices are typically seen as arising from ambiguities or gaps in the law, calling for clearer interpretations or further legislative action. Once legal rules are clearly formulated, it is assumed the police will act in accordance with them.

A study of the MPS by the Policy Studies Institute (PSI) (Smith and Gray, 1985) challenges this approach, suggesting that the influence of individual legal rules can differ. This depends on whether they are viewed as:

- working rules – which are internalised by officers and guide their behaviour;
- inhibitory rules – they are not internalised but are still taken account of during decision-making; or
- presentational rules – these have no effect on officers' behaviour and are simply used to justify police activities.

Dixon (1997) argues that this ignores the cumulative effect of groups of rules. He also says that it is important to include other types of rules, namely:

- reactive rules – created by police management in response to specific incidents; and
- routinised rules – which may have been initially effective, but are now followed in a ritual fashion, with little thought.

Dixon argues for the need to appreciate the process of change and variation in the impact of rules. In other words, the influence of rules is not fixed and uniform. This emphasises the importance of considering the context in which rules are introduced and expected to work.

### *Police culture*

From this perspective, police culture plays the most important role in shaping police practice. The law is not regarded as providing a template for policing; rather, it is used to achieve goals valued in police culture. But there are problems with this view:

- it takes for granted that there is such a thing as 'police culture';
- it minimises the significance of decision-making by individual officers;
- culture is not necessarily universal or permanent (Foster, 1989); and
- police culture can change over time. Legal regulation has contributed to shifts in culture since the mid 1980s (Dixon, 1997).

### *Broader structural factors*

From this perspective, police practice is most significantly affected by the structure in which the police work and the role they play in society. The following draws out important points from four related schools of thought (from Dixon, 1997):

- A 'realist' perspective concedes that legal rules have a limited but important role in regulating police activity. But it also highlights a need to take into account the broader context in which rules and practice are situated:
  - Rules importantly differ in terms of their status; the sanctions associated with them; how specific they are; and how they are enforced. This will affect their impact.
  - The effect of rules will be significantly influenced by the context in which they are introduced. For example, a rule may impact differently in different organisations.
- The 'independent office' of police constables causes problems for regulating behaviour because it creates a legal vacuum. This allows police culture to grow and structure officers' decision-making. Legal regulation can increase accountability by 'tightening the rules'.
- There is an important dichotomy between the theory of legality (respect for due process), and the reality of legal rules and procedures (in which due process is routinely breached). Instead of studying how the practices of officers are permitted and created in law, what 'legality' means must be looked at instead.
- Police culture is affected by the role and function of the police in society. Legal reform has failed to penetrate this culture because police practice is structured by working rules and not legal rules. But this approach fails to take account of the complex interaction between culture and the law.

The above gives a broad summary of the debate about the limitations and difficulties of regulating police practice. It points to differing explanations about why there are mismatches between rules and police practice. We need to keep these in mind through the evaluation, pointing to areas we need to explore to understand how and why the pilot recording rules are or are not followed by police officers.

### What were the aims of the Inquiry's recommendations?

Recommendation 61 of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report recommended the following changes to the recording requirements for police stops and police searches:

1. A record should be made of all police searches.
2. A record should be made of all police stops.
3. The record should include the reason for, and outcome of, the stop or search, and how the person stopped describes their own ethnic background.
4. A copy of the record should be given to the person stopped or searched at the time.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Strictly, the recommendation does not explicitly state that a record should be given at the time. For the purposes of the pilot, such a provision is assumed as implicit in the spirit of the recommendation.

Many of these changes have been considered or recommended in reports of previous research on stops and searches. The following examples illustrate this:

- The provision of a copy of the search record completed at the time was recommended in the report on the Tottenham experiment (NACRO, 1997).
- The recording of all searches, to include voluntary searches, was considered in an earlier report on research in North London (Young, 1994).
- The recording of police stops was considered, and rejected, by research on stops and searches prior to the introduction of PACE (Willis, 1983).
- The use of a self-defined ethnic classification was recommended in a recent report which highlighted disproportionate levels of searches among the Irish living in north London (Mooney and Young, 1999).

Lessons from the preceding discussion provide an important context for the current evaluation. They also highlight important issues for consideration as intended outcomes of the Inquiry's recommendations.

The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report does not explicitly state the specific outcomes intended by its recommended changes to the recording of stops and searches. It does, however, highlight the need for the police to build confidence and trust in the fair operation of stops and searches. It highlights the importance of demonstrating fairness, through openness and accountability, in order to generate trust and confidence within minority ethnic communities.

The recommendation to record all stops and searches might provide a basis for accountability in three ways:

- *individual accountability* – directly to anyone stopped through the requirement to provide a written explanation of the stop;

- *supervisory accountability* – it might allow supervising officers to hold officers to account for their use of stops and searches; and
- *public accountability* – statistics generated from these records might form the basis for forces to be held publicly accountable for their use of stops and searches.

The Report also highlights that “the minority communities’ views and perceptions are formed by their experiences of all ‘stops’ by the police” and states that “it is essential to obtain a true picture of the interactions between the police and minority ethnic communities in this context” (para. 46.31). The recommendation to record all police stops can be considered as a possible basis, therefore, of achieving a statistical picture that is broader than simply the number of recorded police searches and better reflects the range of encounters that impact on the views of minority ethnic communities.

Our review of previous research on stops and searches and on the impact of PACE points to a need to also consider the effect of the recommended changes on the way officers conduct and record searches. The review has also emphasised that the relationship between rules and police practice is complex and problematic, particularly so for stops and searches. So it will be important to consider whether, in fact, recommendation 61 is consistently put in to practice by officers and, if not, how this might be explained.

### 3. The pilot and evaluation

In this section we begin by describing the design, development and conduct of the pilot before setting out the design of the evaluation and the specific research elements within it.

#### What is a 'stop'?

PACE gives officers with "grounds for reasonable suspicion" the right "to detain for the purposes of search [emphasis added]". There is no related coercive power for stops by the police outside the provisions of PACE, which rely on the consent and co-operation of the person stopped, although the general public are unlikely to be aware of this distinction<sup>6</sup>. There is thus no formalised definition of what a police stop is. An important element in the design of the pilot was thus the development of such a definition.

<sup>6</sup> PACE Code A states: "This code does not affect the ability of an officer to speak to or question a person in the ordinary course of his duties (and in the absence of reasonable suspicion) without detaining him or exercising any element of compulsion. It is not the purpose of this code to prohibit such encounters between the police and the community with the co-operation of the person concerned and neither does it affect the principle that all citizens have a duty to help police officers to prevent crime and discover offenders" (Note for Guidance 1B).

The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) had independently planned to pilot the Inquiry's recommendations as an additional element of its Programme of Action on searches (see Fitzgerald, 1999a, 1999b) and had already developed a definition by the time the Home Office pilot was being set up. In consultation with the MPS and based on advice from Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), the following definition was agreed for the pilot:

*When a police officer requests a person to account for their actions, behaviour or possession of anything the encounter will be regarded as a 'stop' for the purposes of this pilot. This will apply if the person is on foot, driving or riding any vehicle, or is a passenger in or on such a vehicle.*

The following was produced as associated guidance:

*It therefore does not include general conversations, giving directions or when seeking witnesses to an incident or an offence. Where, however, a person submits to a **voluntary** search or to the **voluntary** search of a vehicle in his or her charge, this must be appropriately recorded.*

The definition was first piloted in Hounslow. The borough was to have been a site for the MPS pilot and so started as an initial 'test-site' in advance of the beginning of the Home Office pilot in other areas. As part of this process, we conducted some early exploratory interviews with officers in Hounslow, particularly to examine the workability of this definition. It was clear from these interviews that the definition, on its own, provided too little guidance to officers about which of the broad range of encounters with the public should be regarded as 'recordable stops'. Officers working on community beats expressed particular concerns about the frequent informal 'low-

level' stops they conducted to gain community intelligence and also to monitor known prolific offenders. It was likely during the process of these encounters that some 'accounting' was called for by the person stopped. Officers were concerned about having to record them and how this might impact on their working practice.

As a result, PRC agreed to develop a set of 'rules of engagement' as further guidance (see Appendix A). This guidance worked from the agreed definition and aimed to delineate a set of types of encounter which should be recorded as 'stops' for the purpose of the pilot. It was developed in close consultation with policy colleagues in the Operational Policing Policy Unit (now Police Leadership and Powers Unit), representatives from the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), the pilot forces and local senior management from the sites. The process proved to be difficult and required some negotiation to develop rules which fulfilled the requirements of recommendation 61 but which were considered as operationally workable for the pilot. The guidance was subsequently endorsed by the Lawrence Steering Group, set up by the Home Secretary to oversee the Government's response to all the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry recommendations.

We also developed some associated guidance to be used by the pilot sites in preparing training for their officers (see Appendix B). This guidance drew heavily from insights gained in Hounslow and highlighted measures to minimise any problematic public reactions to the new forms, such as giving clear explanations of the pilot and the reason for asking people to describe their own ethnic origin.

### **The pilot**

#### *The pilot sites*

Pilot sites were selected to ensure that the recommendations were tested across a range of policing contexts. Any consistent changes across the sites could thus be more confidently regarded as reflecting the impact of the piloted changes, rather than as a local product of any particular policing environment. The selection covered both metropolitan and county forces, in the north and south of the country, urban, suburban and rural areas, and different mixes of ethnic population.

In consultation with the ACPO Race and Community Relations Committee, Leicestershire Constabulary, Suffolk Constabulary and West Yorkshire Police agreed to participate in the pilot. The MPS agreed to the involvement of Greenwich Borough in addition to Hounslow. Both sites were also part of the MPS's own pilot work on searches. Table 1 summarises the characteristics of the specific areas within the forces chosen for the pilot.

Hounslow Borough, MPS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● covers Hounslow, Feltham, Chiswick, Brentford and Isleworth.</li> <li>● majority white population but significant minority ethnic, specifically Indian comprising almost a fifth of the borough's population.</li> </ul>
Greenwich Borough, MPS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● covers Greenwich, Eltham and Plumstead.</li> <li>● predominantly urban area.</li> <li>● mixed population.</li> </ul>
Chapelton District, West Yorkshire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● covers NE Leeds from Chapelton in the south to Wetherby in the north.</li> <li>● mix of deprived inner city out to affluent rural.</li> <li>● Chapelton has a high minority ethnic population, including a well-established black community. Wetherby is predominantly white.</li> </ul>
Southern Area, Suffolk	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● covers Ipswich town and the rural areas of south Suffolk.</li> <li>● predominantly white population.</li> </ul>
Leicester Central Area, Leicestershire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● covers Leicester city centre and two residential areas (east and west of city centre).</li> <li>● west end near to university, thus a large mixed student population; east has high Asian and smaller black population.</li> </ul>

*The design of the pilot*

The pilot comprised two elements:

- trialling the viability of implementing the recommendations; and
- trialling alternative methods of implementing specific elements, namely:
  - two different methods of obtaining the self-defined ethnicity of the person stopped; and
  - two different designs of form to record both stops and searches.

*Self-defined ethnicity*

1. The use of an open question to the person stopped, recorded as free-text on the form. Based on advice from the Commission for Racial Equality to the MPS, officers were advised to word the question: "How would you describe your ethnic background?"
2. The use of a fixed-response card, based on the 2001 census ethnic origin categories (see Appendix C), from which the person stopped would be asked to

choose the category which best describes their racial origin, which would be so recorded on the stop form.

The primary aim of the test was to discover whether one of these methods was significantly easier for officers to administer. Officers were also asked to make their own ethnic classification using the existing police identity codes (based on the PNC six-point classification). This allowed comparisons to be drawn on how well the self-classification fits the police classification. This was important because of the possible implications of any change for ethnic monitoring of stops and/or searches, specifically that currently published under s95 of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act.

### *Stop form design*

As part of earlier work on force management initiatives (see Quinton and Bland, 1999), we knew that some forces had begun to use, or were considering, an integrated form that combined the search record with the HO/RT1 (the 'producer') and VDRS forms<sup>7</sup>. The pilot offered an opportunity to assess the practicality of such a move. The pilot thus trialled the following two designs of form:

1. A form to record all stops and all searches; and
2. A form that includes the above but also integrates HO/RT1 and VDRS elements.

The primary aim of this trial was to allow evaluation of how easy the forms were to use, whether their design led to any confusion and subsequent inaccurate recording. It would also test whether the integration of HO/RT1 on one form led to a substantial increase or decrease in the total number issued by officers, and as a proportion of all stops.

This required all the pilot forces to re-design their current search forms. The MPS had already made substantial changes to the design of the search record as part of its pilot work. The biggest change involved moving from a small pad of search forms to a much larger individual search record (approximately twice the length). Key changes to this included a much enlarged section for the recording of grounds and the inclusion of an outer cover which summarised the search powers available to the police and people's rights.

For the pilot, the MPS design was refined to record both stops and searches, and included a carbonated counterfoil copy of the record. This design was used by the MPS and by West Yorkshire. Suffolk and Leicestershire worked together to design the combined form. It too included an outer cover describing people's rights and police powers, but included three counterfoil copies. The extra two were for

<sup>7</sup> The Vehicle Defect Rectification Scheme form (VDRS) is used to identify illegal defects on a vehicle and requires the driver of a vehicle to have them mended and to provide proof of this to a police station.

HO/RT1 and VDRS elements that a person stopped would need to show at a police station. All the forms included open text fields to record the reason and outcome of the stop and the self-defined ethnicity as required under recommendation 61. Using this format the police officer would tear out and keep the carbonated copy of the record and give the rest of it to the member of the public at the time of the stop or search (see Appendix D for examples of the two designs).

The two elements to be trialled were spread across the four forces thus:

**Table 2: Summary of piloted elements**

	Self-defined ethnicity	Form design
MPS <sup>8</sup>	open question	stop form
Leicestershire	open question	stop form with integrated HO/RT1 and VDRS
West Yorkshire	fixed response	stop form
Suffolk	fixed response	stop form with integrated HO/RT1 and VDRS

<sup>8</sup> Early negative feedback from patrol officers in Hounslow led to senior management concerns about the original form design. As a result, changes were made to the form. A tear-off slip was designed for the stop record which used three fixed codes to record the reason for the stop (crime, traffic, other) and omitted any record of the person's name and address. A set of pre-defined ethnic categories were also developed and used to record self-defined ethnicity. The new design was used from September 1999 until the end of the pilot.

### Preparations for the pilot

The conduct of the pilot and evaluation was overseen by a steering group chaired by PRC. The group included representatives from the pilot forces, ACPO, the Association of Police Authorities (APA), HMIC and Home Office policy and research colleagues.

### Training

In preparation for the beginning of the pilot, all the sites provided training to their front-line operational officers. The scheduling of this training was somewhat problematic for the forces as it required a significant number of officers to be trained and had to be fitted in around the shift rota patterns these officers worked.

The format and content of officer training was broadly similar across each of the pilot sites. In most cases, training was delivered to shift groups of about 10-20 officers, and consisted of a presentation followed by an opportunity for questions. The content of the presentation tended to cover four main areas:

- the background to the pilot, including the relevant findings and recommendations of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry;
- refresher training on formal PACE search powers (with the exception of Leicester where future training was already planned);
- the specific recording requirements of the pilot (e.g. the recording of stops in addition to searches); and

- introduction of the new form and explanations of how to fill it in.

There was some variation in terms of who delivered the training. In Chapeltown, for example, the inspector with overall responsibility for implementing the pilot provided an input on the pilot itself, and an area trainer covered officers' formal search powers. In contrast, the area trainer in central Leicester delivered all of the training package.

While officers in each of the pilot sites were given training on how to implement the recommendations, it was clear that there were differences in the way the pilot was presented or 'sold' to officers. In one pilot site, for example, considerable emphasis was placed on communicating to officers the potential benefits of the pilot in terms of rationalising paperwork and how the form might provide a useful safeguard against vexatious complaints.

### ***Public awareness***

Recommendation 63 proposes that Police Authorities should have a duty to run publicity campaigns with regard to the recording requirements set out in recommendation 61. This would be an important issue for any national implementation of the recommendations.

All the sites took measures to raise local awareness of the purpose of the pilot. This tended to be through standard consultative channels, which varied according to local circumstances. They typically involved contacts with at least some of the following local groups:

- Police Community Consultative Groups;
- the Police Authority;
- Crime and Disorder partnerships;
- Commission for Race Equality;
- Race Equality Council;
- various community fora; and
- Neighbourhood Watch groups.

There was also wider media publicity of the pilots in certain sites. Press coverage was given to the pilot in Hounslow, Chapeltown and Ipswich. The latter two sites also received local radio and television publicity respectively.

### ***Timing***

It had been planned that the pilot would begin in all the other pilot sites in October 1999. However, difficulties in scheduling officer training and in printing the new

stop and search forms meant that there was a staggered start across the sites. All the sites had begun the pilot by the end of November 1999. The pilot ran for six months until the end of May 2000. The evaluation is based on data collected over that period. All the sites have decided to continue with the new recording until a decision is made by the Home Office about any national changes.

### The evaluation

The evaluation focused on examining how the piloted recommendations had worked in practice and judging their impact. Two principles governed the evaluation:

- To consider the impact of the changes in terms of the issues raised by the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report and other problems raised by previous research.
- To focus it towards overall conclusions about the changes and the viability of national implementation, drawing together the experiences of the five sites. This would limit detailed evaluation of the impact of the pilot at the individual site level.

We considered the aims of the Inquiry's recommendations at the end of the previous chapter. Identifying specific possible outcomes of the changes was essential for focusing the evaluation on the key questions to be covered. It also needed to be sensitive to the likely possibility that the changes would also have unintended (and possibly perverse) outcomes. The methodological design of the evaluation sought to ensure that any such unintended outcomes would be identified.

The *key evaluation questions* are set out below, as far as possible, under the appropriate 'headline' outcome.

Table 3: Headline outcomes and key evaluation questions

Headline outcome	Key evaluation questions
Increased and improved monitoring and accountability of stops and searches	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Do the statistics on stops derived from the records provide an accurate picture of the police-public interactions on the street? Does it provide useful monitoring information?</li> <li>● Does the recording of self-defined ethnicity provide more accurate ethnic monitoring data than currently available?</li> <li>● Is the level of un-recorded searches reduced?</li> <li>● Does the form act as a form of direct accountability to anyone stopped or searched? Are officers more likely to tell someone why they have been stopped or searched?</li> <li>● Do the records of stops and of searches provide a better basis for supervision?</li> <li>● Are statistics generated from these records an accurate basis for forces to be held publicly accountable for their use of stops and searches?</li> </ul>
Improvements in officers' stop and search practice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Does the requirement to give a record to the person stopped mean officers think more carefully about the justification for a stop?</li> <li>● In the case of a search do officers think more carefully about whether they have reasonable grounds?</li> <li>● Are officers more likely to make a record of any search they conduct?</li> <li>● Are officers more likely to record voluntary searches? Are they less likely to conduct voluntary searches?</li> </ul>
Improved public trust and confidence in police use of stops and searches	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Do the changes to recording practices increase trust and confidence in the conduct of police stops and searches, particularly by people from minority ethnic groups?</li> <li>● Is the opportunity to describe their own ethnic origin regarded as a positive exercise by people stopped?</li> <li>● Are stops and searches perceived as more likely to be fair if conducted under the changes?</li> <li>● Are people stopped more satisfied as a result of the provision of a record?</li> </ul>

Early indications from the pilot suggested the following issues should be considered as possible unintended negative outcomes:

- Are the changes more likely to alienate or antagonise people involved in street encounters with the police, through:
  - being delayed longer for completion of the form?
  - being asked to define their ethnic origin?
  - being asked personal details and having a form completed when the police have simply spoken to them?
- Do the changes significantly reduce officers' efficiency and effectiveness through
  - time spent completing forms? or
  - officers being less inclined generally to engage with the public on the street?
- Does the requirement to complete the form at the time mean that the grounds for search are articulated less well for the record?

