

	STRUCTURED DEBRIEF REPORT – M6 jct 5 to 6
Debrief commissioned by:	Matthew Pates, Emergency Planning Manager
Event:	M6 jct 5 to 6
Date of Event:	Thursday 4 th February 2016
Date of Debrief:	Wednesday 10 th February at 14.30
Debrief Location:	McLaren House, Birmingham
Debrief Facilitator:	Sandie Higginbotham, Emergency Planning Officer, Midlands
Debrief Participants:	Matthew Pates (MP), Paul Keasey (PK), Gary Webb (GW), Ian Allen (IA), Richard Hancox (RH), Mike Holmes (MH), Paul Atkin (PA), Frank Bird (FB), Andrew Butterfield (AB), Sioux Hine (SH), Colin Lowther (CL), Alexandra Brown (ABr), Amrit Mahey - observer (AM)
Event Summary: <p>At 01.50hrs on M6 jct 5 to 6 there was a Road Traffic Collision, involving two HGV's and one car. This incident resulted in a fatality, therefore Police forensic investigation was necessary and the Northbound carriageway and 2 lanes of the Southbound carriageway were closed to accommodate this. The scene was handed over to Kier at 07.30hrs, when the investigation had been completed. At 07.20hrs a fuel spillage was reported to the Regional Control Centre and the necessary equipment was mobilised. The first Regional Alert Coordinating Group took place at 11.45hrs and in line with the Crisis Management Manual, Highways England West Midlands escalated to Regional Alert. A further five more RACG's were held, Regional Alert was stood down at 23.45hrs. The carriageway was fully re-opened at 02.00hrs on 5th February.</p>	

ITEM	IDENTIFIED BY	COMMENTS
What went well?		
Communication		
Initial notification of the RTC was prompt from the Traffic Officers (TO) service	SH	
The situation was reactive and the tele-conference calls for the Regional Alert Coordinating Group (RACG) were set up quickly	SH	
Good communication with the Tarmac trucks to get them to scene as quickly and efficiently as possible with assistance of CMPG	MH, CL, RH	
The information sharing on RACG tele-conferences was good	CL	
There were good updates from the Kier Silver and Gold commander to the wider Kier organisation	IA	
There were good clear media messages	CL	
There was some exploration of different options and views on the RACG tele-conferences	AB	
Communication around the severity of the incident, so the public could understand why the motorway was closed	GW	
Traffic Management		
Initial closures were implemented in a timely manner	FB	
Escalation Process		
There was good support from all levels (Bronze, Silver and Gold) of the organization and the service provider in the Crisis Management Manual (CMM) process	MP	
The CMM process was embraced and participated in by NDD, Kier and Customer Operations		

ITEM	IDENTIFIED BY	COMMENTS
Partnership working		
There was a positive response from the Kier supply chain	MH, IA	
Good coordination between Highways England, Kier and CMPG to get the Tarmac trucks to the scene	MH, CL, RH, PK	Dynamic solution involving Kier, CMPG & TO's
Surfacing operations mobilised in a short duration from supply chain	IA	
Policies & Procedures		
The Police policies and procedures were followed through in a timely manner	PK	
Safety		
Works were completed safely	MP	This was a complex night time activity, involving heavy machinery, carried out at zero notice
What didn't go well?		
Communication		
There was a discussion around the fuel spillage on scene, however this was not fed back to the Regional Control Centre (RCC)	SH	
Uncertainty about how far the fuel had seeped into the carriageway	RH	

ITEM	IDENTIFIED BY	COMMENTS
Unsure if the RCC contacted Birmingham City Council and Solihull regarding activating Agreed Diversion routes (ADR's)	FB	Kier log shows communication with Birmingham City Council about the ADR usage and incident updates
Resourcing		
At 07.00 the RCC were advised there were no crews from Kier to remove the Chapter 8	SH, GW	Shift changes between 06.00 and 08.00 – Kier clarified that although there were no crews in depots they were available on call and there was a crew available from Doxey Depot (M6 J14)
Traffic Management		
The information received, was there was no hard signage available which had 4 lanes on	SH	
Transport management off network – wider impacts did not seem to be addressed	PK	Liaison with Local Authority highways
Pressure to re-open the carriageway before evening peak, but then acceptance we would not be able to do so	RH	Consideration to temporarily opening motorway with reduced speed signage and planing but decided against both at the 11:45 RACG meeting.
Partnership Working		
May have been benefitted decision making if CMPG were included into the RACG tele-conferences	PK	See recommendation 5
Not recognising safe and secure routes to the scene– consideration of the assets that were needed to resolve the incident did not include accessibility. Could have used assets from different locations that would have arrived in a timelier manner and not be held up in traffic queues.	RH, MH	This delayed operations, as vehicles were stuck in traffic

