STRATEGIC POLICING AND CRIME BOARD
7ᵗʰ February 2017

Strategic Policing Requirement

PURPOSE OF REPORT

1. This paper is intended to inform the Commissioner of the response of West Midlands Police to the Home Secretary's Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR). It provides an update to the last report to the PCC in Febraury 2016 and should help the Commissioner have due regard to the SPR and to support the setting of Police and Crime Plan for 2017/18.

INTRODUCTION

2. Since the introduction of the Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR) in 2012, and its subsequent refresh in 2015, West Midlands Police have annually produced a report to summarise the current assessment of the six National Threats namely;

    - Child Sexual Abuse
    - National Cyber Security Incident
    - Public order
    - Civil Emergencies
    - Terrorism
    - Serious and Organised Crime

3. The objective of this report is to outline what WMP's response is to each of the threats, identify any risks and vulnerabilities which will allow the Chief Constable (CC) and Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) to have due regard to the SPR and incorporate into their local policing and crime plans.

4. The SPR is supported by the National Policing requirement (NPR) process to establish a minimum capacity; however, this is currently under review by the National Police Chiefs Council. Therefore until these discussions are finalised and clear direction given, we will be operating to the previous working assumptions and WMP will assess its role in the delivery of the 5C's; capacity, capability, contribution, consistency and connectivity.

1

5. ACC Security remains the lead in WMP and chairs the SPR Boards. In February 2016 force leads were tasked to complete their self-assessments in order to form a realistic picture for the CC and PCC and were asked to consider the following;

    - What the current threat is.
    - How will they deliver locally, regionally and nationally.
    - What are their command and control arrangements for managing the threat.
    - Review of current structures and resources.
    - HMIC recommendations.

6. WMP response to the SPR was assessed by the Peel Inspection in February 2016 who recognised that the force had mapped its capability against each of the six threats and states that the force had well-established arrangements in place to assess its readiness to meet these threats, namely through exercise testing and real life operations. Accepting this fact, the inspection did identify areas of improvement, predominantly in the Serious Organised Crime strand of the SPR and this has been considered in the response WMP provides.

7. On reviewing last year's recommendations the following has been successfully completed:

    - The Chief Constable and Executive Team acknowledged the report and incorporated the content into their strategic planning.
    - The Chief Constable and Executive Team has continued to support national colleagues to ensure WMP participate and influence the national response and have implemented any changes necessary in line with national guidance.
    - ACC Security submitted the report to the PCC to inform their assessment and have due regard to the SPR in setting the budget and Police and Crime plan.

SUMMARY OF SELF-ASSESSMENTS AUG 2016

8. The self-assessments have been completed by all force leads who are subject matter experts, in conjunction with the College of Policing capability frameworks (where available), developed from information and intelligence, operational experience, testing and exercising, table top exercise learning, desktop reviews of doctrine, Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment (STRA's) and professional judgment.

9. They will have considered how they are able to fulfil the Capacity and Contribution at local, regional and national levels. They will have reflected on their Capability in relation to skills, training and equipment; assessed how we are able deliver an integrated response with Consistency against our national responsibilities and lastly they will have evaluated how effective our Connectivity is by assessing how successfully we connect across force boundaries through national arrangements and into our key partners.

Terrorism

10. The UK has been the subject of a prolonged threat from Terrorism in various forms, from North-Ireland Related Terrorism to the growth of international Islamic extremism. Terrorism has been scored amongst the highest risks within the National Security Risk Assessment. This is reflected in the National Threat Level which still remains at 'SEVERE', meaning an attack is highly likely. It has remained this level since August 2014.

11. The Government's overarching strategy to reduce the risk to the UK and our interests overseas from terrorism is called CONTEST, which covers the 4 themes; Prevent, Protect, Prepare and Pursue ('4P').

12. WMCTU have developed a capability framework to assess whether they have the required resources to respond to the threat from terrorism aligned to the capability set by The *Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT).*

13. WMCTU are still very much embedded in the Demand Risk Resource (DRR) programme which continues to align resources to the terrorism threat, which is governed nationally. Through everyday investigations, rigorous testing and preparation exercises, WMCTU are satisfied with their ability to respond to their demands to meet the threat and they gain support from the CT Network where necessary. Any vulnerability in this capability is highlighted within the DRR programme and is addressed nationally to ensure this is effectively mitigated.

14. There has been substantial uplift in firearms officers in WMP armed policing, which will see an improved capability of CTSFOs over an agreed timescale and implementation remains on track. The funding has been put in place to cover the next 4-5years, however, consideration needs to be given to the sustainability of maintaining suitable candidates within WMP over this considerable period, and then beyond.

Serious and Organised Crime (SOC)

15. Serious and Organised Crime Local Profiles (SOCLPs) exist for three of the seven Local Authority areas with the others under development. The SOCLPs are designed to be a living document which is refreshed on a quarterly basis in line with the Counter Terrorism Local Profiles (CTLPs) and are used to support the local Multi-agency Prevent Panels in identifying the locations/people/groups of greatest concern. This was implemented as a result of the last HMIC inspection of SOC.