The evaluation also monitored the impact of the pilot on the ongoing level and effectiveness of search activity in the sites. This involved a focus on the following, what might be termed, maintenance questions:

- Had there been any significant change in the number of searches conducted?
- Had the number of arrests from searches changed significantly?
- Had the proportion of arrests from searches changed significantly?
- Had there been a significant change in levels of crime?
- Had there been a change in levels of disproportionality?

The evaluation also examined and compared the 'workability' of the two methods of recording self-defined ethnicity and the two different designs of stop form.

### *Evaluation design*

The evaluation was designed to provide a basis for conclusions about the overall impact of the pilot while retaining a sensitivity to any clear differences between the sites. The focus was thus:

- how the four specific changes recommended by the Inquiry Report operated in practice;
- whether the changes were workable;
- the impact of the two different stop forms and methods of recording self-defined ethnicity; and

- the impact of the changes, focusing on whether and how they produced the outcomes detailed previously.

The evaluation aimed to identify whether or not specific outcomes had been a product of the changes but also to explain how the changes produced those outcomes. The evaluation comprised four main elements:

- interviews with operational police officers and senior managers;
- direct observation of stops and searches in practice;
- interviews and discussion groups with people stopped under the pilot; and
- statistics derived from the records of stops and searches.

● **Interviews with police officers**

Interviews were conducted with a sample of 90 operational police constables and sergeants working primarily on shift but also on community teams. The interviews took place at the beginning of the pilot after it had been running for about three or four weeks. Table 4 provides a breakdown of the sample across the pilot sites.

Pilot site	PCs	PSs	Total
Greenwich	17	4	21
Hounslow	11	2	13
Ipswich	14	3	17
Chapeltown	15	4	19
Central Leicester	15	5	20
<b>Total</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>90</b>

The interviews explored officers' early views and experiences of how the changes worked in practice in the first few weeks of the pilot. They focused primarily on officers recording practices, whether and how the practice of stops and searches had changed and officers' experiences with the public.

In the final month of the pilot, we returned to the pilot sites to re-interview the same sample of officers. Primarily, we explored whether and how officers' views and experiences had changed over the course of the pilot. Forty-six officers were re-interviewed. The others were unavailable for a variety of reasons - their shift pattern precluded it, they had transferred to other duties or to another force, or they were on rest days or sick leave. In addition, we also interviewed a sample of 17 inspectors

and more senior managers to explore further issues of accountability and supervision, the practice of stops and searches and their general views on the impact of the pilot.

### ● Observations

The observations were carried out after the pilot had been running for about four months and covered 40 complete operational shifts, representing over 340 hours. Eight shifts were observed in each site: late turns (generally, 2-10pm) and night shifts (generally, 10pm-6am) from Wednesday to Saturday in one week. The days and shifts were purposely selected to maximise the number of stops and searches likely to be observed. The observations were recorded after each shift: a pro-forma was completed for every individual 'recordable' encounter between a police officer and a member of the public; a quantitative summary sheet recorded the number and type of every police-public contact; and a narrative account of the whole shift was also written. The pro-forma primarily recorded information on the type of stop, the characteristics of the encounter, and whether and how the form was used. Pro-formas were completed for 149 individual encounters, of which 138 were coded as 'recordable' encounters. The types of encounter observed are broken down in Table 5.

<sup>9</sup> Throughout the report, tables may total over 100% due to rounding.

<sup>10</sup> Certain vehicle stops were excluded from the pilot recording requirement (see Appendix A). These were recorded for the purposes of the observations.

Type of encounter	Proportion (%)
Pedestrian stop	42
Pedestrian search	12
Driver stop (recordable)	30
Driver stop (non-recordable) <sup>10</sup>	6
Driver/vehicle search	1
Passenger stop	8
Unclear	1
<b>All</b>	<b>100 (149)</b>

The ethnic breakdown of the individuals in recordable encounters is presented in Table 6 below. No conclusions should be drawn in relation to disproportionality from these figures.

The observations complemented the interviews with officers by allowing a first-hand check on the issues they raised. It also allowed better understanding of how and why

Observer defined ethnicity (PNC coding)	Proportion (%)
White European	71
Dark European	1
Black	12
Asian	15
Oriental	1
<b>All</b>	<b>100 (138)</b>

changes relating to stop and search practice and monitoring (particularly in relation to recording practices) were, or were not, achieved.

● **Interviews and discussion groups with the public**

A qualitative approach was selected for this element of the evaluation because of its clear advantages over surveys and other more quantitative methods for the purposes of exploratory research. As interviews and discussion groups encourage in-depth discussions, they can provide more detailed information on issues than statistical measures alone. In particular, a qualitative approach allowed us to explore in detail the views and concerns of the public, and to examine the perceptions as well as the experiences of being stopped or searched. Qualitative techniques are useful to find out what the public expect from encounters with the police and can also unpack what people felt the Inquiry’s recommendations provided. Furthermore, recent quantitative surveys of people who had been searched, for example for the Metropolitan and Hampshire police, have had prohibitively low response rates.

The work was contracted to the specialist qualitative division of British Market Research Bureau (BMRB). It comprised face-to-face depth interviews with individuals stopped by the police during the pilot and discussion groups with members of the local communities on the pilot sites, covering a total of 159 people. This aimed to:

- explore people’s views and experiences of stops and searches during the pilot; and
- investigate views more generally on the use of stops and searches by the police.

Fifty-five depth interviews were carried out with individuals who had been stopped or searched during the pilot period. The sample was purposively selected using a pre-set quota. This placed an emphasis on people most likely to be stopped by the police - those from minority ethnic groups, the young and males. It became apparent

## THE PILOT AND EVALUATION

during the recruitment process that there was limited use of the form in the pilot sites. Recruiters tried to ensure that as many respondents as possible had at least seen the form. The sampling process precludes inferences to be drawn on rates of stops or use of the form from the sample profiles below (Table 7).

**Table 7: Interview sample by sampling criteria**

Sampling criteria	Sample (n=55)						
Ethnic background	White	Black Caribbean	Black African	Black Other	Indian	Pakistani	Total
<b>Gender</b>							
Male	18	6	8	2	9	6	49
Female	2	–	1	1	1	1	6
<b>Age</b>							
14-18	8	–	2	–	2	3	15
19-25	8	2	1	1	6	–	18
26-40	4	4	6	2	2	4	22
<b>Type of stop</b>							
Stopped	6	2	2	1	4	5	20
Searched	10	4	7	2	3	5	31
Arrested*	4	–	–	–	–	–	4
<b>Form</b>							
Seen, offered or given	12	3	9	2	8	3	37
Unseen	9	2	–	1	2	4	18
<b>Pilot site</b>							
Chapelton	5	–	1	1	–	3	10
Greenwich	1	2	6	–	–	1	10
Hounslow	3	2	2	2	3	–	12
Ipswich	9	2	–	–	–	–	11
Leicester	2	–	–	–	7	3	12

Note: \*Following stop or search encounter.

Twelve discussion groups were carried out with people from the wider community, including a range of ages and minority ethnic groups to explore general views on the use of stops and searches and its perceived impact on the local community. In total

104 people took part in the discussion groups. The groups were constructed as follows (Table 8):

Ethnic Group	18-29 year olds	30-55 year olds
White	Leeds: male only	Greenwich: male and female
White	Ipswich: male and female	Hounslow: male and female
Black African	Greenwich: male only	Hounslow: male and female
Black Caribbean	Leeds: male only	Ipswich: male and female
Asian Pakistani	Leicester: male only	Leeds: male only
Asian Indian	Hounslow: male only	Leicester: female only

The sample profile for respondents in the discussion groups was as follows (Table 9):

Sampling criteria	Sample (n=104)	
Ethnic background	White	37
	Black African	13
	Black Caribbean	20
	Indian	19
	Pakistani	15
Gender	Female	34
	Male	70
Age	18-29	57
	30-55	47

● **Police statistics**

Statistics derived from the police records completed under the pilot provide the basis for examining the pilot affected levels of searches, arrests and disproportionality. Comparisons were made with figures from other areas in the pilot forces and with figures from the pilot sites over the same period last year. The statistics were also used to assess changes in relation to monitoring and accountability.

## THE PILOT AND EVALUATION

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The methodological design of the evaluation deliberately employed this 'mixed-method' approach to collect data that could illuminate different aspects of the pilot as well as provide complementary data in the same areas. In this way we sought to ensure that no element of the evaluation was reliant solely on the strengths (and weaknesses) of any one method. Table 10 outlines how data from the four main elements of the evaluation contributed to the specific evaluation outcomes.

Evaluation outcomes	Evaluation methods			
	Officer interviews	Observations	Public interviews and discussion groups	Police statistics
Monitoring and accountability	X	X	X	X
Officer practice	X	X		
Public trust and confidence		X	X	
Maintenance questions	X			X

## 4. Results: monitoring and accountability I

The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report was clear that the police needed to demonstrate fairness in the way they both stopped and searched ethnic minorities through greater openness and accountability. This would be achieved through improved and increased monitoring of stops and searches. The changes to the recording of stops and searches recommended in the Report would provide the basis for this monitoring and accountability. In this chapter and the next, we examine the impact of the pilot in relation to these issues.

In this chapter:

- we evaluate the accuracy of the picture produced by looking closely at officers' recording practices;
- using the records collected during the pilot, we then explore the feasibility of using them to produce meaningful monitoring information; and
- also explore whether completion of a record at the time provides a basis for greater 'on-the-spot' accountability.

The following chapter evaluates the requirement to record a person's own description of their ethnicity and the impact of the new form.

### Officers' recording practices

Results from both the interviews and observations shed light on officers' recording practices. There was a great deal of variation in the number of searches and stops officers had conducted. Some officers reported, at the time of the first interview that they were yet to have conducted either a stop or a search, others reported stop numbers in the tens or twenties. This variation seemed to be a result of differences in the policing style of individual officers or a function of the work or shift pattern they were doing.

#### *Recording at the time*

Recommendation 61 proposed that records of stops and searches should be given to the person at the time of the encounter. As we discussed in Chapter 2, the existing PACE Code A requirement is that a search is 'recorded on the spot unless circumstances make this impracticable'. A person is entitled to a copy of the record if they ask for it within a year of the search. In practice, however, it is likely that most records of searches are completed later by officers. Anecdotal evidence from some of the pilot sites confirmed this; it was routine practice not to record searches at the time. Only a 'handful' of people had applied in the last year for a copy of their search record, prior to the pilot.

Of the officers interviewed, only a minority reported having completed a record at the time for all the stops or all the searches they had conducted in the fortnight prior to interview. The attitude of one such officer was:

*[It's] common-sense to complete at the time, will get forgotten about otherwise, that's the reason for the format-get it done there and then.*

(Chapeltown PC, 12 years service)

Other officers thought similarly; explaining that they felt it was as easy to do "there and then" and actually saved work, "saves duplicating work, just as easy to fill out there and then."

Another officer, though saying the form took longer to complete, was supportive and regarded the change as a positive development:

*Takes a bit longer, but fill in properly at the time then that will help in the long term. I like it.*

(Central Leicester PC, 3 years service)

We asked officers at the return interviews whether they regarded it as important to complete a record at the time. Most, across all sites, did not think it was.

### *Reasons for recording later*

Officers gave a range of explanations why forms were not filled out at the time, for example:

- the person did not wait for the form;
- it was not 'practical' to do so (examples given included: poor weather, a large crowd of people were present, no forms were available);
- to prevent further delay to the person stopped; and
- the use of a form would formalise the encounter.

The following two interview extracts illustrate officers' views on this final point:

*[Form] doesn't lend itself to flow of conversation... helps to talk naturally... booklet has to go away sometimes.*

(Chapeltown PC, 12 years service)

*Officers with more experience will not go through this formal process.*

(Greenwich Permanent Beat Officer (PBO), 14 years service)

*Non-recording*

The observations revealed that there was a high proportion of encounters which fell within the recording rules for which officers did not complete a pilot form at all. Table 11 provides a breakdown of officers' form-filling activities in all the 138 encounters which warranted a form.

Form-filling activity	Searches (no.)	Stops (%)	Total (%)
Completed fully at the time	9	19	23
Completed partially, finished later	4	2	4
Completed partially, not finished later	1	0	1
Completed later	4	1	4
No evidence of completion	2	79	69
<b>All</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>100% (118)</b>	<b>100% (138)</b>

As the table shows, a form was completed fully at the time in under a quarter of all cases. A form was at least started (but finished later) in 4% of cases. Recording under the provisions of recommendation 61 was thus complied with (or attempted) in 27% of the encounters we observed. We saw no evidence that a form was fully completed in 70% of cases.

Table 11 also indicates that forms were more often completed for searches than for stops. We only observed the conduct of 20 searches, but in over half (13) of them forms were completed (or started) at the time; this was the case for only 21% of the stops we observed. A record was not made (or started but not completed) for three (almost one sixth) of the searches we observed; for stops, the figure was 79%.

It was possible that some forms may have been completed by officers out of our view or after the period of observation. We thus later checked all the recordable encounters we observed going unrecorded against the pilot site data sent to PRC. We found records that looked a likely match for only five of these stops. This would reduce the level of under recording by no more than 4%.

We also explored how compliance with the recording requirements varied between sites but the numbers were too small to provide statistically significant results. It was interesting to note, nonetheless, that recording was highest in central Leicester and

Ipswich (about half of the recorded encounters) and lowest in the three sites from the two metropolitan forces (about one encounter in five recorded, on average).

### *Types of encounter*

We now explore the reasons for the levels of under-recording and begin by examining the types of encounters we observed between the police and the public.

We conducted further analysis of the recordable encounters by analysing and coding the narrative accounts of our observations. Once again, this emphasised the range and number of activities that take place in the process of such encounters. Our coding sought to focus on the primary purpose of the encounter and to make clear distinctions in terms of the recording rules that had been developed for the pilot. In this way, we wanted to examine how recording practices varied between:

- 'typical' stops - prompted by police suspicion and where people are called directly to account for their behaviour or presence; and
- stops in the 'grey area' - where an officer's activity is focused elsewhere and calling to account is a secondary or more minor aspect of the encounter.

Nine codes were developed as follows:

- Search – any search.
- Suspicion based – the 'typical' stop where an officer is suspicious about a person's actions and calls them directly to account e.g. person parked in a deserted car park known for drugs.
- Suspected drink drive – stop of a vehicle for suspected drink drive where passed breath-test.
- Road traffic advice or warning – vehicle stop prompted by observed or suspected motoring offence e.g. failure to display tax disc.
- Monitoring or check-up – checking names, whether wanted on warrant, e.g. 'routine' stops of prostitutes.
- Establishing background or involvement – finding out what has happened, getting sides of stories, general incidents but not sure what has happened e.g. man and woman arguing in street over custody of child. The officer tries to find out who has done what.
- Reprimand – order maintenance intervention with informal censure or warning.
- Peacekeeping – very similar to reprimand but with no informal censure e.g. stopping fights, moving people on.
- Don't know/other – remaining encounters.

This is summarised in Table 12.

Encounter type	Compliance (no.)	Non-compliance (no.)	Total
Search	12	8	20
Suspicion based	6	20	26
Suspected drink/drive	6	8	14
Road traffic advice or warning	6	18	24
Monitoring or check-up	1	10	11
Establishing background or involvement	0	13	13
Reprimand	2	14	16
Peace-keeping	0	9	9
Other	1	4	5
<b>All</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>138</b>

Note: Compliance is defined as when an officer recorded, or attempted to record an encounter but the person did not wish to wait. Non-compliance is defined as when an officer made no attempt to record, for whatever reason.

This shows some very clear differences in recording levels. Some types of encounter were very infrequently recorded. None of the stops where an officer was trying to establish someone's background or the nature of their involvement in an incident were recorded. These were often very complicated encounters with officers involved in long discussions with various parties to an incident. Stops primarily for peace-keeping or reprimand were also rarely recorded. In many such cases, officers seemed not to consider it might be a recordable stop. This seems likely to be because these stops were furthest removed from the 'typical' suspicion-based stop. Calling to account was more a minor, but routine, part of the process rather than being the primary, or driving, purpose of the stop. Other encounters, such as vehicle stops based on a drink/drive suspicion and searches, were much more likely to be recorded. Still, under a third of the 'typical' suspicion-led stops observed (for which calling to account is the primary purpose) were recorded. These differences point, at least in part, to practical difficulties in operating the recording guidance.

To illustrate, an example of this is where the level of police suspicion is low, and officers stop someone who has aroused their interest, even though there may be no strong suspicion of involvement in an offence. An encounter of this type is illustrated in Box 1, below.

### Box 1: Monitoring

We are driving along X and the officers spot a prostitute. They compare notes - neither recognise her - so they decide to stop and check her out. This appears to happen in part because they don't recognise her, and they want to know who she is, and perhaps also because they routinely check on the occasional prostitute. The encounter is very friendly. The girl knows the routine, and actually comes into the van without an invitation and without any resistance from the officers. She is keen to get out of the cold for a moment. She is asked if she is on bail or on warrant. She says no. She is asked her name and date of birth and a PNC check is carried out, which confirms her story. She is asked whether she has been arrested before? What drugs she is taking? ('Smack - what else?' she replies). She is 19, she explains she has a one-year-old daughter who has been taken from her by social services. The officers are warm to her. After the exchange, she gets out of the van, and the van is on its way again.

Box 2 provides an account of a peacekeeping encounter. In this case, the officers' priority in intervening is to impose their authority quickly on an incident of minor disorder. As they begin to achieve this, and things start to calm down, one officer calls a boy to account. But this is merely a minor part of the process of the stop, rather than the purpose of it. The requirement to record such a stop might well be regarded as running against the officers' initial priority to impose order on the situation.

### Box 2: Peacekeeping

3.00am. We go to the taxi rank area which is still busy with people. One of the officers spots the beginnings of a confrontation as, amongst a crowd of people, two lads are squaring up to one another. PC X drives the van onto the curb right up to where the fight is happening, and both PC Y and X leap out the van. Y grabs one of the lads - a black boy, whilst X starts talking to the other boy (white) - there are several hangers-on all getting involved. X appears to be asking the boy what has happened, and generally trying to calm the boy down. After a couple of minutes, things have calmed down a bit and other people involved are intervening to calm people down.

*Other factors in non-recording*

We also examined other factors that might be associated with an officer's likelihood of recording. These are summarised in Table 13.

Variable	Compliance rate (%)	Number of cases
<b>Duration of encounter</b>	***	
5 minutes or less	8	73
more than 5 minutes	44	63
<b>Duration of encounter (adjusted)</b>	***	
5 minutes or less	11	84
more than 5 minutes	48	52
<b>Did officer explain reason for stop?</b>	**	
yes	29	89
no	13	39
<b>PNC check</b>	**	
not carried out	19	98
carried out	38	40

*Notes:*

- Adjusted time taken involves subtracting 5 minutes for encounters where a form was filled in/attempted.
- Significance levels of  $p < 0.01$  are marked \*\*\*; significance levels of  $p < 0.05$  are marked \*\*.
- Excludes don't knows.

The above table shows that there are some interesting associations between the characteristics of an encounter and whether officers make a record. The strongest association is with the length of the encounter. 'Fleeting' encounters of less than five minutes were significantly less likely to be recorded than those of more than five minutes (even when the duration for these are adjusted downwards by five minutes to take account of time taken filling the form). Encounters where the officer explained the reason for the stop were also associated with recording, though less strongly. If a PNC check (on a person's name or vehicle registration) was carried out it was also more likely that a record was subsequently made. The use of a PNC check is likely to reflect higher police suspicion and the stop is thus likely to be more intrusive and formalised.