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Decision making		
The decision making process for running traffic on the affected section wasn't through enough	CL	The Regional Alert Coordination Group had difficulty evaluating the potential options, risks and mitigations.
Difficult to make a decision with the information around the fuel spillage at the time of the RACG tele-conferences	GW	See above
The option to run on a planed surface wasn't fully explored	AB, RH	See above
Delay in decision to resurface	RH, MH, FB	Time taken to decide to mobilise for re-surfacing the carriageway. Options to mitigate the impact of the spillage taken first
There was no decision log set up	FB	Not all incident commanders routinely maintain decision logs. See recommendation 1
Hand – over of scene		
There was no indication of a fuel spillage when the scene was handed over from the CMPG	PK	
Escalation Process		
This incident should have been Routine Operations	MP	This incident type is common enough that we should have been at routine operations. The CMM is designed for exceptional events

ITEM	IDENTIFIED BY	COMMENTS
All levels represented at RACG	MP	The RACG consisted of Bronze, Silver and Gold representatives, making it a large and unwieldy. It made it difficult to record issues, questions, decisions and actions
Delay in escalating to Regional Alert	IA, GW	

No.	RECOMMENDATIONS	RESPONSIBLE OWNER	COMMENTS	COMPLETED
1	Embed a culture of maintaining decision logs across CO, NDD and Supply Chain: All involved in incident response to ensure that they complete an individual log of options discussed, decisions made, decisions not made and their rationales. Meetings to ensure a meeting Loggist is present to record meeting decisions	ALL	Training set up to look at this	
2	Clarify who is responsible to notify the Local Authority highways, of the use of an ADR	Customer Operations	CL has taken this action away	
3	Mechanism required to assess accurately the damage to the carriageway for a fuel spillage	Kier/Customer Operations	Discussion with CMPG	
4	Service Provider to inform HE Tactical commander where financial risk exceeds £10000 contractual limit and transfers to HE, in circumstances where critical incident resolution could be delayed by attempts to deliver the lowest cost option	Kier/ Service Manager	CMM is designed as an internal function	

No.	RECOMMENDATIONS	RESPONSIBLE OWNER	COMMENTS	COMPLETED
5	Consider inviting external subject matter experts to participate in Highways England operational meetings/RACG's	EPT/Duty OM		
6	Incident managers to be cognoscente of wider traffic impacts and welfare of public in queuing traffic and review transport management plans both on and off network, during such incidents	Customer Operations/NDD	Wider affects should be considered early during Routine Operations which may mitigate the need for Regional Alert. This needs a scope and timescale putting forward.	
7	The use of Operation Freeway (M6 Toll Suspension) should be considered for Critical Incidents on this section of road and the decision and rationale recorded in the decision log.	EPT	The decision not to use Operation Freeway in this case was correct.	
8	Develop a contingency plan for the management of Major Incidents on the Birmingham Box	EPT	In consultation with Local Authority	

No.	RECOMMENDATIONS	RESPONSIBLE OWNER	COMMENTS	COMPLETED
			highways and businesses	
9	Kier to undertake a strategic review of the mobilisation of their supply chain	Kier		
10	Review VSS Policy on the use of message signs to support Red X signs on non ALR sections and the opening of the hard shoulder for incidents in conjunction with chapter 8	Customer Operations	'Lane closed for incident access'	
11	Create a grab bag in the RCC for duty Operations Manager, to assist in incident management.	EPT/Duty OM	To be discussed further, but may contain, ADR's and previous debriefs	
12	Options for internal Command and Control of incidents should be considered early and as appropriate to the specific circumstances of the incident (i.e who is working and what level of command and where are they best situated)	Customer Operations		
13	Consider corporate policy for management of staff who may have come into contact with bodily fluids or contagions such as Hep B/C or HIV	Kier & Customer Operations		
14	A mechanism should be developed to ensure that lessons learned from all Cold Debriefs is shared with the Highways England Supply Chain	Customer Operations: Gary Webb / TIKM		
15	Incident Commanders Across NDD, CO and Supply chain require regular training and practise of CMM / Incident Command skills to ensure CPD.	RCG Training and Exercising Group	EPT to raise issue with	

No.	RECOMMENDATIONS	RESPONSIBLE OWNER	COMMENTS	COMPLETED
			Group Chair	
16	Development of CMM command and Control structure to better facilitate activity at all command levels and operation of multiple disciplines.	EPT via RCG	Consider whether operational aspects of incident management would benefit from a separate meeting with one or two representatives from this forum feeding in to the RACG. The New NCBP introduces such improvements.	