16. Organised Crime Groups (OCGs) are identified locally and mapped (OCGM) centrally, enabling Lead Responsible Officers (LROs) to understand the risk posed by crime groups through a Tiered response. Aggregation and regular review of OCGM scoring provides an indication of either a rise or reduction in the threat, risk and harm posed, with local monthly tactical OCGM meetings supported by an analytical document enabling comprehension of gang related criminality.

17. The Regional Confidential Unit (RCU) within WMROCU assess the threat of sanctioned operations by combining OCGM, MoRILE and Confidence scores to provide a numerical assessment of serious and organised crime which in turn feeds into their tasking processes. When the threat increases, structured tasking processes enable escalation from local into force and from force into the region.

18. Due to the demographic of the West Midlands policing area, the management of serious and organised crime (SOC) is common practice across central departments and Local Policing Units (LPUs) alike. Through local business processes, daily, weekly and monthly meetings take place supported by a tactical assessment where LROs allocate local resources to OCG management against the '4P' principles.

19. WMP have a full range of covert assets which are deployed against SOC criminality and distributed according to the greatest risk. We also have established a dedicated Prevent and Protect Team based within Force CID whose purpose is to provide

intelligence, with a focus on preventing those who are vulnerable to engaging in serious & organised crime now and in the future.

20. However, it is recognised that WMP needs to gain a greater understanding of the totality of the threat picture and they will need to continue with the development of SOCLP's in order to do this.

Public order

21. WMP historically has a well proven track record for its capability for Public Order situations. In the last year we have successfully trained Police Support Units (PSUs) to meet its Mutual aid spontaneous requirement of 19 PSUs. There have been no significant changes in the threat assessment and therefore it has not been necessary to change our current requirements.

22. The policing of football stadia still remains the most significant public order volume demand across the region, nevertheless WMP capability is assessed as 'Good' across all the demands set out within the STRA.

23. WMP continues to be satisfied that we can consistently and effectively deliver against our public order commitments and we learn from the evaluation of incidents, both planned and spontaneous. It does however, remain challenging that when meeting these responsibilities there continues to be detriment to non-emergency local policing during deployments.

24. As part of the WMP2020 change programme the force by the end of 2016 will be reducing to 62 PSUs, however this does not diminish our ability to mobilise resources and maintains our continued SPR commitment.

Civil Emergencies

25. Operations Emergency Planning (OEP) works to the Chief Constable in partnership with the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) and in support of its objectives. This group assess the risk to WMP following a review of information provided by the National Risk Assessment and categorises these risks based on the perceived threat. Plans are then drawn up to counter the threat posed and to take steps to negate any impact it may have.

26. WMP are currently working to national planning assumptions of perceived threats with an exercise planned for 2017 to review and test plans concerning crowded places. Through regular testing of likely scenarios, WMP remains confident in its ability to deploy the right staff with the right skill set, and regularly reports to NPoCC our trained officer capability, they then record these on a nationwide IT system which includes our Chemical, Biological, radiological and Nuclear (CBRN), Casualty Bureau and Disaster Victim Identification trained staff locally and we are regionally accountable.

27. There have also been real life deployments which have tested the regional and national connectivity and we have been able to respond effectively without impacting on other services provided in WMP.

National Cyber Security Incident

28. WMP lead for cybercrime is the ACC Crime. Silver responsibility is then devolved to the Head of Intelligence who in turn chairs a Strategic Governance Group (SGG). In addition to key stakeholders attending this group, four leads for the '4P' strategy attend ensuring that the force strategy (drawn directly from the Force Strategic Assessment and Control Strategy) links directly into the regional and national cybercrime strategies.

29. The respective '4P' leads represent the following business areas: Pursue (DCI Force CID), Protect (DI Intelligence), Prevent (DCI Force CID and National Prevent Lead), Prepare (Senior Leader, Information Management). The SGG is also well supported by the OPCC who have identified cybercrime as a priority, along with the Regional Cyber Crime Unit (RCCU) within the Regional Organised Crime Unit (ROCU). The existing cybercrime strategy is now under a review with the support of academics from Birmingham, Warwick and Derby Universities.

30. The Technical Intelligence Development Unit (TIDU) has now closely aligned with the RCCU. It remains a resource for WMP but also supports our regional partners more effectively and ensures that resources are not unnecessarily duplicated at force and regional levels. The Economic Crime Unit (ECU) has primacy for serious fraud investigations for WMP and links directly into Action Fraud. There is a significant capability within the ECU to manage cyber-enabled fraud 'in house' and to support investigations within other departments and teams. Cyber-enabled crime is also supported by Digital Media Investigators (DMIs) that are distributed throughout the Intelligence and Investigations departments at both the local and force level. Again they link directly into TIDU, RCCU and Digital Forensics who provide specialist capability when required.