The finding on PNC checks is of particular interest because some pilot sites actively sought to measure recording compliance rates. This involved following up any encounter where a PNC 'name-check' had been put in by an officer (on the basis that the use of such a check signalled that the stop was likely to be one that should be recorded). The above result from our observations suggests that, across the sites as a whole, less than half of those encounters were recorded.

Both the interviews and the observations provide further explanation for the level of under-recording. There were certain types of stops some officers identified as less likely to be recorded, for example:

- 'routine' vehicle stops (e.g. giving advice);
- regular and routine contacts (e.g. with known prostitutes); and
- brief stops where suspicions are quickly allayed (e.g. looking for described suspects immediately after an incident).

It was also clear from the interviews that although the majority of officers knew and understood the definition of a stop developed for the pilot, some officers did not. For example, some of these officers were under the impression that any stop had to be recorded, others thought they did not have to record a vehicle stop if an HO/RT1 was issued. By the time the observations were carried out it also appeared that in some cases local interpretations of the rules had developed, often within shift teams but also across a pilot site. This led to different practices on, for example, the recording of vehicle stops involving breath-tests.

Other reasons for under-recording arose from the interviews, for example:

- if there was no intelligence or evidential value in the stop: "if they are known criminals I'll fill one in, that's good information to have, but Joe Bloggs, a good bloke, wouldn't bother";
- forgetting to do a form: "it's not coming naturally"; and
- not to delay the person stopped.

The levels of non-recording, even for searches and 'typical' suspicion-led stops, suggest that even when encounters conform closely to a typical 'recordable' situation, adherence to completing forms is not full. This surely must reflect some reluctance by officers to fully comply with recording requirements. An officer explained:

*Some informal searches not included, checking 'scallywags' - what's in their pockets. If arrest will do form.*

(Greenwich Community Beat Officer, 14 years service)

Some officers made explicit their views on the impact of non-recording:

*Not doing forms so the statistics are wrong.*  
(Central Leicester Sgt, 21 years service)

*It's not going to show an accurate picture of stops-not everyone completes them.*  
(Greenwich PC, 8 years service)

### Monitoring stops and searches

Having examined the recording practices of officers, we now assess the viability of the piloted changes for monitoring purposes.

Each of the pilot sites developed a system to collect completed stop forms and store the information from them on a dedicated database. Some forces, such as the MPS, had already developed such a database in relation to their own work on searches. Others, such as Ipswich, had to design one specifically for the pilot. Each site then sent regular 'data dumps' of records to PRC, roughly one month in arrears, for analysis. However, there were always some back-records that took longer to get through the process. Thus there was always a few months 'lag-time' before all the records for a particular month on a site had been entered on the local database and subsequently sent to PRC.

Data input at site level was also resource intensive. The requirement to record stops as well as searches significantly increased the number of forms to be input onto a database. This was particularly the case in Ipswich and central Leicester where the form also incorporated the HO/RT1. Both sites needed to employ an additional person to cope with the inputting. PRC funded this additional staff element. Extra part-time support for inputting was also required in Chapeltown.


Data management by PRC was complicated by the different designs of database on the sites and by the different coding conventions used when inputting the records. In the MPS, for example, searches were stored on a 'corporate' database (already designed and used for their pilot work) and stops were stored on another database developed specifically for the pilot. The process of data conversion to allow for comparable analysis across sites was, therefore, resource intensive.

The following analysis does not aim to provide a comprehensive statistical picture of each individual site. Rather, we aim to explore whether and how the recording changes piloted could provide the basis for enhanced monitoring through comparative analysis of key results. For example, we present results that combine

stops and searches (offering a more complete statistical picture of interactions between the police and the public) and others that distinguish between the two types of encounter. We draw on complete monthly records provided by the sites available at the time of writing. Details of the records are presented in Table 14.

	Number of records	Period
Greenwich	4,911	1 Dec 99 – 31 March 00
Hounslow	6,095	1 July 99 – 31 March 00
Ipswich	2,679	15 Nov 99 – 25 May 00
Chapeltown	4,781	22 Nov 99 – 23 May 00
Central Leicester	4,415	15 Nov 99 – 31 May 00

Figure 1 provides a breakdown of the way the forms were used in each pilot area.




The chart shows that there are important variations between forces in the way that the forms have been used. For central Leicester and Ipswich, both using the integrated form, about a fifth of forms have been devoted to non-recordable stops. These represent encounters where HO/RT1s have been filled-out on occasions that

do not fulfil the definition of a stop as laid down for the pilot (see Appendix A). These include road traffic accidents, or occasions where a VDRS or Fixed Penalty Notice (FPN) was issued.


The chart also shows that there are substantial variations in the balance of stops to searches between sites. Thus, while less than half of Greenwich and Hounslow records relate to stops, the majority of recorded encounters in the other sites relate to stops, with eight out of nine relating to stops in Ipswich.

Ethnic breakdowns of stops and searches also show some important differences between sites, which is likely to be closely linked to the demographic make-up of the sites, although it may also be linked to differing levels of disproportionality. Figure 2 presents the ethnic breakdowns of stops and searches for the pilot sites.



The chart shows that stops and searches of white people were most common in Ipswich (91%) and least common in Hounslow (54%). The dominant minority ethnic group also varies between areas, with the highest proportion of Asian people stopped or searched in central Leicester (26%) and the highest proportion of African Caribbean's stopped in the London boroughs (15% in both cases).


The forms also allow for analysis of the focus of the stop. While there is some variation in the way this information is recorded across sites, it is possible to generate information on whether stops are targeted at vehicles (including vehicles, drivers and passengers) and pedestrians. The records relate only to recordable encounters, and therefore ignore the non-recordable records for central Leicester and Ipswich.



There are clearly some variations between sites in the balance between recorded vehicle and pedestrian encounters (Figure 3). This may reflect some differences in the policing environments between sites. For example, the fact that the largest proportion of vehicle encounters were recorded by Ipswich may reflect the fact that a large part of this area is rural, where stops of cars are likely to be more common than of pedestrians. However, variations between sites may also reflect recording practices. For example, differences may exist in the extent of any under-recording between vehicles and pedestrians, which in turn may vary between sites.

The recording of both stops and searches also allows us to make some comparisons between the two types of encounters, and to reveal whether there are any differences in the profile of those targeted. Figure 4 provides a further ethnic analysis of stops and searches, this time broken down by stops and searches.

Figure 4: Recorded stops and searches on different ethnic groups




The chart suggests that, in general, the ethnic profiles of stops are similar to that of searches within areas. However, in Greenwich and Central Leicester, there is an indication that searches on white people are more likely to be carried out than stops.

The next chart, Figure 5, compares recorded stops and searches in terms of the distribution of pedestrians and vehicles.

This chart shows a very clear and consistent pattern: recorded stops are far more likely to involve vehicles than recorded searches. The reason for this is unclear. It may be that this simply represents the difference in the nature of the two types of encounters - a point that will be explored later. However, it is also possible that under-recording of pedestrian stops is greater than pedestrian searches, in comparison with stops and searches of vehicles.

It was notable that there were some variations in the quality of data recorded by forms between sites. In particular, for Central Leicester and Ipswich, which have a similar form design, there were a substantial number of cases where the classification of a stop, voluntary search or PACE search was not carried out by ticking of the appropriate (or any) boxes. Similar problems existed for these forms regarding the




classification of forms into vehicle or pedestrian. This is likely to reflect in part the complexity of the forms (see Appendix D) which have a multitude of tick-boxes, and may have given rise to confusion or oversight. As a result, many records had to be 'cleaned' - that is they had to be allocated to categories based on other information on the form - particularly sections of the form which allowed for free-text descriptions. A second problem, also for the Ipswich and central Leicester forms, was classification into recordable and non-recordable encounters. Because many of the boxes across the form were filled-in, even though a stop record may not have been required, it also required manual checking of records to differentiate between those that should and should not be counted.

*Reasons and outcomes*

One of the key elements of recommendation 61 was that both the reason and outcome of the stop or search should be recorded. Across the sites, there was significant variation as to how this was recorded on forms and subsequently registered on databases. There were also differences between the information available for stops and that for searches. The nature of the data available on the databases is summarised in Appendix E.

In practice, the information which is recorded as free text is difficult to analyse, simply because it is not easily reducible to simple fixed codes. The most easily presented information on the reasons for stops or searches across sites is the 'object' of searches, as this is clearly coded into the same categories. Figure 6 presents the findings of this comparison, across sites.



The chart shows that there are some variations between sites. For example, 'stolen property' was most common as an object for searches in Ipswich (totalling 52%) and lowest in Greenwich (27%). Drugs searches are most common in the London boroughs and Chapeltown - making up about two in five, while making up just one in five in Ipswich and central Leicester.

While the free-text nature of the 'reasons' and 'grounds' for stops and searches prevents any statistical analysis, some assessments of the quality of entries can, however, be made. This has implications for how well they can be used for monitoring by supervisors, or as a basis for direct accountability to a person stopped.

In general, grounds given for searches were reasonably detailed - although they often used abbreviations. Some examples include:

*Baseball bat seen under passenger seat.*

*Info received that occupants of veh[icle] trying to sell drugs to cashier at petrol station.*

*Circulation of 3 robberies sus with desc given out on radio above fits desc of above.*

However, there were instances where grounds were less clear, for example:

*Drugs search.*

*Info received.*

*Acting furtively.*

Reasons for stops were generally less elaborate than grounds given for searches - which might be expected given that stops do not necessarily require legal grounds. However, they were often reasonably clear:

*Manner of driving on wet roads.*

*Made threats to hotel staff.*

*Red light area check docs.*

Once again, however, there were some examples where the reasons given were fairly limited and unclear, sometimes resorting to police terminology:


*M. T.P V/W.*

*Routine.*

*Traffic stop.*

It is clear that a set of pre-coded reasons for stop would be a far better basis for any meaningful statistical monitoring. However, this would limit the explanatory usefulness of the record for the person stopped. The free-text examples above illustrate some of the potential to provide a clearly articulated written explanation of the stop. There is clearly a tension here between the desire for enhanced monitoring and improved direct accountability. We explore this in the next chapter when we discuss the design of the form.


Outcome measures suffer from some similar problems to 'reasons' type measures - they are not generally similar across sites. One common measure which was available, however, was the arrest rate for searches, presented in Figure 7.



The arrest rates between sites are actually fairly similar across sites, ranging from a high of 16% in Greenwich and Hounslow to a low of 12% in central Leicester. Leicester's rate was affected by an operation during the pilot involving the use of many section 60 searches, for which arrests are less common (see Miller, et al., 2000).

It was also possible for three out of the five areas to provide an arrest measure for stops.

This shows that across these sites, arrest rates from recorded stops were fairly similar, at around two or three per cent. This under-estimates arrests produced by stops. Arrests arising from vehicle stops, for example as a result of a positive breath-test, were frequently unlikely to be recorded by officers as stops. The above should simply be taken as an example of a statistical measure of the outcome of stops. The danger with using arrest rates for stops is that it might be regarded as a measure of the effectiveness of stops, as it is for searches. This could be inappropriate since the



result of many stops will be the dissipation of police suspicion. This is why they end as stops rather than progressing to more intrusive encounters.

The free-text measures of outcomes were fairly brief. They included, for example:

*Negative [in relation to a search].*

*Allowed to proceed.*

*Verbal warning.*

As we noted above in relation to the reasons for stops and searches, there is a similar tension between recording outcomes for statistical monitoring and providing a meaningful written explanation for the purposes of public accountability.

### Summary

- The level of under-recording found in the pilot places in doubt the accuracy of any statistical picture produced. It is likely that the figures produced during the pilot represent, at best, a third of the encounters that should have been recorded. The accuracy of the search figures alone is likely to be better but still somewhat less than perfect.

The results of the evaluation allow us to map out the main reasons for this under-recording:

- *Definitional/practical difficulties* – The evaluation highlighted the inherent difficulty of developing any definition to cover the range and variation of stop encounters. Police stops are dynamic processes not definable events. During this process, the police may conduct many activities, in the light of developing or diminishing suspicion, of which ‘calling to account’ may often be a minor one.
- The development of detailed guidance, as well as a formal definition of a stop, did not provide absolute clarity about what constituted a stop. The attempt to create recording rules that balanced the recording requirements of the recommendations with operational practicalities was not entirely successful. It led to a particular lack of clarity about the recording of two particular types of stop: certain vehicle stops, for example where a breathalyser is used; and certain pedestrian encounters where ‘calling to account’ is in question. This resulted in inconsistent recording of such encounters.
- *Managing intrusion* – Officers were more likely not to record ‘fleeting’ encounters where they quickly saw no need, for their purposes, to extend them. The requirement to record in such cases was more likely to be seen as an intrusion on their own time, but also on that of the person stopped. Officers had experienced people’s desire to end a stop quickly and the form was not regarded as a worthwhile delay in such circumstances. The common lack of explanation given about the form would not provide any incentive to the person stopped to wait further.
- *Officer discretion* – It was clear that many officers used their discretion to selectively record. This selectivity focused both on reasons to actively make a record (e.g. for intelligence purposes) and reasons not to record (e.g. to avoid formalising encounters). The perceived value of the exercise varied between different types of officers.
- It was also clear that there was a tension between the provision of information for statistical monitoring purposes and as a basis for accountability, either to the person stopped or to a supervising officer. Pre-coded information could be used for statistical purposes but did not provide the basis for a detailed written explanation. There was wide variety in the quality of written explanations for the reason and outcome of stops.

## 5. Results: monitoring and accountability II

Recording how a person described their own ethnicity ('self-defined ethnicity') was another important element of the recording changes. In this chapter, we:

- assess whether the collection of this information is feasible and if it provides a basis for improved accuracy of ethnic monitoring;
- examine the views and experiences of the police and public in relation to this recording requirement; and
- consider the views of the police and the public on the 'vehicle' for this monitoring and accountability- the new design of stop form.

### Recording self-defined ethnicity

The earlier statistical analysis of the pilot records used the officer-defined PNC ethnic codes, as these are consistent across sites. However, one of the elements of recommendation 61 is for those stopped to self-define their ethnicity. We examine the results of the evaluation on this aspect here, drawing on data on three aspects:

- statistical comparisons with the existing officer-perceived classification;
- officers' experiences with the question on the street; and
- public views about being asked the question.

The information was recorded differently across the pilot sites. In Chapeltown and Ipswich those stopped or searched were asked to choose from a pre-defined set of codes, based on the classifications for the 2001 Census. In Greenwich and central Leicester, those stopped or searched were able to describe themselves precisely as they wished, and this was recorded in a free text box on the form. Hounslow moved from an open-ended to a closed category response, which was different from the other areas.

### *Enhanced ethnic monitoring?*

In practice, only the pre-defined codes allow for a broader statistical analysis. This information was only collected in Ipswich and Chapeltown. The free-text responses were so varied as to be close to useless for the purposes of monitoring. Thus, in central Leicester over 600 separate ethnic codes emerged from the open-ended question. Greenwich data was probably more straightforward, though still with over 200 different codes - based just on stops (search data did not contain self-defined ethnic codes). Many of the codes across sites were fairly straightforward and with a substantial amount of re-coding work could have been collapsed into some general categories for analysis such as, for example: 'Somalian'; 'Pakistani'; and 'Black'.

However, there was a wide range of recorded public responses which did not fit clearly into any ethnic classification, for example:

*Christian.*

*Double Dutch.*

*Inner city youth.*

Those with the pre-coded ethnic categories offer more potential for analysis. Table 15 (over) presents a comparison of self-defined ethnic codes with the police perceived ethnic codes based on data from Chapeltown.

Because of small numbers in some columns, it is only those defined by officers as White-European, African Caribbean and Asian that can be meaningfully analysed from the figures presented. The table reveals many interesting details. To start with, it is notable that just under 90% of those classified as White European classify themselves as White-British. This figure is likely to be higher, when we bear in mind that five per cent refused details and three per cent reported 'not known'. In fact, there are few other self-defined categories that make a substantial contribution to the White European category - just over one per cent describe themselves as White-Irish, and just over one per cent describe themselves as White-Other.

Among those defined by officers as Asian, over 70% describe themselves as a category of Asian. However, there are three per cent who describe themselves as White and Asian, and interestingly four per cent - one in 25, who describe themselves as Black Caribbean. It is notable, too, that 15% either refused details or did not know how to classify themselves, and 12% describe themselves as 'Any Other'.

The officer defined African Caribbean category (which approximates to Black) highlights some interesting issues. Nearly a quarter either refused details, or did not know how to classify themselves. Over a half described themselves as Black Caribbean, Black African or other Black background. However, 13% - about one in eight - described themselves as White and Black Caribbean.

Table 16 (over) provides the equivalent breakdown for Ipswich.

In this case, we have enough numbers to look more closely at the Dark European group, in addition to the White European, African Caribbean and Asian groups.

RESULTS: MONITORING AND ACCOUNTABILITY II

**Table 15: Breakdown of self-defined ethnic codes by officer perceived ethnic codes for Chapeltown**

Self-defined ethnic codes	Officer perceived ethnic codes						
	White European %	Dark European %	African Caribbean %	Asian %	Arab %	Oriental %	Other/unknown %
White – British	87.6	9.1	2.1	1.4	–	–	–
White – Irish	1.1	–	–	–	–	–	–
White – Other	1.4	9.1	0.4	–	–	–	–
White and Black Caribbean	0.3	9.1	13.0	–	–	–	27.3
White and Black African	–	–	0.4	–	–	–	–
White and Asian	0.1	9.1	–	2.8	8.3	–	–
Any other mixed background	0.3	18.2	1.3	–	–	–	9.1
Asian – Indian	0.0	–	0.8	15.1	–	–	–
Asian – Pakistani	0.2	–	2.1	42.5	–	–	–
Asian – Bangladeshi	–	–	–	6.6	–	–	–
Any other Asian background	–	–	–	8.5	–	–	–
Black Caribbean	0.2	9.1	44.1	3.8	–	–	–
Black African	–	–	3.8	0.5	–	–	–
Any other Black background	0.0	–	5.0	0.5	–	–	–
Chinese	0.0	–	–	–	50.0	25.0	–
Any other	0.4	9.1	3.3	2.9	25.0	25.0	9.1
Refused details	5.3	18.2	9.0	10.9	–	50.0	9.1
Not known	3.1	9.1	6.1	13.0	16.7	–	45.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0 (2,163)</b>	<b>100.0 (11)</b>	<b>100.0 (238)</b>	<b>100.0 (212)</b>	<b>100.0 (12)</b>	<b>100.0 (4)</b>	<b>100.0 (40)</b>

RESULTS: MONITORING AND ACCOUNTABILITY II

Table 16: Breakdown of self-defined ethnic codes by officer perceived ethnic codes for Ipswich

Self-defined ethnic codes	Officer perceived ethnic codes						
	White European %	Dark European %	African Caribbean %	Asian %	Arab %	Oriental %	Other/unknown %
White – British	87.0	11.8	2.3	3.8	–	–	37.2
White – Irish	0.9	–	–	–	–	–	–
White – Other	0.8	5.0	1.4	1.9	–	–	2.1
White and Black Caribbean	0.4	8.4	7.5	–	–	–	1.1
White and Black African	0.1	5.0	1.4	–	–	–	–
White and Asian	0.1	2.5	–	3.8	–	–	–
Any other mixed background	0.1	4.2	2.3	1.9	–	25.0	1.1
Asian – Indian	–	2.5	0.9	20.8	–	25.0	–
Asian – Pakistani	0.2	1.7	–	1.9	–	–	–
Asian – Bangladeshi	–	11.8	0.9	34.0	20.0	–	3.2
Any other Asian background	–	4.2	0.5	5.7	–	–	–
Black Caribbean	0.2	3.4	32.4	–	–	–	3.2
Black African	–	1.7	10.3	1.9	–	–	3.2
Any other Black background	0.1	1.7	9.4	1.9	–	–	1.1
Chinese	0.1	4.2	0.5	5.7	80.0	–	1.1
Any other	0.7	19.3	12.2	5.7	–	50.0	5.3
Refused details	6.8	10.9	13.6	7.5	–	–	33.0
Not known	2.6	1.7	4.2	3.8	–	–	8.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0 (4,346)</b>	<b>100.0 (119)</b>	<b>100.0 (213)</b>	<b>100.0 (53)</b>	<b>100.0 (5)</b>	<b>100.0 (4)</b>	<b>100.0 (94)</b>

The picture of the White Europeans is fairly similar to that shown in Chapeltown - 87% defined themselves as White-British, with most of the remaining cases either refusing details or being missing data.

Among Dark Europeans, only just over one in ten (11.8%) identified themselves as White-British, with no other single category dominating the breakdown. It was notable, however, that over one in ten (11.8%) of Dark Europeans identified themselves as Asian-Bangladeshi, suggesting some problems with officer based classification in respect of this category.

Over half of those classified by officers as African Caribbean described themselves as some category of Black, and a further 8% described themselves as White and Black Caribbean. More than one in ten counted themselves as 'Any Other'. Once again, there were a large number of declined or missing responses for this category, making up nearly one in five cases.

Finally, among the small number of officer defined Asians, over half fell into self-defined Asian categories and about one in 25 described themselves as White and Asian. Interestingly, more than one in 20 described themselves as Chinese and a further one in 20 described themselves as 'Any Other'.

The overall picture that emerges from these comparisons is that the officer-defined ethnic codes are reasonable approximations, although less detailed, of the categories in which individuals place themselves although there are some variations in the accuracy of officer assessment. It should be noted, however, that these results were produced from data in only two sites: Chapeltown and Ipswich. Data from sites with different demographics may well have produced different findings.

Officer classification is most accurate for those defined as White Europeans, who almost all see themselves as White-British. However, the issue of a differential between White-British and White-Irish for example (Mooney and Young, 1999), might well come out more strongly in certain areas of London. By contrast, Dark Europeans are clearly a very heterogeneous category - describing individuals from a wide range of backgrounds. It seems likely that where officers place individuals in this category, they do so often where there are officer-defined categories that would be more appropriate. However, Dark Europeans, at least in the sites reviewed, represent only a small group of all those monitored.

The African Caribbean category largely covers those from the wide range of Black backgrounds, including those of mixed origins. However, there are clearly data quality problems with the self-defined ethnicity of those falling into this group, with a notable minority either declining to identify themselves, or being classed as missing data - though the reasons for the latter are not clear. This suggests that if monitoring was to rely exclusively on self-defined ethnicity, up to a quarter of those defined by officers as African Caribbean might not be classified at all. Finally, the Asian category also largely covers those from Asian backgrounds, although those from a wide range of backgrounds can be found within it. This suggests that officers may often place people in this category when they are a little unsure about someone's ethnic background.

*Experiences on the street*

The observations also allow an assessment of the reaction of people stopped when asked for their self-defined ethnicity (Table 17).

Reason	Number
No obvious reaction	20
Generally positive	1
Surprise/puzzlement	4
Amusement/sarcasm	4
Uninterested	2
Hostility	3
<b>All</b>	<b>34</b>

Note: Excludes don't knows.

This indicates that about two-thirds of those stopped had a fairly neutral reaction. Almost a quarter of people reacted with surprise or amusement. Three people who experienced the use of the form and being asked their ethnicity reacted in an overtly hostile way.

The following extract illustrates the importance of the manner in which the question is introduced (Box 3). In this case, the question is asked although the officer does not produce a form. It is asked without any lead-in or explanation. As a result, the person stopped does not understand the question. Difficulties are overcome with assistance from the other officer.

### Box 3: Introduction of the self-defined ethnicity question

Vehicle stop of south east Asian couple around 3.00am. The couple are being spoken to at the side of their car. The extract comes towards the end of the encounter.

The couple are talking to themselves looking through his wallet. PC X has his pocket book out. "What is your self-defined ethnic origin", asks X. The man does not answer. X puts his head down in between the two. "Mr [name]" he says slightly louder and repeats the question. The man goes "Huh?" quizzically. PC Y says something like, "how would you describe your ethnic background, what is your race?" The man still appears not to understand. Y says, "We would say we are White European, would you say you are Chinese...?" Understanding comes to the man's face "ah, Vietnam".

Given the numbers observed are very small, the findings on their own are suggestive at best. However, many officers interviewed had experienced, even after only a few weeks of the pilot, similar negative public reactions to the form though most seemed to relate more to disinterest than hostility or concern. A significant minority of officers had also already experienced negative reactions to asking the person's ethnicity for example, "But I'm black British, why are you putting me apart?" and "[I'm] white obviously, it's a stupid question". Examples of less serious reactions included amusement "white lads thought it was amusing [they] said 'can I be any of these [categories]?'"

Other officers had not experienced any negative reactions. And most officers readily admitted that most encounters were unproblematic and that giving an explanation up-front was likely to make a negative reaction unlikely. Our observations showed that explanations were sometimes not given and these were more likely to produce difficulties either in terms of misunderstanding or more negative reactions. Nonetheless, it was clear that many officers were not happy with this element of the recording requirement.

A minority of officers held strongly negative views about asking the question. Some admitted in the first interviews that they were not asking the question at all. They were concerned about being seen as stupid by white people and racist by people from minority ethnic groups and saw no value in asking the question. An officer explained:

*I'm not going to escalate the situation by asking people how they describe themselves. Each colour has a code and that's it. I don't see the reason why we have to ask the question.*

(Greenwich PC, 8 years service)

### *Public views*

Respondents in the BMRB work were asked:

- how they felt about being asked to describe their ethnic background;
- how important it was for people to describe themselves;
- what they thought of the way they were asked and whether the question could be put differently;
- why they thought they were being asked about ethnicity in the first place - the rationale for the question; and
- how they felt about being asked to describe their ethnicity.

There were mixed reactions to having been asked to describe their ethnicity by the police, related to what they understood as the reason for the question. For those who did not mind being asked, it was regarded as something that was part of everyday life now, or they could see a good reason for it. For example, some commented that the question was just something the police have to do as part of their job. Others were unhappy about being asked but had answered the question because they were in a hurry to get away (implying that they thought that not answering would somehow delay them), and also because they could see some positive reasons for being asked. People who thought the question was racist tended to resent being asked. No one who had been offered a form said they refused to answer the question on ethnicity, even those who objected to it.

When respondents received an explanation during the research, which related to the statistics on stops and searches, they could perceive a positive reason for being asked about ethnicity. This suggests most respondents did not receive an adequate explanation at the time.

For some people the opportunity to describe their ethnic identity was very important -in terms of their individual rights and for the sake of accuracy:

*Very important... I might look Asian but I might be half black and half Asian, whatever. As soon as anybody else takes that away from you that's like losing your identity. It's your right to say who you are.*

(Indian female, aged 29, stopped only)

Others felt the police should be left to decide a person's ethnic identity. Being asked about ethnicity was seen as offensive because they felt that their ethnicity was obvious. Others agreed with this last point, but did not see it as a reason not to ask about ethnicity:

*Well personally, it doesn't really matter because they can see it obviously. They only have to look at you and they know what colour you are. They can tell I'm a black but what they can't tell is I'm a Black British, Caribbean or African... I think this [self-defining approach] is more precise.*

(Black-British male, aged 18, searched)

Respondents also expressed concern that other people would give 'cocky' answers to the question.

People were generally happy with the way ethnicity was presented on the form, and during the stop encounter. Respondents remarked on the question being part of everyday life 'nowadays', for example, on job applications. Some people felt the list of fixed-categories used provided good coverage, but others commented that they did not quite fit the categories, or they could pick more than one:

*I could turn round and say: 'Yes, I am a British person, I might be Indian, don't call me Indian, I am British'. But I'm Indian, I'm a British Indian and I'm happy with that.*

(British Indian male, aged 40, stopped)

Even so, these people did not necessarily feel the need for the police to record their answer verbatim. Some could see no real difference between being presented with a list of categories versus recording answers verbatim, particularly if they felt it would all come down to the same categories anyway. Some respondents thought the list was better (for example, they were used to that approach), whilst others felt it would be easier just to say what they thought. There did not appear to be any link between a respondent's preference, for list or verbatim approach, and their ethnic identity.

Whilst some were unsure why the question was asked, other respondents had a range of views. The key justification for asking someone's ethnic identity related to monitoring police use of stops and searches in terms of ethnicity (and in particular, identifying any racism) and ultimately in producing statistics that showed that the tactic was being applied fairly across all ethnic groups.

Some people, however, were suspicious that the police would use the statistics to make links between ethnicity and criminal behaviour. They believed the question on ethnicity formed part of the police checking for information to help them with their enquiries. Examples of this were given including: finding out whether the person's residency was legitimate, or needing to know in case the police needed to gather information on someone who was not born here, or having a description that could be matched against subsequently reported crime.

In the context of recommendation 63, these views highlight the importance of raising not only public awareness, but also public understanding about the purpose of collecting such information.

### **The new stop forms**

In this section we consider the impact of the form itself as a vehicle for accountability through both supervision, and directly to the person stopped or searched. We examine the views and experiences of:

- operational officers;
- supervisors; and
- the public.

The lack of enthusiasm of police officers for any new piece of paperwork is well known and was expressed by officers here too, "any extra form is a pain", "it's another form." Nonetheless, and perhaps surprisingly, the majority of officers in each pilot site were, at least, content with the design of the new form.

Comparing across the sites, the greatest level of officer support was in central Leicester (only two officers expressed negative views); the least was among the sample of officers in Greenwich. The most commonly expressed view was that the form was "straightforward" or "easy to use". There was strong positive support from some officers in all the sites. It was seen as an improvement on forms used previously, particularly in allowing improved recording of information or intelligence, particularly physical descriptions, "can fit in more detail"; "overall, I like how it encompasses so much."

Support tended to focus on ways the form would contribute to tasks officers considered important. The intelligence benefits were identified particularly by members of a proactive patrol team "good - a lot more information, intelligence... more space for description", for whom the use of intelligence was central to their role. In central Leicester and Ipswich where the combined form was in operation,

very few officers raised problems with it. More officers expressed positive support for the simplification, "good to have three forms together", "incorporation of VDRS and HO/RT1 is fine." One officer went further:

*Great, all in one form, should have the FPN included... a long time coming-saves us carrying lots of paper.*

(Central Leicester PC, 17 years service)

There had been a concern that having the HO/RT1 'producer' attached to the stop form would encourage an increase in its issue. However, statistics on this showed little change in either area compared to pre-pilot levels.

The most frequent reservations related to the form's size, "cumbersome" and "bulky" and its length, "too long". There was a concern repeated across the sites and by some, otherwise supportive, officers that the form was difficult to fill out on the street, particularly if raining. Practical difficulties were based on its size and "flimsiness" with some officers needing to use a clipboard. These difficulties were most frequently raised by, or in relation to, officers who patrolled on foot, on their own or on motorcycles. The strongest negative reaction was "it's a pain in the arse to fill in".

### *Supervision and accountability*

The new form could provide a useful basis for improved accountability through direct supervision of the records submitted to and checked by shift sergeants and inspectors. We explored this in interviews with more senior managers across the sites. About half of the 17 officers interviewed felt that the form had been useful in terms of supervising their team in some way. In contrast only four said that the form had not been of use. Responses were relatively mixed in terms of how the form was useful, though tended to focus on it as a good monitoring tool for officer activity. A couple of supervisors added that the form showed them whether officers were recording their activity properly:

*Can see who's filling in forms correctly - who is in, who is stopping-checking.*

(Inspector, Ipswich)

As a monitoring tool, the details recorded on the form can provide supervisors with information about the stops and searches carried out by officers (e.g. the number of forms submitted, the quality of the reasons or grounds and the outcome of the encounter). However, the value placed on stops and searches by supervisors in assessing officers' performance varied considerably. Overall, 13 supervisors said that searches were a useful method of assessment, although the vast majority talked

about this in terms of examining officers' grounds for search, the 'quality' of the search (e.g. arrests) and officer activity in general:

*How they do it is important, not numbers - important not to alienate people.*  
(Inspector, Ipswich)

*[Don't] view it as quantity but quality. Expect officers to be motivated by intelligence - if a picture of someone is shown, then I would expect from the team that person to be stopped and searched.*  
(Sergeant, Central Leicester)

Only one supervisor interviewed commented that the quantity of searches carried out was important. Views were more mixed, however, about stops as a means of assessing performance: just under half felt they were a useful indicator either in terms of quantity or in other ways, for example seeing officers were conducting stops regularly. Just over half did not regard stops as a good indicator. There was also a sense that stops and searches together formed only part of a much wider picture of an officer's performance.

In terms of accountability, supervisors can also play a positive role through management and leadership by actively encouraging officers to complete forms. Eleven sergeants and inspectors said that they had emphasised the importance to the shift team of completing records for stops and searches. Roughly half of these said that they had encouraged officers all the time. Others were more selective and had tended to support officers either at the start of the pilot or when they needed to (e.g. with identified officers):

*Put strong emphasis during training/first couple of months. Now taken as given.*  
(Inspector, Ipswich)

One sergeant who had been given dedicated responsibility for the pilot, and who had a central role in monitoring forms, said that it was very difficult to know when forms had not been completed by officers.

Both supervising forms and encouraging recording practices require supervisors to adopt an active role. Some inspectors said that these duties had been delegated to the sergeants. Although some officers did say that the sergeant would 'bounce' forms back that were not completed to the required standard, a few felt that their supervisor did not check the form thoroughly (i.e. forms had been 'bounced back' from a divisional level). One inspector commented that he did not emphasise the supervision of forms because of his work pressures:

*Haven't got time... Very little [checking] gets done. Not too worried about it to be perfectly honest.*

(Inspector, Hounslow)

This suggests that, at least for some more senior managers, ongoing oversight of recording loses out to competing priorities and pressures. These findings echo those from research on the impact of PACE (Bottomley, et al., 1991) which indicated limited supervision of officers or search records. There is also an argument that this is a reflection, at least in part, of changing roles and responsibilities for supervisors across the service as a result of management restructuring and changes to policing style.

This finding is unsurprising and understandable. The danger is that it places greater importance on the supervision of sergeants who are likely to face equal but different pressures. The concern is that the necessary emphasis on making accurate and adequate records 'falls through the cracks' at supervisory level and, in practice, is left to individual officers to take on. We have seen earlier in this chapter that for some officers at least the completion of forms will then be discretionary. But there is also an argument that the proper (and more cost-effective) approach is to develop a culture where operational officers do things correctly first time without the necessity of supervision.

### *Public views*

In this section we examine public reactions to the form based on data from:

- our observations of patrol work; and
- the interviews and discussion groups conducted by BMRB.

Our observations allow us also to examine how the use of the form was received on the street.

Table 18 shows that the large majority of cases were unproblematic. In a fifth of cases the use of the form did produce concern or hostility from the person stopped. The lack of an explanation was again more likely to produce such a reaction. Officers gave an explanation in under half of the observed encounters where a form was filled in.

The following example aims to illustrate the importance of how the form is introduced in an encounter and how its purpose is explained (Box 4). The encounter as a whole is handled well by the officer apart from his use of the form, which might be best described as clumsy. The way the form is introduced, the lack

Table 18: Public reactions to the form

Reason	Number
No obvious reaction	22
Interest	1
Surprise/puzzlement	2
Amusement/sarcasm	2
Disinterest	1
Concern	4
Hostility	3
<b>All</b>	<b>35</b>

of explanation about it or the ethnicity question result in a more negative reaction from the person stopped than seems likely from the way he was treated otherwise.

**Box 4: Introduction of the form**

1.30am We are driving slowly behind a bus when a car overtakes us from behind and also overtakes the bus. PC X accelerates slightly to follow the car and almost immediately pulls it over. PC Y does the talking, while X gets on the radio to do a PNC check on the registration plate. Y explains to the driver, “the reason we stopped you right was because this is a single lane road and you overtook us”. The man claims he was not doing over thirty and Y disagrees lightly but does not argue about it, “even so it’s a bit extravagant, don’t want to get onto trouble for a little thing like that do you? Just want to take it easy”.

Y breaks off to go back to the car to get a form saying, “I just have to fill in a form”. The man reacts to this by groaning loudly and starts complaining that he has been burgled, his car attacked. Y says “Its not a ticket, it’s just for our records to say we’ve stopped you” but does not mention the pilot.

As Y completes the form, X asks the man if he has been at work and is now going home. “Trying to,” says the man. X asks if the man has his own company, the man says yes and gives the name of the company, X nods his head and says something about that being the name that the car came under from PNC. Y then says, “I’ve just got to ask you this question on the form” and asks the ethnicity question. I hear the man say something about his human rights. (Back in the car Y says the man also said, “I object to that”) Y gives him the inner slip, and says, “it just explains why we’ve stopped you... you can keep it or throw it away.”

Again, the numbers from the observations are small. We can look to responses from the work by BMRB to provide further evidence on public views. These were importantly affected by their experience of how the form was used by the officer who stopped them.

- **How the forms were introduced by officers**

Police officers used a variety of methods for introducing the form during the stop encounter. Explanations varied, from mentioning that the form was part of a new initiative that related to the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, to saying the form was for police records.

Some police officers described the content of the form and others talked people through what they were writing down. People's initial reactions to the form appeared to relate to the explanation they were given by the police. If officers did not explain the purpose and benefits of the form, respondents paid little attention to the form at the time. In some cases, this experience contrasted with their views once the form had been explained in detail during the study; they could see a number of benefits to reading and keeping the form.

*I didn't take [the form] because I didn't know it was because of this [the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry]. I think I would have taken one... had I known.*

(Black African male, aged 32, searched)

- **Confusion over the purpose of the form**

There could also be some confusion over the purpose of the form as a result of the way an officer explained it. Some respondents were told that the form was for their use, and were given a rationale for keeping the form. For instance, respondents could remember the police officer mentioning that they could show the form at any subsequent encounters that day. Respondents saw this as advantageous as it could potentially save them time should this occur (for example, they would not have to have their name checked against police records again). However, some people took this explanation to imply that the copy was of no further use to them the day after the stop.

- **Form not given at time**

Some respondents were not given a form at the time, but told they could obtain a copy later. In some cases, the form was filled in at the time, but the person was offered the opportunity to collect it the next day. Some respondents felt that they should have been given a copy at the time and not expected to collect it at a later date.

*They have the time to stop and search you, they should have the time to carry [the form] and give you a copy.*

(Black African male, aged 26, searched)

None of the respondents who were told that a form would be available from the police station had actually collected their copy; they could see no point in doing so.

Given this range of experiences and the impact they had on respondents' views and understanding, they were also taken through the form in detail during the research interview. This process highlighted some elements of particular interest to them, specifically:

- the reason for the stop – people wanted to know that a stop was based on justifiable grounds;
- the name of the officer – in case a person wanted to make a complaint;
- knowing their rights – this was considered particularly useful in helping a person to know what to expect when they were stopped; and
- understanding police powers – particularly with regard to the reasons why people might get stopped and how stops and searches are not to be used to target certain sections of the community.

### *Views on the form design*

Respondents were also asked their views on the design and content of the form. They were either indifferent to the size of the form, or felt it was too big. For example, one respondent said he would rip off the front sheet describing his rights, and then throw the rest away. It was suggested that the form could be bigger in order to attract more attention to it.