31. The SGG has identified some gaps and areas for improvement across this capability. As a result, a digital lead for WMP has been nominated and tasked with uplifting the capability for Digital Investigations and Intelligence (DII) and to work closely with the national DII lead and the developing National Police Chief's Council (NPCC) Digital Strategy 'Think Digital'.

32. It has also been identified that as awareness grows, through the protect and prevent work of the SGG and the growing national focus on cybercrime, reporting is increasing and greater demand will be placed on the WMP capability. As a result a bespoke specialist cybercrime capability is proposed for WMP, with primacy for force level cyber-dependent crime, to work alongside the RCCU, supported by an enhanced DMI capability to tackle cyber-enabled crime and the 'mainstreaming' of digital forensic capabilities for the securing of digital evidence in routine investigations.

Child Sexual Abuse (CSA)

33. On a national level the Child Protection Abuse Working Group (Chaired by NPCC national lead) has identified existing and predicted demands on policing in England and Wales for CSA. It is summarised that CSA is still underreported, however it is still predicting there will be escalating demand based on current year on year figures.

34. The Strategic Intelligence team within WMP has reviewed the threat posed to the West Midlands area and it is predicted that we will mirror the same trend of increasing demand at a similar rate. It indicates that CSA and Child Sexual Exploitation (CSE) is a significant threat to WMP.

35. WMP has seen Child Abuse total recorded crime rise for the third successive performance year and a similar pattern specifically with CSA. The Public Protection Unit (PPU) holds responsibility for the investigations, accountable to ACC Crime.

36. Establishment has increased to allow for the creation of Multi Agency Safeguarding Hubs (MASH) which facilitates screening and case strategy discussions, in all seven local authorities. The operating model has continued to adapt to meet emerging trends in CSE. The proactive central investigative team and co-ordinators work alongside the Local Authorities playing a key role in our joint response.

37. The region also has a regional CSE police and partnerships co-ordinator looking to distil good practice and deliver consistency under the regional framework. The force is embarking on devising a CSE Strategy which will better position the force for the future. It will allow the force to set the strategic direction and offer a route map for us to continue to develop a consistent and robust response to CSE.

38. The establishment of the main Child Abuse Investigation Teams (CAIT) is based on the 2014 allocation of resources. We have more recently reviewed staffing requirements and the force is exploring a growth in operational strength to meet the upward trend in demand. PPU will also be subject of review in the second stage of the force change programme (WMP2020) where a full review will be undertaken in line with the force's target operating model. The landscape of child abuse investigation continues to change and bring new challenges. Greater provision of both skilled staff and HOLMES support for complex investigations is one example that we are looking into and are currently piloting an approach by working closely with the force Major Investigation Team.

39. WMP will have to consider and implement plans to effectively resource Child Abuse Investigations in the future to deal with the continued increase in predicted demand year on year of reported incidents.

CONCLUSION

40. WMP remains in a strong position to articulate its capacity and capability in order to deliver against national policing responsibilities and we have consistently evidenced this. The business processes in place are still 'fit for purpose' and we are able to hold ourselves to account in these arenas. As such, we have identified our strengths and vulnerabilities.

41. It is now for the CC and PCC to have due regard for the contents of this annual report and for consideration given for the below recommendations. Once agreed by the Chief Constable and the Executive Team, this report will be presented to the Police and Crime Commissioner to consider within their strategic planning.

FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

As per recommendation 8.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

None

RECOMMENDATIONS

1) Child Sexual Abuse:
   Chief Constable in undertaking the review of the current operating model should consider how it will resource CSA against the predicted increasing demand year on year.

2) Organised Crime:
   Chief Constable to support the continued to development of our Serious and Organised Crime operating model together through the ROCU change programme and that is effectively aligns to WMP2020. WMP should support the continued role out and development of SOCLP's to improve the understanding of the threat and totality of the response to Organised Crime.

3) Cyber Crime:
   Chief Constable to acknowledge medium term planning assumptions for anticipated additional resource required to meet the threats posed from Cyber Crime.

4) Counter Terrorism:
   Chief Constable to continue to support the on-going DRR Programme and align with national recommendations, accepting the current capability and capacity is good.

5) Public Order and Civil Emergencies:
   Chief Constable to continue to support existing processes within WMP for Public Order and Civil Emergencies, accepting we have sufficient capability and capacity for current and predicted demands.

6) SPR:
   The Executive Team to team consider the impact of the WMP2020 programme in meeting our local, regional and national responsibilities under the Strategic Policing Requirement.

7) The Executive Team to note the contents of this report and the full assessments and incorporate the recommendations into their strategic planning.

8) ACC Security to submit this report to the OPCC to inform their assessment and have due regard for the SPR in setting the budget and further strategic planning.