Some felt there was too much information on the form which they found off-putting, especially if someone wanted to read it at the time of the stop. The part completed by the police drew particular comment. At the top of that part of the form were various codes and key words which were incomprehensible to respondents; for example, the references to the legal sections for different search powers like s1 or s23. They wondered what they meant, and were dissatisfied that a form to be given to people who had been stopped used police terminology. There was concern that a box on the form might be ticked 'against you' without the person knowing what it meant.

*Like the 'vol search' - what does that mean to anyone? If that was ticked against you, you just don't know, do you.*

(Indian female, aged 29, stopped)

There was a sense that this section of the form had been designed with the police in mind, not the public.

*Key message to tell the Home Office: That when they write these things out they write these things up in the scenario of what a normal person would do, not someone in a suit... [They should have] an ordinary person instead of an upper-class suity, whatnot. I mean, some of the stuff you don't understand. I mean, as I say, what's all this lark about? [Section 1, s23 etc]... that's no good to us you know. No, that's what they should do, plan it properly. As you say you're doing your survey, they get you to do what you're doing and like, sort of like, I say what we think about these things... Well if you asked a suity or whatnot what needs to be sorted out they'd tell you nothing. 'Cause they don't get searched every day like we do.*

(Black Caribbean male, aged 27, stopped)

The above discussion of public views highlights the need for the police to look carefully at how the form is introduced to people during a stop. It also shows that consideration of the form design is not simply a bureaucratic exercise. It has important implications for the achievement of key aims of the recommendations. It is obviously essential, for example, for someone who has been searched to be able to tell from the form whether the police officer considered the search voluntary and if not, what search power was being exercised. If people cannot understand what key aspects of the form like this mean, the record of the search provides little basis for any meaningful accountability.

### Summary

- Officers had some difficulties with recording a person's description of their ethnic origin. For most officers, the question tended not to be problematic, particularly if they explained the question. But they were still likely to have encountered some difficult reactions, a few actively hostile. This led most officers to feel at least uncomfortable about asking the question and a small minority, at least at the beginning of the pilot, had not asked it at all. Officers avoided asking the question of white people, for fear of appearing stupid, and of people from minority ethnic groups, for fear of being seen as racist.
- It was clear that the self-defined coding based on the 2001 census was far more practicable for monitoring purposes than the open question, and was also more easily used by officers. Overall, the new coding provides some basis for enhanced ethnic monitoring. However, the proportion of missing data on self-defined ethnicity for people classified as African Caribbean would be problematic if replicated in any national monitoring system.

- The integrated form proved generally to be supported as a simplification by officers. It did not tend to lead to an increase in the issue of HO/RT1s as had been feared. The form was, however, more complicated than the 'simple' stop form and this led to problems in the accurate recording of information on the form.
- In many cases, people stopped during the pilot were not given an adequate explanation of the form's purpose. This meant they gave the form little attention or were confused about its purpose. But during interview, with a chance to consider the form again, they saw particular benefits to receiving information about:
  - the reason for the stop;
  - the officer's name;
  - their rights; and
  - police powers.
- People were critical of much of the police jargon on the form and used by officers. This jargon also limited their understanding of the information on the form and thus its usefulness as a basis for accountability.

## 6. Results: changes to officer practice

In this chapter we examine whether the piloted changes had any impact on officer practice in relation to searches or stops. We begin by exploring possible changes at the general level by examining statistics on searches and arrests for the sites as a whole. We would expect any significant impact of the changes to show on search levels across sites. This focuses on looking at any obvious changes in search levels compared to before the pilot.

### Search levels across the sites


In particular, we looked for indications of pilot impact across sites in terms of:

- the numbers of searches carried out in sites;
- arrests from searches;
- levels of disproportionality; and
- levels of crime.

In order to address these questions, each of the pilot areas is discussed in turn. The analysis was hampered somewhat by great variations in availability and quality of historical data that forces could easily provide.

### Hounslow

Figure 9 presents changes in levels of searches, arrests from searches and crime (total notifiable offences (TNOs)) over the period of the pilot.




Unfortunately, historical data on crimes in Hounslow and Greenwich boroughs were not available from before April 1999. This was a result of the recent MPS-wide amalgamation of Operational Command Units (OCUs) to form Borough OCUs. Historical data was held at OCU level. The graph shows that the introduction of the pilot did not seem to have any effect either on the levels of searches or resultant arrests – there is a large, temporary, upward shift in January and February. This was due to the Territorial Support Group working on the Borough over that period.

In view of the general lack of change, we would not expect the pilot to have had any impact on crime levels. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the crime rates show no signs of any major shifts, given that there is substantial month-on-month variation in any case. Crime rates were lower overall during the pilot than the three months that preceded it.

*Greenwich*

Figure 10 presents changes in the searches, resultant and arrests and crime for Greenwich.



For the four months of the pilot, searches show a slight downturn. However, this is only very slight, and in view of the wide variation in search rates observed before the pilot, we should be cautious about making any inferences about the pilot


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'causing' this slight downturn. The numbers of arrests from searches during the pilot are fairly consistent with pre-pilot levels - and there is little to suggest that arrest rates have improved as a result.

During the pilot, crime rates show a slight increase. However, this needs to be seen in context. The beginning of the pilot represents a low point in relation to overall crime, and crime rates during the pilot are actually lower than they were during the early part of 1999. There is certainly little reason to expect crime rates to have changed, given that searches and arrests from searches have not changed substantially, and there is no evidence that they have changed in any meaningful way.

### Chapeltown


Looking now at Chapeltown data, Figure 11 presents data on searches, arrests and crime for Chapeltown.



The chart shows that searches have remained at a fairly similar level, despite some fluctuations, since the beginning of the pilot, although in the year before the pilot searches appeared to show a general downward decline. Levels of arrest remain relatively consistent over the whole period. And crime has declined from a peak, to which it had risen in the month preceding the pilot. Again, there is little suggestion that the pilot has had any major impact on any of these measures.

Central Leicester

Equivalent data is prevented for central Leicester in Figure 12.




The picture in central Leicester is a little less clear, at least at first glance. Certainly, since the beginning of the pilot, there has been a reduction in the use of searches, bar March 2000 when there was a sudden increase. This increase was associated with an operation which made use of a large number of section 60 searches. However, this general decline needs to be placed in context. First, there was a decline in searches prior to the beginning of the pilot, and this looks as though it could simply represent a continuation of the trend. Furthermore, when we look at the remainder of Leicestershire Constabulary - where no pilot was taking place - there was a similar decline in searches starting around January of 1999 and continuing through the pilot period. Levels of arrest have more or less followed the pattern of searches. It is notable too that crime rates remain fairly similar level to those observed throughout the year before the pilot.

Ipswich

Finally, data for Ipswich are presented in Figure 13.

Figure 13: Changes in searches, arrests from searches and notifiable offences in Ipswich



<sup>11</sup> Ipswich could only provide search figures on paper and on a quarterly basis for the pre-pilot period. These figures were simply divided to provide monthly figures, hence the lack of variation across the three month period.

Since the beginning of the pilot in Ipswich, search levels have remained similar to levels immediately before the pilot, although there is evidence of a longer-term decline<sup>11</sup>. Data on arrests from searches is not available for the period before the pilot. Crime rates appear to be on a par with previous levels. Overall, the picture does not suggest that the pilot has had any real impact on the levels of searches or crime.

In terms of disproportionality, the picture was fairly consistent across the sites. There was little significant change in the levels of disproportionality for searches compared to the pre-pilot period. There was some difference in the level of disproportionality of stops compared to searches over the pilot period but this was not significant and did not hold across all sites.

The statistical picture above does not indicate any significant change in the profile of searches and arrests across sites that might point to the pilot having an impact. Significant fluctuations in certain sites during the pilot period can be explained with reference to specific local operational factors. This general picture, however, does not mean that there has been no change in stop or search practice. We now look more closely at possible changes in practice at the level of individual officers through analysis of interview and observational data.

### Informing the public

Some officers felt that they had not changed the way they conducted stops or searches or the number they carried out. But many officers across the pilot sites did say that they felt they did things differently. Probably most frequently mentioned was that officers now thought more carefully about stops and the way they treated people:

*Have to be more on the ball in treating people.*  
(Central Leicester PBO, 16 years service)

*Tend to give more reasons and explanation to the person.*  
(Chapelton PC, 10 years service)

*More detailed grounds [on the form]- have to explain more.*  
(Central Leicester PC)

Many officers were extremely positive about the benefits of giving more information to the public. For some, there seemed to be an 'in principle' improvement:

*I think whatever information we can give to the general public for reasons for what we do is good.*  
(Ipswich PS, 11 years service)

*To fill in for a search at the time is a good idea for someone to know why they've been stopped.*  
(Ipswich PC, 8 years service)

*Good for the public to know why they have been stopped.*  
(Central Leicester PBO, 10 years service)

In relation to searches, officers felt that the information on powers would allow the person to see that they had been searched legitimately, with legal grounds. There was an appreciation of the need for people to have a record to take away and look at from the actual encounter:

*People know the reason, must be good thing... probably didn't appreciate the reason as things happened so quickly. Now have paper with powers [written on it].*  
(Chapelton proactive unit PC, 4 years service)

*Written on form that you have grounds, that's positive- [they] can check that [the search is] within powers, more accountable, encouraging people to check they have been dealt with properly.*  
(Central Leicester Sgt, 16 years service)

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*More details recorded the better for all concerned. I'm a great believer in telling people everything, prevents complication. I take lots of notes.*

(Greenwich Community Beat Officer (CBO), 4 years service)

More generally, the making of a written record was "more professional" and would lead to "higher standards" of search. Some officers felt that explaining reasons for stops was a way of demonstrating that the specific stop (and the police more generally) was fair:

*Giving information is good, word will spread that we're acting fairly.*

(Central Leicester PC, 8 years service)

For others, the changes were a vehicle for demonstrating to the public that things had changed. This would benefit police-community relations more generally:

*Very useful information on the front in terms of public understanding the new system... shows police are serious about sorting themselves.*

(Central Leicester PBO, 15 years service)

*Will be putting across to the community why we stop people, not just because we are police. I think it will aid relations with us and the community.*

(Greenwich PC, proactive unit, 4 years service)

The information on powers of search was also seen as beneficial to officers themselves in reminding them what powers they had:

*Reminds me of powers.*

(Chapeltown PC, 2 years service)

*Explanation of powers useful as a reminder.*

(Central Leicester PBO Sgt, 8 years service)

*Information on powers is a good prompt for officers.*

(Central Leicester PC, 8 years service)

We could not tell whether this meant that officers were more likely to think in legal terms when considering whether to search. Experience from other research suggests that this is doubtful. It has pointed to difficulties in regulating officer practice, particularly in relation to making decisions to search, precisely because officers' decision-making processes are not legalistic (Dixon, et al., 1989).

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Others, however, were perhaps more defensive about giving more information to the public. They saw this change as enabling the public to complain:

*Living in a complaint happy environment... police don't feel protected.*  
(Greenwich PC, 6 years service)

From this perspective, the written record was still of benefit but as a "safeguard" in case of complaints from the public:

*New amount of info can assist in protecting officers from complaints.*  
(Central Leicester PC, 4 years service)

*Good if have complaint because there is a record.*  
(Chapelton PC, 10 years service)

*It's a backup for me.*  
(Greenwich PC, 4 years service)

The increase in public information was not always seen as being beneficial for relations with the public. Exceptions focused on police relations with the "ne'er do wells" who were often the subject of stops. Officers felt the new form had no purpose in these encounters:

*Scrote fraternity just do not like getting stopped.*  
(Hounslow PC, 25 years service)

Some officers saw the form not simply as ineffectual with such people but as positively harmful for the police:

*Criminals will see it as working in their favour.*  
(Central Leicester PBO Sgt, 8 years service)

*They're getting wise to it - we're educating them.*  
(Greenwich PC, probationer)

*Suspect known criminals read the information and give us a hard time.*  
(Ipswich PC, 12 years service)

*Pandering to the villains.*  
(Ipswich PC, 12 years service)

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Such views suggest that, at least for some officers, the provision of a record for a stop or search may be selective and based on some notion of the person 'deserving' an account.

### Recording practices

Some officers highlighted previous under-recording of searches. As a result of the changes, a search was more likely to be recorded during the pilot. But one officer made clear this would reduce, but not eliminate, non-recording of searches:

*Encourages you to fill out form where previously wouldn't have.*

(Chapelton CBO, 7 years service)

*A lot of previous under-recording. Now because have to give the form there and then [there is] less under-recording.*

(Ipswich CBO, 2 years service)

A rurally-based officer said he was more likely to conduct voluntary searches than those under PACE. He explained that this was because local people were pro-police and happy to co-operate. It was clear that these had gone unrecorded in the past. This officer said he would record some, but not all of such searches under the pilot:

*Perhaps the odd voluntary search may now be recorded.*

(Ipswich PC, 10 years service)

### Search practice

In relation to searches officers admitted that they personally, or other officers they knew, had not always conducted searches 'properly', i.e. legally, in the past. Some officers at least, said that the pilot had made that less likely. Many of these officers still claimed, counter intuitively that the number of searches they conducted remained unchanged:

*Has been some done on the 'jangly bell', something not quite right, but technically not really something.*

(Hounslow PC, 25 years service)

*Before [the pilot] if a quick stop/search I might have said on your way - now because of the pilot and forms - [I] work to the rules.*

(Central Leicester PC, 5 years service)

*I won't stop/search anyone now until I've got 150% grounds... previously not illegal but you've got policeman's hunch.*

(Greenwich PC, 14 years service)

*...Will be stopping them with actual grounds rather than a fishing trip.*

(Greenwich PC, proactive team, 4 years service)

*Older officers will need to cover their backs in terms of grounds, lot of officers don't do GOWISE.*

(Chapelton PC, 2 years service)<sup>12</sup>

*[People considering their reason for search]... they're doing it now with justification.*

(Ipswich Sgt, 10 years service)

<sup>12</sup> The GOWISE mnemonic summarises provisions set out in PACE Code A for the conduct of searches. These are explained in full later in the chapter.

This was not always an obvious change for the better. For some officers it was clear that they were less confident about conducting searches, and anxious about getting "grief on the street" or "hassle" from the person stopped. This led them to avoid encounters that seemed most likely to be confrontational:

*I'm more wary of stopping people now and if I don't have to I won't.*

(Greenwich PC, 8 years)

Other officers were more negative about the effects on their ability to search.

*Should be able to stop anyone without justifying it.*

(Chapelton project team, 3 years service)

*Feel being questioned why do certain things - takes away discretion.*

(Central Leicester PC, 10 years)

Others were more fatalistic, acknowledging the change as a result of malpractice in the past:

*We're paying the price for '70s policing with stop and search... another bit of your discretion being chipped away.*

(Ipswich PC, 12 years service)

*We're paying the price for the past... people messing about on the streets.*

(Greenwich PC, 14 years service)

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*Another stick in our spokes... all in the name of justifying our existence.*  
(Ipswich CBO, 21 years service)

During interview, some officers said that they now conducted fewer stops. This was particularly the case in the two London sites and is most likely to be part of the broader fall in searches that occurred across the MPS (Fitzgerald, 1999, Miller, et al., 2000). Officers also expressed this view across the sites, during the observations. However, the fall was often attributed, not to the pilot, but with reduced officer numbers on the shift. There was evidence that shifts were running close to, or at, minimum levels during some of the observation periods. An officer explained:

*At the moment, we are just fire-fighting, going from call to call-that might mean we are more visible but we don't get the chance to be proactive. We just don't have the manpower. And when we drive round to calls we see people, and we probably have grounds to search them but you have to let them go.*  
(Hounslow PC, probationer)

Others made a link to the 'political climate' after the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report and the high profile given to the issue of searches:

*Not as many stops done. Before 'let's give him a tug' but doesn't happen anymore. It's obvious as I've been away and come back. Most don't notice this gradual change... drop because of Macpherson Report... done for a good reason now.*  
(Greenwich PC, 21 years service)

*Before we were stopping anything that moves.*  
(Hounslow PC, 4 years service)

Few, if any, officers across the pilot sites regarded a fall in searches as a positive change. This is most likely a product of the general, strongly held, belief in the effectiveness of searches against crime, and that 'more searches' is inherently better: "Crime has gone up - people aren't stupid. If they aren't getting turned over as often, then they are going to do more crime". Few officers displayed an understanding of the important difference between raw numbers of searches and arrests and arrest rates for searches.

Some officers made it explicit that the pilot had made no difference to their working practices. Satisfying the recording requirement was not going to get in the way of doing 'the job' as they perceived it:

*I can't believe a form would change the way I'd do something.*  
(Central Leicester PC, 17 years service)

*Form will go by the board before job.*  
(Chapelton CBO, 13 years service)

There is a need to be cautious about simply assuming that how officers talk relates directly to how they behave in practice when facing the everyday realities of street patrol<sup>13</sup>. Findings from our observational work provide some basis to judge these views. Primarily, this related to observing whether officers conducting searches complied with the requirements set out under PACE Code A and summarised in the GOWISE mnemonic. This mnemonic summarises the PACE Code requirements for officers to take 'reasonable steps' to give a person to be searched the following information:

- the *Grounds* for the search (what prompted reasonable suspicion);
- the *Object* of the search (what article is being looked for);
- show their *Warrant* card if not in uniform;
- *Identify* themselves by name;<sup>14</sup>
- give details of the *Station* they work from; and
- inform the person of their *Entitlement* to a record of the search within 12 months.

We observed the conduct of 20 searches and were able to observe clearly whether GOWISE was followed in 13 of them. Full compliance occurred in only five of these 13 searches. The officer gave both his/her name and police station in less than half (six) of these cases, and name only in a further two. In one case neither the grounds nor the object of search were explained to the person searched and in a further two cases the object but not the grounds were articulated.

The number of cases is, of course, very small. Nonetheless, this non-compliance with the legal requirements of PACE occurred during the pilot (with the attendant profile given to searches) and, perhaps more importantly, in the presence of a Home Office researcher. This suggests that it is highly likely that at least a significant minority of searches continued to be conducted outside the provisions of PACE during the pilot.

Further evidence of this comes from one of the searches we observed. In this case, the officer followed the requirements of PACE summarised by GOWISE completely. But a colleague who had been present at the scene later commented jokingly, "Hey

<sup>13</sup> Waddington (1999) makes this point in his discussion of the differences between police culture as expressed in 'the canteen' and practices exhibited on the street.

<sup>14</sup> In cases linked to the investigation of terrorism an officer need only give his/her warrant number or other identification number.

(name), I clocked the GOWISE, nice one". That this was worthy of note (and humour) suggests that such an occurrence is not quite routine.

### Summary and conclusions

- The views expressed in interview suggest that, among some officers in all sites, the pilot have prompted some change in their 'mind-set'. Officers were more likely to at least 'think twice' about stops and searches, and provide more explanation and information during any stop or search.
- Many of these officers have seen tangible benefits in the changes. This suggests that recommendation 61 may have, at least, symbolic value: the requirement to record at the time highlighting the significance of searches (and perhaps also stops) to officers and the need for thought and care in conducting them.
- However, there are other officers for whom the changes are an imposition, with only negative implications for how they police.

Can we usefully identify how these differences are structured between officers? Are there any obvious 'fault-lines' along which we can map officers' likely reactions to the changes?

- The community beat officers we interviewed were more likely to be unhappy about the 'formalising' effect of the form on encounters that they tended to prefer to conduct on an informal basis. For some, this seemed to apply to the conduct of searches as well as stops. They, along with other officers who routinely patrolled alone, were also more likely to raise issues of practicality and safety in relation to completing stop forms on the street, particularly stops of groups.
- There was no obvious relation between an officer's length of service and their reported reactions to the pilot. Some officers younger in service felt that the changes would be more of an imposition on older officers (the 'old sweats'), but this was not apparent from the interviews.
- Beyond these differences it is difficult to identify 'types' of officer more likely to react positively and to report change as a result of the pilot. There was a sense, however, that an officer was more likely to react positively where the changes fitted with, or at least did not restrict, their individual style of policing.

A number of research studies have identified clear, and consistent, differences in outlook and style among groups of patrol officers at constable level. These differences have been mapped against four general types of officer (Box 5).

**Box 5 Four general types of officer**

**Peacekeepers** – place greater emphasis on public tranquillity than law enforcement and are as happy to perform the service role as that of crime control.

**Law enforcers** – focus on law enforcement and the apprehension of criminals. Service work is given a lower priority and regarded as less important.

**Alienated cynics** – have become frustrated and disenchanted with the job and now merely seek to serve their time as easily as possible.

**Managerial professionals** – are officers ambitious for promotion, more likely to react favourably to management policies than fellow officers.

(from Reiner, 1995)

There is a danger that broad descriptions such as these are used as lazy generalisations. But, in this context, they provide some basis for identifying possible differences in officer reactions to the pilot.

- The piloted changes are most likely to fit the ‘policing-view’ of officers who fit the peacekeeping or managerial mode. Emphasis on these aspects would be more likely to enhance their support.
- The ‘thief-taking’ focus of law-enforcers may lead some of them to downplay the priority they give to the recording requirements. Managerial interventions to encourage such officers would need to emphasise other potential benefits of the changes, such as increased intelligence from recorded stops. (Though as we have seen this may just lead to selective recording along such lines.)
- Negative reactions to the pilot are unsurprising from any officer displaying obvious levels of cynicism or disenchantment. Efforts to encourage the commitment and participation of such officers are key but probably most difficult. The role played by the supervisors of such officers is likely to be very important.

## 7. Results: public trust and confidence

As we noted earlier, the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report highlighted the negative impact of stops and searches on police relations with the public, most specifically with minority ethnic communities. Previous research detailing this is reviewed in Miller, et al. (2000). The work conducted by BMRB with members of the public as part of this evaluation confirms this picture and generates further qualitative insights. This provides an important context for judging their views on the impact of the recommendations.

The chapter begins with a summary of their general views and then reports on the public's assessment of the importance of the piloted changes for public trust and confidence in the police. The full results of the work by BMRB are reported in Stone and Pettigrew (2000).

### Public views and expectations

All the respondents in the depth interviews had been stopped and/or searched at least once by the police in the last three months and were able to describe their experiences in great detail. The frequency of stops varied widely. At one extreme, some respondents had only been stopped once during the pilot period, whereas others had been stopped several times a week, describing it "as a fact of life".

There were also several instances of people recalling being stopped and searched repeatedly in one day, often within a very short space of time, which aroused strong feelings of anger and victimisation. Black, Asian and white respondents had experienced being stopped repeatedly.

Those who were stopped or searched told of the embarrassment they had felt at the time. Examples included being stopped outside work or outside their local mosque. Some also described how embarrassing it was to be separated out from a group of friends and searched in front of them. For some, who had been stopped both on foot and in a car, a foot stop was more embarrassing because in a car they might have been stopped simply for a traffic offence, but on foot they felt directly targeted.

Others were simply worried about who might have seen them - "someone always sees you", and would "think you are automatically a criminal". This compares sharply to the views of officers who regard such encounters as routine.

*Because I dislike being put aside by the police, that makes me look bad to anybody that's walking passed, they'll think 'He's been up to no good', it gives you a bad image.*

(White male, aged 18, searched, seen form)

This was particularly a worry for some of the younger respondents in the study who thought that they would be seen by family members - a view expressed by some of the Asian respondents.

*I think the other thing is if an Asian lad gets stopped, if the parents find out you've had it, you're going to get killed. Even if you've just been stopped and you've got a letter, they won't ask the reason toward the stop, they'll just... you know in a white family the parents will support the lad if he's not in the wrong. If he's in the wrong, fair enough, but if he's not in the wrong then they'll fight for it... Asian families etc. you'll get slapped.*

(Male respondent, Pakistani group discussion – male only, aged 18-29)

Even when some respondents felt they had 'nothing to hide', they still experienced a sense of fear or nervousness about being stopped, partly because of the nature of the experience, the lack of trust they held in the police, and their previous experiences with the police. Some of the respondents believed that the police would try and plant things on them or accuse them of something they had not done - "somebody else could have done something and I'm going to get pulled in for it". This belief was mainly based on occasions when they had heard of friends or relatives having had things planted on them.

*I must confess, there's a sense of a bit of fear because all I know, I was trying to find out the reason why and trying to link it up with the fare I picked up, and hope that I'm not being wrapped up with something I don't have any connection with.*

(Black African male, aged 38, searched, offered form)

Some of the Asian women in the study felt that their experiences of being stopped had been particularly frightening because of the manner of the police officers.

Views of the experience of being stopped tended to be negative - some respondents talked about the police appearing to have low expectations of them and treating them as if they were "guilty until proven innocent" - which was found to be insulting. Some were angry about the stop, especially when looking back on what had taken place.

However, there were those who had more positive experiences of being stopped for the following factors:

- the reason they were given seemed reasonable and genuine;
- the officers were polite and friendly in their attitude and questions;

## RESULTS: PUBLIC TRUST AND CONFIDENCE

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- the stop did not last a long time or inconvenience the respondent; and
- the respondents did not feel as though they were being targeted, for example, because of the car they were driving or the colour of their skin.

Even so, for those who were stopped, the negative experiences were far more memorable than the positive ones. This was believed to be for a couple of reasons. Firstly, because it was felt that the number of negative experiences outweighed the number of positive ones, and secondly because they tended to reflect, think and talk about the negative experiences more than the positive ones. It was apparent from the depth interviews and discussion groups that black respondents were much less likely to recall positive experiences than white or Asian respondents.

### *Perceptions of officers' attitudes*

Respondents were quite vocal about their perceptions of officers' attitudes during stop and search encounters. Sometimes the police were described as 'cocky' in their attitudes and the types of remarks they made during stops and searches, for example: "been nicking any cars tonight lads?" and "got any drug dealers' numbers on your mobile?".

Some respondents complained that police officers were patronising, arrogant, aggressive and intimidating. They believed that police officers like this aimed simply to provoke respondents into reacting vocally or even physically, to give the police an excuse to arrest them. Although this view was held across all ethnic groups, it was expressed particularly strongly by some of the black respondents:

*They're just trying to be sarcastic so you probably lose your temper or get arrogant with them. That's what they want I think.*

(Black Caribbean male, aged 25, searched, seen form)

Some of those who were stopped a lot believed that the police were frustrated because "stop and search doesn't work that well for them" and that this affected their attitude. Respondents from all ethnic groups who had been stopped regularly believed that the police officers were ruder to them than they would be to someone who was not stopped as often. This was based on a perception that officers "seem to take liberties". This manifested itself in some police officers not asking questions properly - they were seen to be telling rather than asking. Others were described as using very bad language, which was regarded as offensive, particularly by some of the older people in the study.

*Well, basically their exact words were, yeah and I've got witnesses because I was with two other people yeah, was: 'Don't fuck me about, right, and I won't fuck you about, where have you got your drugs?'*

(Pakistani male, aged 18, searched, no form seen or offered)

Some acknowledged that the police have to be strict and remain in control of the situation and that this may be reflected in their attitudes. Respondents, particularly in the group discussions, believed that the police might have aggressive attitudes because of the aggression that they had to deal with from the public. However, there was a sense that "aggression or a bad attitude is always going to be met with aggression or a bad attitude". Some respondents admitted to being quite abusive to the police when they were stopped, whilst others said they remained polite throughout because they wanted to get the stop over as quickly as possible. They did not want to provoke the police - there was a belief that by being abusive to them, an arrest or a 'trip down to the station' would result.

There was a sense that the police do not know how to address people from minority ethnic communities, which has been echoed in other studies. Some black and Asian respondents had experiences of police being directly racist to them during stops - "you Nigerians, you people should be led back to the jungle". Other black and Asian respondents thought that, although the police were not directly racist in their stop encounters, they were ruder and less polite than they would be to a white person - "you can just sense it, bad vibes and they just want to get you".

Some noted that when they were stopped by two police officers, which was felt to be very common, often one had a different attitude from another. For example, there were situations in the study where one police officer was described as friendly and polite, but the other one was aggressive and abusive. This was reflected in their general views of the police - "there are both good ones and bad ones".

However, there were instances where respondents felt that the attitude of the police was extremely good and that this made the stop as pleasant as it could be. They were described as being extremely polite, jovial in their manner, or "were talking to you like you were a mate". Some respondents stated that when the police officers had been polite and friendly, they themselves were polite and friendly in return:

*We got stopped by the police in unmarked clothes but they were really helpful and pleasant, they were asking us questions and they said to us: 'We were wondering if we could stop and search you'. And they asked us questions: 'Where do you live?'. They took our names, addresses, our descriptions, what clothes we were wearing*

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*but after he talked to us, and we were talking to him, we weren't showing him no attitude and they weren't showing us attitude so they didn't bother searching us, they just said: 'Thanks for being helpful to us'.*

(Indian male, aged 19, stopped, no form seen or offered)

### *Explaining the reasons for a stop*

Reasons were not always given to respondents as to why they had been stopped - this tended to fuel curiosity about the search, and made people feel more uncomfortable. It also made the experience more intimidating and frightening since they did not have any idea of why they were stopped. For some, however, when a reason was given by officers, there was suspicion that it had been concocted and was not genuine, leading people to feel targeted because of their colour of skin, dress, and age. For example, some respondents who were stopped quite regularly felt the police always gave the same reasons (e.g. "car in the next street has been broken into"). Similarly, the description of stops and searches by officers as 'routine' was felt by some to be unacceptable and reinforced the perception that the people being stopped were being targeted because of who they were rather than what they were doing.

Although on some occasions, the reason for the stop was the first thing stated by the police, there were some instances where no explanation was given until the stop was well underway. On other occasions, the reason was only given when the respondent asked why they were being stopped. Some respondents felt that the ways in which reasons for the stop were explained often sounded accusatory, reflecting the 'guilty until innocent' attitudes of the police, so that the person being stopped felt as though they were being accused of committing the "burglary down the road".

Where a reason was given and was believed to be genuine, respondents felt happier about the stop and believed that the police were just doing their job. Whether the reason was perceived to sound genuine or not was reflected by:

- how the police officers stated the reason;
- whether it seemed reasonable to that area e.g. if there was a lot of car crime in that area; and
- how the description of suspects came across.

There was a very strong perception that the way in which stops and searches are currently handled causes more distrust, antagonism, and resentment than any of the positive effects they can have - "they're probably screwing up more than they're actually getting results". This has been reflected in recent other research for PRC (Stone, 2000).

There was also concern about the amount of resources that stops and searches use at the expense of other methods. Some of the respondents from across all the ethnic groups who were stopped regularly held particularly strong views in this respect, as it was felt that police never found anything when they were stopped or searched.

However, respondents could not suggest alternatives for stops and searches, and felt that if there were fundamental changes in the ways they are used, who they are targeted at, attitudes of the police, and reasons given, then they had a role.

*Generally I think it is a good thing because - it is a good thing but it depends how they go about it and who they stop and who they search. The majority of the time they stop the wrong people, people who are innocent, they don't seem to stop anybody who is committing crimes.*

(Indian male, aged 19, searched, no form seen or offered)

Respondents could think of ways in which they felt stops and searches could work, in particular they could be used for finding weapons, drugs, stolen or shoplifted items, and that it might help to reassure the general public, in particular much older people with regard to their safety. Respondents felt they had thought of these ways with a lack of any real knowledge of what works in practice. Indeed, some of the group discussion respondents across all ethnic groups thought that the police should publicise how effective stops and searches were and "show how they are doing good stuff on the streets."

However, it was felt that "most of the time it is a pointless exercise" in that the police are never seen to target the right people. It was felt that the way in which stops and searches are targeted and handled meant that they do not appear 'to work': "the whole system has to change". Among the young black and Asian respondents in particular, it was felt to antagonise the local community, resulting in a lack of trust in the police.

### **Views and experiences of the pilot**

The focus of the BMRB work was on public views and experiences of the pilot. The research explored what effect the pilot forms had on respondents, specifically on their views of the police and whether having a record of the stop made the police more accountable.

Respondents regarded having a record of the stop encounter as important and so welcomed the idea of the form. They felt that receiving information in writing was a key benefit because it would help people better understand what had happened

during a stop and also their rights. Respondents also highlighted other potential benefits:

- **Having an informative record of the encounter to keep**

Some respondents liked the idea of having the opportunity to keep the form as their own record of their interaction with the police. Others who did not take a form (or pick one up) thought they would take one if they were stopped in the future. Some, who had taken a form, were surprised at the amount of information they gathered from it on closer reading.

- **The form as evidence for a complaint**

Some people were simply pleased that the police were looking to improve their use of stops and searches. Others remarked that the form could be used as evidence of what happened during a stop. This could be used in court or as part of a complaint. A complaint could be either about an individual stop experience, or in response to repeated stops which a person might consider to be harassment (by the police in general, or from an individual officer - having the name of the police officer in writing was important to respondents). It was felt the form went some way to overcome the feeling that it would be 'their word against mine' if a complaint were made. However, the form could only be used in this way if people were given the form every time they were stopped.

Some respondents believed the use of the form would also benefit the police. They felt that the form provided a way for the police to get across to people that they were just doing their job. It was felt that this might encourage a better atmosphere during the stop encounter.

Even though the form was a welcome step forward, some concerns were raised over civil liberties. Some respondents were disturbed at the thought of a pile of forms with people's name on, sitting at the police station, even though they had never actually been charged with any offence.

There were mixed views as regards the form and whether its use would instil trust amongst the general public. Some people felt the form made the police appear more professional and were impressed with the information setting out their rights. For example, one person welcomed the police officer showing him the form as a way of checking the accuracy of the record:

*It's good that he showed me what he was writing down, so I knew it was correct.*  
(White male, aged 18, stopped, seen form)

Also, it was suggested that the information describing how stops and searches should not be used by the police (such as, not stopping people on the basis of their ethnic identity) might instil some confidence, but as this was on the back of the form, it could be overlooked. In addition, receiving a copy of the form at the time helped some people to feel confident that information could not be altered should they wish to complain about how a stop was handled. They felt that this might occur if a police notebook was the only source of evidence. For example, one respondent remarked that he felt more confident that he would be believed if he could show the form as evidence for a complaint, but only if the police officer had signed the form at the time.

Even so, others were less sure. There was a sense that it may be “all good on paper”, and in terms of the law, but there was cynicism over how the police would interpret any recommendations and regulations. For this reason, some respondents were of the opinion that nothing would change as a result of the recommendations. Essentially, some felt that their confidence in the police relied on more than just receiving a form, and it was commented that it was how individuals were treated by the police that affected people’s trust:

*It’s not what they say, but how they say it.*

(White male, aged 33, searched, seen form)

Whilst there was some cynicism over how the police would interpret the recommendations, respondents did feel that the pilot forms improved the accountability of the police. However, one of the key ways in which accountability was believed to be enhanced was having the possibility of making a complaint if a person felt the number of times he or she was stopped (without justifiable reason) led the person to believe they were being harassed:

*It’d have the copper’s name on it. If he keeps harassing me and I got grief, [I could] see how many times... [and can see if I can] have something done about it.*

(White male, aged 19, searched, seen form)

Respondents were concerned that this step forward could be undermined if officers were not giving the form to people at every stop encounter. Since even those who were regularly stopped by the police during the pilot period could only remember seeing, or being offered, the form once, there were some doubts as to whether this apparent advantage of the recommendations would be of any benefit.

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Respondents felt that having an official document relating to the stop added a degree of professionalism to the encounter. This was worth more than just being told what was going on:

*I thought, he's doing it properly he's doing it like he's - because that's probably the first time I've ever had one of them offered. I never had one of them offered before.*  
(White male, aged 19, searched, seen form)

A record of the name and collar number of the officer who carried out the stop meant that people would know who to complain about should they need to. However, people noted that there was nothing on the form to tell them where a complaint should be directed:

*It doesn't tell you, if you have got a complaint, who to see.*  
(White male, aged 18, stopped, seen form)

Again, knowledge of their rights helped individuals to know what should be expected from a police officer during a stop - for example, that he or she is to give their name to the person they stop. Equally, the information helped people to understand what not to expect during a stop or search (for example, on what grounds a search can be carried out). There was some scepticism over this - for example, one respondent remarked that police powers were so wide that there was little they could not do under the law.

Accountability was thought to be heightened as information could not be altered after the event without it being obvious when the original and the copy were compared. Some people felt that the form only became proof (that is, evidence) if the police officer signed the form, but others went further; they wanted space on the form for the person stopped to sign it as a correct account of what happened.

There was concern that the form did not record the attitude of the police officer. Some people felt that a measure of this would increase accountability:

*I know it's a big step to be monitored - it's a long thing away. But I think that would be much, much better than like the paperwork. Or you have a record and they have a record - but you still don't know what really the police officer' like. Okay so you've got a record of them giving this. ... why they stopped you, but you don't know how their attitude was towards that stop. I think that's one of the biggest things.*

(Indian male, aged 19, stopped, no form offered or seen)

Another form of accountability mentioned by respondents was how the police monitored the information collected on the forms. People thought that without regular monitoring of stops there could be little accountability. Respondents were unclear as to whether any monitoring was undertaken, or for some, whether the monitoring that was done was adequate. It was suggested that an independent body should be responsible for monitoring and publishing the statistics on stops and searches. People were concerned that the police might manipulate the statistics and/or only publish them when the findings were favourable to the police. There was more confidence in having an independent body involved.

Some people wanted to know the statistics, even to the point of seeing what had happened on the day that they were stopped themselves. It was also suggested that the statistics could be broken down to the level of individual police officers to monitor individual biases in how stops and searches were used, particularly as a way of monitoring racism in the police:

*To make sure they are doing their job properly. To make sure they are not being racist in the people that they stop... just monitoring that they were doing it fairly.*  
(White male, aged 18, stopped, seen form)

Respondents were unaware of the statistics already publicly available on searches. For example, a woman wanted to know if her perception that searches were targeted at black people was indeed 'a fact'. It was felt that such data needed to be published so that the general public could have access to it. Respondents had more confidence in the statistics on stops and searches being published by the government or an independent body, than the police doing this themselves.

### *Suggested changes*

Respondents' experiences of the pilot led them to suggest a number of changes they felt would enhance the impact of recommendation 61. Importantly, they highlighted the need for the form to be properly explained by officers to ensure people understood the benefits of keeping it. The time spent on the form during the research interview had made respondents aware of the value of the form in a way that was not apparent at the time of the stop. It was suggested that the police start off with a verbal explanation and then give people the time to read the form if they wanted to. Some felt the police ought to tell people to have a look at the form.

In practice, during the pilot, some police officers did relate the form to the case of Stephen Lawrence, but others did not. Some respondents felt that making this connection added some reassurance as to the purpose and nature of the form:

*This is what they could have said. Because to be honest now that I look at this [form] - when you're given it you just don't look at it, you don't see it or you don't acknowledge the information. But there it says plainly: 'Leicester Constabulary is taking part in a national pilot following the recommendations made by the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry'. So why could they not have just said that? ... If they'd said 'as a direct result of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry this is what we're doing' I would have felt more comfortable about it then.*

(Indian, female, aged 29, stopped, seen form)

As mentioned previously, there was some frustration that the form was not given out at every stop encounter, which appeared to undermine the accountability of the police. Apart from ensuring that this takes place, respondents also mentioned the idea of having more publicity (for example, on television) about the whole initiative. It was suggested that this would have the benefit of keeping people informed, which, in turn, might help to calm down a potentially aggressive stop encounter. In addition, if people were better informed, then they might ask for a copy of the form in the knowledge that it existed and was available to them.

Some respondents felt that the form did not go far enough in terms of accountability. Some suggested that space could be made on the form for individuals to write in their comments alongside side that of the police. This reflected an implicit lack of trust in the police, about either what information officers would record on the form; or that officers might alter the written form in some way. Others, however, felt that being given a signed copy of the form addressed this issue adequately.

### Summary

- The BMRB research highlighted concerns (noted earlier) about the way police officers deal with people they stop or search. Interviewees gave examples where they felt officers had not treated them properly and had not explained why they had been stopped. Some had experienced multiple stops in short periods. There were also examples of police officers dealing with people very well. But interviewees were clear that their bad experiences had greater impact on them. Black respondents were far less likely to recall positive experiences than white or Asian respondents.
- It was clear that most people stopped or searched had not received an explanation of the pilot and the new form from the officer who had stopped them. This had limited their understanding of the purpose and usefulness of the form. In interview, however, they had more time to reflect. They regarded having a record of the stop encounter as important and so welcomed the idea of the form.

- Receiving information in writing was viewed as a key benefit. It would help people to better understand what had happened during a stop and to also understand their rights. Respondents also highlighted other potential benefits of the form:
  - it was an informative record to keep;
  - it could be as evidence for a complaint;
  - it helped to show that the police were just doing their job; and
  - it made police seem more professional.
- In terms of increasing their trust and confidence in the police, people were clear that officers' attitude and the way they dealt with people was more important than the formal procedure they followed.

### 8. Conclusions and recommendations

The evaluation focused on the impact of the pilot in relation to three main headline outcomes. What can we now conclude about the capacity of the Inquiry's recommendations to deliver significant changes in those areas?

#### Monitoring and accountability

The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report made clear the view that there was a need for an enhanced statistical picture of police stops of the public, particularly in relation to stops of people from minority ethnic groups. However, the usefulness of the statistical picture, either for effective monitoring or as a basis for meaningful accountability, relies on the accuracy of the figures on which it is built.

- The level of under-recording found in the pilot places in doubt the accuracy of any statistical picture produced. It is likely that the figures produced during the pilot represent, at best, a third of the encounters that should have been recorded. The accuracy of data on searches is likely to be better than the data on stops, but remains less than perfect.
- The evaluation did not show conclusively that the pilot had improved the recording of searches. Interviews with officers suggested that more (but not all) searches, including so-called voluntary searches, were recorded than before the pilot. Levels of recorded searches on the sites, however, showed little obvious change.
- The pilot made completion of search records at the time more likely. As a result, it is highly likely that more people received a record when searched compared to before the pilot.
- Stops were far less likely to be recorded than searches. The definition and guidance developed for the pilot did not, in practice, provide absolute clarity about what constituted a stop. The lack of clarity was greater for pedestrian stops than for vehicle stops. The pilot highlighted the inherent difficulty of developing a definition to cover the range and variation of police-public encounters, and which could be easily applied in practice. It is difficult to see how this could be overcome to ensure full recording.
- Practical solutions are likely to focus on a tighter definition of a police stop. A partial solution to this problem might be simply to extend ethnic monitoring to existing stop forms, such as FPNs, VDRS and HO/RT1.

- Officers were more likely to record stops selectively in comparison to searches. This reflected, in part, less support for the recording of stops amongst officers. They saw less value in recording stops from both their own and the public's perspective.
- The results of the pilot highlighted the importance of management input in encouraging and supporting compliance with the recording requirements. It is clear that significant and sustained managerial involvement would be needed to implement the Inquiry's recommendations across the police service and to make them work in full. The role of the immediate supervisor and central monitoring is significant.
- The training delivered to officers prior to the pilot was also important. In retrospect, the results of the pilot suggest that this training placed too great an emphasis on the process of filling out the form. Many officers were unclear about the point of the pilot and the reasons for the changes in the recording requirements. This may well help to explain why officers often did not adequately explain the pilot to people they stopped or searched.

### *Recording self-defined ethnicity*

- The collection of self-defined ethnic data is possible but not unproblematic. The question could, on occasion, produce difficult or hostile reactions from members of the public. The evidence indicates that negative reactions were minimised when officers provided, in advance, a clear explanation for the question.
- Explaining the purpose of collecting information on ethnicity is also important to reassure people. Some people were concerned about how the police might use the information, for example to make links between ethnicity and crime or to check their residency status.
- The results of the pilot suggest that the new coding provides some basis for enhanced ethnic monitoring. However, the proportion of missing data on self-defined ethnicity for people classified as African Caribbean would be problematic if replicated in any national monitoring system. This points to the need to retain the officer-based classification system in parallel with any new self-defined monitoring.
- It was clear that the self-defined coding based on the 2001 census classifications was far more practicable for monitoring purposes than the open question, and was also more easily used by officers.

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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### *The new form*

- The integrated form was generally supported by officers, who welcomed the rationalisation of three forms into one. Nonetheless, completion of the integrated form seemed to be more complicated than the 'simple' stop form. This led to problems in the accurate recording of information on the form.
- Members of the public interviewed for the study welcomed the use of the new form and saw it as a useful basis for accountability. They were critical, however, of the police jargon printed on the form and written by officers. The use of jargon limited their understanding of the information on the form and thus its usefulness as a basis for accountability. The information on police powers received strong support.

### **Officer practice**

- The views expressed in interview suggest that, among some officers in all sites, the changes have prompted some change in their 'mind-set'. Officers were more likely to at least 'think twice' about stops and searches, and provide more explanation and information during any stop or search. Many of these officers saw tangible benefits in the changes.
- This suggests that recommendation 61 may have some important symbolic value: the requirement to give a record at the time highlighting to officers the significance of stop and search encounters for the public and the consequent need for thought and care in conducting them.
- However, there were other officers for whom the recording requirements were an imposition, with only negative implications for how they police. Changes in their policing practice as a result of the pilot was thus far less likely.

### **Public trust and confidence**

- Members of the public interviewed for this study saw benefit in receiving written information about the reason for the stop, the name of the officer who stopped them, their rights and police powers. It was clear though that public trust and confidence is primarily based on being treated fairly and with respect and being given a good reason for the stop, rather than on changes in procedure.
- Despite the efforts of the pilot sites to publicise the changes, it was clear that public awareness was low. This meant that many people stopped by the police were uninformed or confused about the purpose of the form. This was particularly the case when officers did not provide an explanation at the time.

Overall, it is clear that the recommendations of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, on their own, are unlikely to produce sufficiently positive outcomes in relation to fairness and community confidence in stops and searches. The findings and conclusions of the research in the rest of PRC's programme should help to identify other necessary measures.

### Recommendations

- Officers should be required to make a record at the time for all searches covered by PACE Code A, including so-called voluntary searches. The record should be offered to the person searched.
- Despite the problems highlighted by the pilot, further consideration should still be given to the difficult issue of recording of police stops. This study has confirmed that the public welcome receiving a written record of such encounters.
- The search record should include information about all police powers to search and associated public rights. Information should also be provided explaining how a member of the public can register a complaint. The information on the form should be presented in a way that is easily understood.
- Officers should be trained in how best to use the form. Such training should emphasise to officers the importance of giving a clear explanation about the purpose of the form to the person stopped.
- With regard to recommendation 63, the Home Office and the Association of Police Authorities should consider how best to raise wider public awareness about police powers and duties in relation to stops and searches. One possibility, currently in use in some forces, is a widely available pamphlet describing police powers and public rights in relation to stops and searches.

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## Appendix A

### Guidelines for recording 'stops' and 'searches' under Macpherson

#### 1. Introduction

- 1.1 These guidelines have been developed primarily to help operational officers involved in the Macpherson stop and search pilots<sup>15</sup>. Their central aim is to provide practical guidance about the type of police-public encounters that should be recorded as 'stops' or 'searches' under the Macpherson recommendations.
- 1.2 The guidelines seek to follow the Macpherson Report proposals on expanded recording of police stops. The report does not provide a detailed definition of a 'stop' but gives an indication of the type of encounter in paragraph 45.8 and recommendation 61 (reproduced below).

<sup>15</sup> The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry was referred to as the Macpherson Inquiry during the planning stages of the pilot.

*Para 45.8: [The experience of minority ethnic communities] goes beyond the formal stop and search figures recorded under the provisions of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, and is conditioned by their experiences of being stopped under traffic legislation, drugs legislation and so called 'voluntary' stops.*

*Recommendation 61: ...ensure that a record is made by police officers of all 'stops' and 'stops and searches' made under any legislative provision (not just the Police and Criminal Evidence Act). Non-statutory or so-called 'voluntary' stops must also be recorded. The record to include the reason for the stop, the outcome, and the self-defined ethnic identity of the person stopped. A copy of the record shall be given to the person stopped.*

- 1.3 The following definition, and associated guidance, has been developed for the purposes of the pilot:

When a police officer requests a person to account for their actions, behaviour or possession of anything the encounter will be regarded as a 'stop' for the purposes of this pilot. This will apply if the person is on foot, driving or riding any vehicle, or is a passenger in or on such a vehicle.

*It therefore does not include general conversations, giving directions or when seeking witnesses to an incident or an offence. Where, however, a person submits to a **voluntary** search or to the **voluntary** search of a vehicle in his or her charge, this must be appropriately recorded.*

1.4 The following provides more detailed practical guidance on how to implement this definition.

### **2. Pedestrian and vehicle searches**

2.1 Any search conducted under whichever appropriate legislation, or voluntarily, should be recorded as a search.

2.2 There may be occasions when voluntary searches are used on a broad-scale (such as at sporting events, demonstrations and large-scale public events) as part of a defined operation. In these circumstances searches should be recorded unless it is judged by the senior officer in charge (of Superintendent rank or above) that this requirement would impact detrimentally on the effectiveness of the operation. Such a decision, and the reason for it, should be recorded by the senior officer in charge.

### **3. Pedestrian stops**

3.1 There are many different occasions when a police officer will be prompted to approach or stop a member of the public and talk to them, with or without exerting any power to detain the person. The following set of encounters should be regarded as recordable 'stops' for the purposes of the Macpherson pilots:

(a) Where an officer detains a person for the purposes of search (under whichever appropriate legislation) but does not undertake a search because the grounds for the search are removed as result of initial questioning or for some other reason.

(b) Where an officer has no grounds for search but has suspicions or concerns about a person's specific behaviour or actions, their presence in a particular location, or their possession of a particular article, at that time, and those suspicions prompt the officer to approach or voluntarily stop the person to interrogate them to account for that behaviour, action, presence, or possession.

(c) Where an officer stops a person for the primary purpose of obtaining information about that person.

3.2 The following need not be recorded as stops:

- (a) Where an officer approaches a person and talks to them for the primary purpose of gaining general information or community intelligence, or to maintain a relationship with that person as a source of information (such as may be involved with speaking to a community informant or persistent offender).
- (b) Where an officer stops someone to immediately arrest them or report them for an offence.
- (c) Attempts to obtain preliminary information from potential witnesses.
- (d) General 'social' interactions and enquiries.
- (e) When officers are stopped or approached by members of the public (e.g. to ask for assistance).

#### 4. Vehicle stops

4.1 The following encounters should be regarded as stops for the purposes of the Macpherson pilots and recorded as such:

- (a) Where an officer detains a vehicle for the purposes of searching the vehicle and/or the driver and/or occupants but does not undertake a search because the grounds for the search are removed as result of initial questioning.
- (b) Where an officer has suspicions or concerns (but no grounds for search) about the behaviour or actions of a driver and/or occupants of a vehicle, the possession of a particular article, or the presence of a vehicle in a particular location at that time, and those suspicions prompt the officer to stop the vehicle to question the driver and/or other occupants of the vehicle to account for that behaviour, action, possession or presence.
- (c) Where an officer stops a vehicle and requires the driver to prove ownership of, and right to drive, the vehicle, through requesting driving or test certificate documents, whether or not this involves the issuing of an HO/RT1.

4.2 Stop records for any passenger in a vehicle stopped under Macpherson should only be completed if an officer is suspicious about a passenger's behaviour, actions or possession of an article and the officer asks that passenger to account for that action, behaviour or possession.

- 4.3 The following need not be recorded separately as vehicle 'stops' for the purposes of the Macpherson pilots:
- (a) Where an officer stops a driver because they have committed a moving traffic offence and completes the relevant paperwork (e.g. Vehicle Defect Rectification Scheme or Fixed Penalty Notice).
  - (b) Where a driver is stopped following an accident.

### 5. Making a record

5.1 The following points should be noted:

- (a) When making a record the officer should briefly inform the person stopped about the national pilots.
- (b) An officer should ask for the name and address of the person stopped. If the person queries this request, the officer should inform them that they are not required to provide the information. The officer should explain that the details will ensure a complete record of the encounter. If the person stopped still refuses, a brief physical description of the person should be noted.
- (c) An officer should briefly note down the reason why they stopped the person and the outcome of the stop. For a search, under whichever legislative power, full grounds for the search need to be recorded.
- (d) Where an officer judges that it is impractical to make a record of the stop at the time, they should ensure that a record is completed retrospectively, with a brief explanation of the reason why it could not be completed at the time.
- (e) The person stopped should be offered a copy of the record at the time of the stop (though they are not required to take it). If this proves impractical the officer should inform the person that they can obtain one from the officer's station later (but only if they have given their name and address).

5.2 Self-defined ethnic classification

- (a) The self-defined ethnicity of every person stopped or stop/searched should be recorded.
- (b) The ethnicity of every person stopped should also be recorded based on an officer's visual perception.

- (c) An officer should make a visual classification before asking the person about their self-defined ethnicity. It is important that officers record their visual perceptions accurately. This is not a test of officers' abilities - it is not about getting a 'correct answer', but about improving ethnic monitoring and confidence in the police.
- (d) We advise that questions on ethnic identity should be asked at the end of an encounter to prevent confrontation or allegations of preferential treatment. This, however, is at the discretion of officers.

## Appendix B

### Recording 'stops' and 'searches' under Macpherson – training guidance

#### 1. Introduction

The aim of the Training Guidance is to highlight to trainers and officers the central themes and issues relating the national pilots of the Macpherson stop and search recommendations. The guidance seeks to:

- describe the background and aims of the recommendations and national pilots; and
- advise officers on how best to manage stop encounters in terms of stopping members of the public, making a record, recording self-defined ethnicity, and issuing the stop form.

A set of examples are also provided as an annex to help clarify to officers the definition of a 'stop' and the required recording practices.

#### 2. Background to the pilot

Officers should be aware that the introduction of new forms and recording practices are the basis for the national pilots of the Macpherson stop and search recommendations. Rather than accept the recommendations on stop and search outright, the Home Secretary gave his commitment in the Action Plan responding to the Macpherson Inquiry to assess their implication for the service. The Policing and Reducing Crime Unit has been given the responsibility for co-ordinating and evaluating the pilots.

The stop and search recommendations are being piloted in four sites: the MPS (in the boroughs of Hounslow and Greenwich); Leicestershire; West Yorkshire; and Suffolk. All the sites are planning to 'go live' in November. There will be a bedding-in period in which teething problems are likely to be experienced. However, as Hounslow started piloting in 1 July many of these teething problems should have been addressed or planned for.

PRC will report on the pilots to fit with progress on the Home Secretary's Action Plan. There are three likely outcomes: the recommendations will be accepted in full; elements of the recommendations will be accepted; or the recommendations will be rejected. The final decision will be informed by the experiences of the four pilot sites.

PRC plan to evaluate the pilot throughout the six month piloting period through four main components:

- analysis of stop and stop/search data;
- officer interviews to gather their experiences of the pilot and how the new recording practices affect their operational duties;
- observation of officers carrying out stops and stop/searches; and
- interviews and/or discussion groups with members of local communities.

Operational officers will therefore have a central role in the implementation and evaluation of the pilot. PRC welcome their co-operation in addition to their openness and honesty.

### 3. The Macpherson stop and search recommendations

Officers should be aware that the overarching aim of the Macpherson recommendations is “to increase the trust and confidence in policing amongst minority ethnic groups”. In addition, the report made three specific recommendations in relation to police stop and search powers:

*Recommendation 60:*

*That the powers of the police under current legislation are required for the prevention and detection of crime and should remain unchanged.*

**Accepted by the Home Secretary.**

*Recommendation 61:*

*...that a record is made by police officers of all ‘stops’ and ‘stops and searches’ made under any legislative provision (not just the Police and Criminal Evidence Act). Non-statutory or so-called ‘voluntary’ stops must also be recorded. The record to include the reason for the stop, the outcome, and the self-defined ethnic identity of the person stopped. A copy of the record shall be given to the person stopped.*

**To be piloted.**

*Recommendation 62:*

*That these records should be monitored and analysed by the Police Service and Police Authorities, and reviewed by HMIC on inspections- the information and analysis should be published.*

**To be piloted.**

The national pilots are planned to test the impact and feasibility of implementing the Macpherson recommendations. The recommendations and the national pilots are not about removing the power of stop and search, but about re-building trust in the police across all communities. Both Macpherson and the Home Secretary view stop/search as a useful and effective police tactic.

### 4. Managing stop encounters

Officers should be aware of PACE stop/search requirements, the definition of a 'stop', the recording guidelines, and additional training included in the annex.

#### *Stopping a member of the public*

Research has shown that members of the public are more satisfied after a stop/search if the police officers involved explain why they were stopped. Officers should, therefore, be advised to explain to the person verbally why they have been stopped. Early findings from one pilot site indicate that most stops and stop/searches are relatively 'easy' if the person is given full information by officers. Officers are also advised to refer to the national pilots when carrying out a stop.

#### *Making a record*

Records for statutory stops and searches under PACE and other legislation should be complete in accordance with the PACE Codes of Practice. Records for voluntary searches and all other stops should be completed as described in the Guidelines for Recording Stops and Searches under Macpherson.

When recording stops under the pilot project, members of the public might raise concerns about the recording of their details. To alleviate public concerns, officers might explain that the person is not being 'issued a ticket' and that details are being recorded to comply with the recommendations of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry. Further details of the pilot project should be provided by the officer if they are requested to do so.

In making a record, officers should request the name and address of the person stopped. Early experiences indicate that, in general, members of the public who have been stopped do not object to giving this information. Where public concerns have been raised, officers have commented that additional information can alleviate these concerns. Therefore, if a person queries an officer's request, the officer should explain to the person that they are not required to give their name and address, but that the information will ensure a full record of the encounter. If the information is not provided, officers are advised to take a full description of the person. A parallel can be drawn with the recording of names and addresses for searches as described in the PACE Codes of Practice.

The record should contain the reason for the stop and its outcome. This information is required to provide a full explanation to the person stopped and for a complete record of the encounter. Officers are advised to record brief details of the reason for and outcome of 'voluntary' stops.

For example:

- Reason for stop: loitering round garages.  
Outcome of stop: concerns alleviated.
- Reason for stop: to speak to man parked in high crime area late at night.  
Outcome of stop: issue of VDRS.

Officers are expected to provide full grounds for searches under PACE or any other legislative provision.

#### *Recording self-defined ethnicity*

Officers should record the self-defined ethnicity of every person stopped. Officers are advised to ask the question in the following way: "How do you describe your ethnic background?". It is suggested that the question be asked at the end of the stop to prevent confrontation or allegations of preferential treatment. Officers in the MPS and Leicestershire are expected to write the response of the person in the free-text space provided. Officers in Suffolk and West Yorkshire should show the person the flashcard and note down the appropriate category (A-P).

Officers should be aware that this information is required to help improve ethnic monitoring by distinguishing between 'invisible' ethnic groups (e.g. the difference between Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Indian).

Early findings show that most people do not have a problem with answering the question. In cases where public concerns are raised, officers are advised to explain to the person stopped that the information is being recorded to comply with the recommendations of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry. If the person still refuses to provide the information, officers are advised to note that the information was not provided. If the person gives an 'incorrect' answer (e.g. a white person states they are black), the officer should record the response as that has been given. It is important that an accurate record of an encounter is made based on the information provided by the person stopped.

If the person stopped does not understand the question, officers are advised to rephrase it (e.g. "what is your cultural background?", "what is your heritage/parentage?" or "describe your racial origin?") or to use appropriate examples to help the person.

The ethnicity of every person stopped should also be recorded based on an officer's visual perception. Visual perceptions should be recorded using the PNC codes in the space provided. Officers should record their visual classification accurately before they ask the self-defined ethnicity question. This information should be recorded to fulfil current monitoring requirements and to evaluate the self-defined ethnic classification. Officers should be made aware that this is not a test of their abilities or about getting a 'correct answer', but about improving ethnic monitoring and public confidence in the police.

### *Completing the stop form*

A stop form should be completed for every stop that fulfils the criteria set out in the guidelines for recording.

In some encounters, it might not be possible or practical to make a record at the time of the stop (e.g. the stop is confrontational). This is at the discretion of the officer. In these cases, officers are advised to inform the person stopped that they are entitled to a record, and to complete the form retrospectively.

For example:

- A lone officer stops a group of youths to interrogate them. The encounter between the officer and the youths is tense. The professional judgement of the officer is to record the encounter later to prevent the encounter escalating into confrontation.
- During a stop encounter, an officer receives an urgent call which he/she must respond to immediately.

### *Issuing the stop form*

Every person stopped under the guidelines for recording is entitled to a complete record of the encounter. Officers should offer the person stopped a copy of the record at the time, but should also be aware that the person stopped is not required to take the copy. Officers are advised not to forcibly give the person stopped a record of the encounter (if a copy of the record is declined, this should be noted on the stop form).

If it is impractical to make a record of the stop (for the reasons described above), officers should inform the person that they can obtain a copy of the stop form from the officer's station at a later date. This provision is only available to members of the public who have given their names and addresses to officers.

## 5. Annex - Defining and recording 'stops'

Officers are expected to follow the guidelines for recording stops and stop/searches. In support of the guidelines, examples have been developed to help clarify when stops should be recorded. It would not be possible to provide an exhaustive list of examples and those provided are simply illustrative. Officers will be expected to use their professional judgement to decide whether they have carried out a 'stop' as defined for the national pilots.

Every officer taking part in the pilot should receive copies of the stop definition and the accompanying Guidelines for Recording. Officers should be given time to read and ask questions on the definition and related guidance. For the purposes of the pilot, a 'stop' has been defined as the following:

"When a police officer requests a person to account for their actions, behaviour or possession of anything the encounter will be regarded as a 'stop' for the purposes of this pilot. This will apply if the person is on foot, driving or riding any vehicle, or is a passenger in or on such a vehicle.

It therefore does not include general conversations, giving directions or when seeking witnesses to an incident or an offence. Where, however, a person submits to a *voluntary* search or to the *voluntary* search of a vehicle in his or her charge, this must be appropriately recorded."

Officers should be reminded to record all stops and stop/searches under PACE and other legislation. It might be necessary to refresh officers in their statutory powers of stop and search, primarily in terms of object and grounds for search, and recording requirements.

The following examples have been developed to help clarify to officers the recording requirements of the pilots (the numbering refers to the guidelines for recording):

### Searches

- 2.1 Any statutory or 'voluntary' search carried out by the officer, even if consent has been given (e.g. 'Would you mind emptying your pockets? You do not have to consent to the search, and if you don't consent, I do not have the power to search you.').

### Exemptions from recording

- 2.2 Senior officers should be aware of their decision-making responsibilities during broad scale operations. Voluntary searches should be recorded by officers until the senior officer decides otherwise. Statutory searches are not covered by this provision and should be recorded as described above.

### Pedestrian stops

- 3.1 (a) describes stops for the purpose of a search, the grounds for which are removed as a result of initial questions. These are covered by the PACE Codes of Practice which officers should be reminded of.

For example:

*A man matching the description of a suspect is seen by officers attempting to gain entry to the back of house. The officers believe that they have grounds to search the man for 'going equipped'. On initial questioning the man explains he has lost his keys and is trying to get into his property. The man shows the necessary identification and the officers are satisfied with his explanation and so do not conduct a search - a stop record is completed.*

- 3.1 (b) describes encounters where the primary purpose of a stop is for an officer to check what a person is doing or carrying, or to check on his/her presence in a particular place. The aim of the stop is to interrogate the person who has been stopped (e.g. 'what are you carrying?', 'what are you up to?', and 'can you explain why you are here?').

For example:

*A man is seen loitering around parked cars in a crime hotspot. An officer approaches the man to check what he is doing and is satisfied by his explanation.*

*An officer stops a group of youths to questions them in connection with some fresh graffiti in the area. The officer asks to look at the youths' hands for paint and asks whether any of them have any spray cans.*

- 3.1 (c) refers to encounters where the primary purpose for stopping a person is to get information about them. This might describe some of the interactions between beat officers and prominent nominals, where officers gather intelligence on the person who has been stopped (e.g. 'how's the drug habit?', 'have you got a car at the moment?' or 'how are you making a living?').

For example:

*There have been a number of burglary dwellings on an estate. The beat officer is interested to find out if any of the local persistent young offenders might be responsible. As a result, the officer approaches one of the persistent offenders (known to finance a drug habit through burglary) to ask them if they have been involved and if they are still taking heroin.*

*An officer does not recognise two teenagers on her beat. Although they are not acting suspiciously, the officer questions them to find out who they are and what they are doing in the area.*

### **Exemptions not to be recorded**

- 3.2 (a) describes encounters where the main aim of talking to a person is to get general information from them or to maintain on-going communications with them. This might describe other interactions with prominent nominals, where the person is not asked to account for themselves (e.g. 'is anyone dealing on the estate?', 'who is Johnny hanging around with?' or 'do you know who's involved in the robberies?').

For example:

*A known 'joy-rider' who is not acting suspiciously is approached by an officer. The officer's primary interest is to find out from the 'joy-rider' who might be responsible for recent car thefts. The 'joy-rider' is asked who has been hanging around the area and whether he has seen anything.*

*An officer approaches a community informant who has not been in the area recently. The officer is keen to start a conversation with the informant to maintain the future flow of intelligence: "I haven't seen you on my beat for a while. How are things?".*

Officers will be expected to use their professional judgement to distinguish between these encounters and those described above in 3.1.

- 3.2 (b) refers to cases where the person stopped is arrested or reported for an offence immediately. Stops or stop/searches that later result in an arrest should be recorded.
- 3.2 (c) describes encounters where the person is questioned as a potential witness (whether or not a witness statement is eventually taken).

For example:

*An officer receives a call about an indecent exposure. On attending the scene, the officer asks a man in the area whether he has seen anything. The man is asked to describe the events and to provide a detailed description of the suspect.*

- 3.2 (d) includes encounters that are primarily 'social' in nature. During a social interaction, an officer might ask a person questions but these should not be of any policing interest.

For example:

*An officer attends a club after closing and starts a friendly conversation with a group. They have not been acting suspiciously or expected to provide intelligence for policing purposes. During the conversation the officer asks them out of interest where they are from and what pubs they have been to.*

However, should the interaction result in the person being made to account for their actions, behaviour or possessions, the encounter should be recorded as a stop.

- 3.2 (e) refers to encounters that have been initiated by members of the public.

For example:

*An officer is stopped by a member of the public and asked for directions.*

*A local resident approaches an officer to notify him/her about offences in the area.*

### Vehicle stops

- 4.1 (a) describes vehicle stops that do not result in a search of the vehicle, driver or passengers. These are covered by the PACE Codes of Practice of which officers should be reminded.
- 4.1 (b) describes encounters where the primary purpose of the stop is to check what the driver or occupant of a vehicle is doing or carrying, or to check on the presence of the vehicle in a particular place. The aim of the stop is to interrogate the driver and/or passengers who have been stopped (e.g. 'what are you carrying?', 'where are you going to?', and 'can you explain why you are driving around here?').

For example:

*A young man is parked out at the back of some garages in a high crime area in the early hours of the morning. An officer decides to stop the man and to ask what he is up to. The man explains that he is waiting for a friend to the satisfaction of the officer.*

*A response car stops a mini containing five youths at a petrol station. The driver is asked what he is up to and where they are going. Two of the passengers (known drug takers) are asked if they are carrying drugs.*

- 4.1 (c) describes a vehicle stop where a driver is questioned about the ownership of, or right to drive, the vehicle. This may, or may not, involve the officer asking the driver to produce driving or test certificate documents. Such encounters should be recorded as stops whether or not the driving documents are produced at the time, or an HO/RT1 is issued .

For example:

*A car is stopped because the tax disk is not visible. Following some initial enquiries, the driver is also asked to produce his driving licence. As the driver is unable to produce the requested documents, he is issued with a HO/RT1.*

*A known offender driving a van is stopped by an officer because she is suspicious about the ownership of the vehicle. She questions the driver about the van's mileage, when the tax expires and its type of tyres and runs a registered owner and lost or stolen vehicle computer check. As a result, she is content that the driver owns the vehicle.*

- 4.2 highlights that stop records for any passengers in a vehicle should only be recorded if they are interrogated by an officer about themselves or possessions:

In the earlier example of the five youths in a mini, two of the passengers were questioned in addition to the driver. In this case, stop forms should be completed for the driver and the two passengers questioned but not for the other two passengers.

#### **Exemptions not to be recorded**

- 4.3 (a) refers to encounters where an officer stops a driver because they have committed a moving traffic offence and the officer subsequently completes the relevant paperwork.

For example:

*A driver is stopped for speeding/driving through a red light. As a result, the driver is issued with a fixed penalty notice.*

*A car turning right is seen by officers to have a faulty indicator light. The driver is stopped as a result and immediately issued with a VDRS.*

- 4.3 (b) - self-explanatory.

## Appendix C

### Self-defined ethnic categories

The 2001 Census question on ethnicity is composed of two parts. Respondents are asked to select a broad ethnic group and then a more specific cultural background within this group. The following categories, used in the pilot, relate to the census classifications on cultural background.

- A. White - British
- B. White - Irish
- C. Any other White background
  
- D. White and Black Caribbean
- E. White and Black African
- F. White and Asian
- G. Any other Mixed background
  
- H. Asian - Indian
- I. Asian - Pakistani
- J. Asian - Bangladeshi
- K. Any other Asian background
  
- L. Black - Caribbean
- M. Black - African
- N. Any other Black background
  
- O. Chinese
- P. Any other



## Explaining Police Powers to Stop or Search You . . . Know Your Rights!

### GENERAL CONTACT

The police can speak to you or any other person during the course of their duties. They do not need to suspect you of having committed any offence to do this.

### SEARCHES REQUIRING REASONABLE SUSPICION INCLUDE:-

- Sec. 1 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
- Sec. 23 Misuse of Drugs Act 1971
- Sec. 47 Firearms Act 1968

The police have the power to detain you, and/or your vehicle, for the purposes of a search if they have reasonable grounds to suspect that you have with you:

- Stolen goods
- A knife, pointed or bladed article or other offensive weapon
- Articles that can be used for burglary, theft or deception
- Drugs
- A firearm

Before detaining you for the purpose of a search for the above items, the police must have reasonable grounds for suspecting that the item will be found. They **cannot** detain you for the purpose of a search on **personal factors** alone, e.g., just because you are:

- Young
- From an ethnic minority group
- Dressed in a particular way (unless you fit a description of someone suspected of having committed an offence nearby)

Your vehicle may also be searched under these powers when it is unattended. If so a notice must be left in or on it by the searching officer stating that he/she has searched it; the name of his police station; that an application for compensation for any damage caused may be made to the police station. You can apply for a copy of the search record within 12 months.

### STOP AND SEARCH UNDER TERRORISM POWERS OR IF VIOLENCE IS ANTICIPATED

- Sec. 60 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994

The police also have powers to detain you and/or your vehicle (if it is with you) and to search for offensive weapons and dangerous instruments if it is believed that incidents involving **serious** violence may soon take place in the locality, or that persons are carrying dangerous instruments or offensive weapons in the locality. A senior officer must give written authority which will be held at the police station.

- Sec. 13A and 13B Prevention of Terrorism (Additional Powers) Act 1996

There are also powers to stop and search vehicles and their occupants (13A) and pedestrians (13B) in an area, if a senior police officer authorises it, to prevent acts of terrorism.

For these three powers, the officer does **not** have to have reasonable grounds to suspect the individual stopped or searched of carrying dangerous instruments or offensive weapons or of involvement in the anticipated violence or terrorism. However these powers may only be used by a police officer in uniform.

### STOPPING A MOTOR VEHICLE ON THE ROAD

- Sec. 163 Road Traffic Act 1988

A police officer in uniform can also stop any vehicle and speak to the driver. They do not need to suspect you of having committed any offence. They can also require you to produce your documents for the vehicle at a police station if you are not able to show them at the time. If they do this you will be issued with a different document.

The power to stop a motor vehicle does not give a right of search. If the police want to search your vehicle without your consent they have to do so under one of the above powers.

**An officer may also search a person or their vehicle in the street with their consent where no search power exists. The officer should ensure that the person is told that they need not consent and that without their consent they will not be searched.**

Juveniles, people suffering from a mental handicap or mental disorder and others who appear not to be capable of giving an informed consent should not be subject to a voluntary search.

West Yorkshire



**WEST YORKSHIRE  
POLICE**

## INFORMATION FOR PERSONS STOPPED OR SEARCHED

**STOP AND SEARCH HELPS TO PREVENT CRIME  
AND CATCH OFFENDERS. IT IS USED FOR THE  
BENEFIT OF THE LOCAL COMMUNITY.**

### Requirements before and after search

- Police officers are required to use powers of stop and search fairly and without prejudice. They are also required to be as considerate and courteous as possible whilst maintaining their own and the public's safety.
- Stop and search powers allow police to search you, anything you may be carrying and any vehicle you may be in.
- When exercising these powers police officers can use reasonable force to detain and search you but they are only allowed to use force if you have been given the chance to co-operate, where appropriate, but have refused.

### WHAT THE POLICE OFFICER MUST DO

Before using any search power the police officer must take reasonable steps to inform you of:

- their name (except for terrorism searches) and the police station they are from;
- the object of the search;
- the grounds or authorisation for the search; and
- that you are entitled to a full copy of the record of the stop or search now or within twelve months.

If the police officer is in plain clothes:

- they are required to show you their warrant card.

If the search is in public the police officer can require you to take off only:

- your outer coat, jacket and gloves.

If a more thorough search is necessary, it must be conducted:

- out of public view; and
- by an officer of the same sex as you.

If you have any comments about the stop or search you may contact your local police station.



**CRIMESTOPPERS** *Anonymous information about crime could earn a cash reward.*

**0800 555 111**

### STOP/SEARCH RECORD

**PERSON STOPPED OR SEARCHED**

Name: .....  
 Address: .....  
 Postcode: .....  
 DoB: ...../...../..... Sex: M/F\* Tel: .....  
 Verified: .....  
 ID Code: ..... Self defined ethnic classification: .....

**IF STOP ONLY, COMPLETE 'B' BELOW**

**IF STOP AND SEARCH, COMPLETE 'A' BELOW**

#### A SEARCH RECORD

The Authority for the stop and search was (please ✓ the box that applies):

(These sections of the relevant Acts are summarised on the cover)

S.1  S.23  S.47  S.139b  S.60  S.13A  S.13B   
 Voluntary  Other Power  Please specify: .....

Description of person searched (including clothing): .....

Height: .....

Clothing removed? Yes  No

If Yes, list items: .....

Intimate parts exposed? Yes  No

Place first stopped (show a junction and appr. distance from): .....

The search took place on: Date: ...../...../.....  
 Between: ..... am/pm\* and ..... am/pm\*  
 at: ..... (place)  
 Object: .....  
 Grounds or Authority: .....

Vehicle searched? Yes  No

Vehicle details: .....  
(Make/Colour/Model/VRM)

Vehicle attended? Yes  No  If No, leave a Form 175  
 Damage caused? Yes  No   
 HQ/RT 1 issued? Yes  No   
 VDR issued? Yes  No

If vehicle/person searched: Property found? Yes  No

Details: .....

Arrested? Yes  No  Custody Record No.: .....

Offence: .....

**B STOP ONLY RECORD YOU HAVE NOT BEEN SEARCHED**

Reason: .....  
 Outcome: ..... Date: ...../...../.....  
 Between: ..... am/pm and ..... am/pm  
 at: ..... (place)  
 Vehicle present? Yes  No  Index No.: .....

#### COMPLETE IN ALL CASES

Officers stopping or searching: .....  
(Names, Rank No. and Station No. and Station if counter terrorism search)

Signed: ..... (PRINT NAME): .....  
(Officer completing record)

Copy of record supplied at time of search/stop? Yes  No

If No, please give reason: .....

Supervised by (PRINT NAME): .....

**Self-defined Ethnic Classification****FIXED RESPONSE**

- A. White - British
- B. White - Irish
- C. White - any other White background
  
- D. White and Black Caribbean
- E. White and Black African
- F. White and Asian
- G. Any other Mixed background
  
- H. Asian - Indian
- I. Asian - Pakistani
- J. Asian - Bangladeshi
- K. Any other Asian background
  
- L. Black - Caribbean
- M. Black - African
- N. Any other Black background
  
- O. Chinese
- P. Any other

The West Yorkshire Police is committed to improving the way in which Stop and Search is used by Police Officers.

We are mindful that we must demonstrate that we use Stop and Search effectively and fairly.

We aim to:

- Improve the effective use of Stop and Search in tackling crime.
- Demonstrate to members of the public the contribution of Stop and Search in tackling crime.
- Ensure Stop and Search is used fairly across all ethnic groups.
- Ensure Stop and Search is used in a way which enhances community confidence.

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## Appendix E

Information on reasons and outcomes of stops and searches on databases		
Area and encounter type	Reason measures	Outcome measures
Greenwich stops	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Object of stop code</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Outcome code (including whether arrested and other legal processes)</li> </ul>
Greenwich searches	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Object of stop code</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Arrest/reason for arrest code</li> </ul>
Hounslow stops	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Object of stop code</li> </ul>	
Hounslow searches	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Object of stop code</li> </ul>	
Chapelton stops	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Free-text for reasons</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Free-text for outcome</li> </ul>
Chapelton searches	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Object of stop code</li> <li>● Free-text for 'grounds'</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Arrest code (yes/no)</li> <li>● HO/RT1 issued code (yes/no)</li> </ul>
Leicester stops	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Free-text for reasons</li> <li>● Origin of search</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Arrest code (yes/no)</li> <li>● Reason for arrest code</li> <li>● HO/RT1 issued code (yes/no)</li> <li>● Other legal process code</li> <li>● Free-text for outcome</li> </ul>
Leicester searches	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Object of stop code</li> <li>● Free-text for reason</li> <li>● Free-text for 'grounds'</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Arrest code (yes/no)</li> <li>● Reason for arrest code</li> <li>● HO/RT1 issued code (yes/no)</li> <li>● Other legal process code</li> <li>● Free-text for outcome</li> </ul>
Ipswich stops	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Object of stop code</li> <li>● Free-text for reason</li> <li>● Free-text for 'grounds'</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Arrest code (yes/no)</li> <li>● Reason for arrest code</li> <li>● HO/RT1 issued code (yes/no)</li> <li>● Other legal process code</li> <li>● Free-text for outcome</li> </ul>
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