west midlands
police and crime
commissioner

Strategic Policing and Crime Board

20th February 2018

Strategic Policing Requirement

Presented by: T/ACC Kenny Bell

Purpose of paper

1. This paper is intended to inform the Police and Crime Commissioner of the West Midlands Police's response to the Home Secretary's Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR).

2. The duty, in part, is fulfilled by the submission of this annual report to the Strategic Police and Crime Board, the objective of which is to outline WMP's response to each of the threats in the SPR and identify any risks and vulnerabilities, thereby enabling the Chief Constable (CC) and Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) to demonstrate both that they have "had regard" to the SPR and that an effective response is in place. This informs the PCC and enables him to set the Police and Crime Plan for 2018/19.

Background

3. The SPR was issued in 2012 in execution of the Home Secretary's statutory duty to set out what are, in her view, the national threats at the time of writing and the appropriate national policing capabilities required to counter those threats. Whilst many threats can be tackled by individual police forces within their own force areas, national threats such as terrorism, civil emergencies, serious and organised crime, public order, and a national cyber security incident, require a coordinated or aggregated response in which resources are brought together from a number of police forces. Forces often need to work collaboratively, and with other partners, national agencies or national arrangements, to ensure such threats are tackled effectively.

4. SPR review;

In April 2014, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) recommended that the SPR should be periodically reviewed to ensure it remains relevant and effective.

The Home Office consulted policing partners to consider the validity of existing and emerging threats and ensure that the SPR remains current and fit for purpose.

5. The recent unprecedented increase in reporting and investigation of CSA calls for a joined-up approach by forces to provide an integrated, robust policing response, by ensuring skilled investigators are available and that all victims have access to justice. Lone offenders, groups and gangs can commit offences across police forces.

- This is in accordance with s37A Police Act (1996) as amended by s77 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011.
- The term 'large scale cyber incident' in the previous SPR has been replaced with 'national cyber security incident' in line with updated Cabinet Office guidance.
- The term "police and crime commissioners" is used as shorthand so as to make reference to police and crime commissioners, the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime in the Metropolitan Police District and the Common Council of the City of London. Reference in this document to a "chief constable" is intended to apply to every chief constable in England and Wales, the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, and the Commissioner of the City of London Police.

6. PCCs and chief constables are expected to plan and prepare together or in support of national arrangements.

7. Part B of the SPR outlines the policing response that is required nationally to counter these threats, in partnership with other national agencies.

8. It briefly sets out:

- The combined national capacity of all police forces to respond to these threats, expressed in terms of the outcomes sought – these are drawn, wherever possible, from publicly available national Government strategies. PCCs and chief constables must have regard to this aggregate capacity when considering the respective contributions they will make;
- The capabilities that police forces, often working collaboratively, need to maintain in order to achieve these outcomes;
- The requirement for consistency among forces for certain key specialist capabilities where the resources from more than one police force need to be integrated, or work effectively alongside each other. In some instances this

requirement for consistency may need to involve other key emergency services and agencies;

- The connectivity arrangements by which resources from several police forces may effectively be coordinated or mobilised, together and with those of other agencies – such as the Security Service or NCA.

- The combination of consistency and connectivity forms the basis for interoperability between police forces and with other partners.

9. **Fig 1.** *Components of the SPR threat strands being assessed*

10. PCCs are required to have regard to this SPR when issuing or varying their police and crime plans. They must keep the police and crime plan under review in light of any changes made to the SPR by the Home Secretary.

11. It is not uncommon for legislation to require public bodies to "have regard to" guidance, codes of practice or other material. The effect is that the PCC and chief constable should follow the SPR unless they are satisfied that, in the particular circumstances, there are good reasons not to. It does not mean that either the PCC or the chief constable has to follow the SPR blindly, but they should not depart from it without good reason (and should be prepared to be able to justify any departure from it on a case by case basis).

Key points

12. West Midlands Police (WMP) has tested its response to national threats along with other UK police forces in the past twelve months, particularly to the terrorism threat.

13. WMP can support a primary mobilisation to a national threat, however it is assessed that there is a likely impact to local service should this be required over a prolonged period but we predict we could maintain attendance at emergency incidents.

14. WMP has seen an uplift in its Firearms mobilisation and CT Firearms response capability within the past twelve months. An unintended benefit of this uplift has been an increased use of such resource to deal with an escalating Firearms threat in the force.

15. Our ability to respond to the national serious and organised crime threat is coordinated through the WMROCU. The restructure of Serious & Organised Crime (SOC) assets within WMP and WMROCU has now seen the settling of new processes and an improvement in response to SOC internally within WMP.

16. WMP has not had a requirement to respond to National Cyber Security Incident (NCSI) within the past twelve months. WMP is currently in the process forming a Dedicated Cyber Crime Unit.

17. Rates of Child Sexual Exploitation (CSE)/Abuse have increased in WMP in line with national trends. Action has been taken to build a model to support CSE/Abuse investigations, and whilst PPU has grown significantly in size, the workload of PPU officers remains high.

18. In 2018, WMP will deliver a new operating model for the Public Protection Unit. However there are likely to still remain challenges in resourcing as the diversity of investigative cases evolves and become more serious and complex.

Terrorism

19. The UK faces a sustained, serious and challenging threat from International Terrorism and remains a high-priority target for Islamist extremists. The evidenced increase in successful attacks carried out by either individuals or small groups, coupled with a wide range of attack methodologies, has placed significant demands upon the CT network. Responding to these incidents affects all areas of policing due to the need to protect the public, apprehend those who committed the act and provide reassurance and stability to communities to avoid deeper repercussions.

20. The responsibility to police Domestic Extremism (DE) is within the remit of the WMCTU. The proscription of National Action in December 2016, the first extreme right wing (XRW) group to be proscribed as a terrorist organisation, has enabled WMCTU to utilise more powerful TACT legislation within its investigations into XRW activity where appropriate. In addition, the attacks against Jo Cox, MP and the Finsbury Park Mosque, illustrate the increasing risk of spontaneous DE lone actors who have been evidenced deploying tactics comparable to those inspired by international terrorism.

21. The crossover of DE nominals into activity contrary to the Terrorism Act now places an increasing demand on CT resources particularly concerning intelligence gathering and raising awareness across West Midlands Police.

Capacity, Contribution, Capability, Consistency and Connectivity

CT Response

22. 2017 saw five attacks, this has increased pressure on all investigative resources across the CT network as reactive investigations intensify, at the same time as demand around proactive investigations continues to grow.

23. Both WMP and WMCTU faced resourcing challenges in meeting the requirements of the national Critical threat level but this was well-managed for the two periods at Critical. An uplift in staff has been required to support the Prepare pillar of the Contest strategy, given the learning from the move to Critical threat following Manchester and Parsons Green attack. A team within WMCTU has been established to consider the regional Prepare strategy.

24. Between September 2016 and September 2017, WMCTU supported 665 staff deployments out of the region in support of the National CT Network which is significantly higher than in previous years.

25. WMCTU utilises the national CT secure network to share intelligence nationally and each CTU site connects regionally and locally through Contest meetings and sub groups of Protect, Prepare, Prevent and Pursue sub boards which deliver local plans.

CT Firearms

26. WMP has successfully completed phase 1 of the two year National Armed Uplift programme and phase 2 will see WMP grow its capacity of Counter Terrorism Specialist Firearms Officers (CTSFOs) by April 2018 meeting WMP's national requirement.

27. Within the past twelve months, in response to national CT threat, the force has utilised resources, supported by Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC) and Ministry of Defence (MoD) Police in response to Op Temperer.

Our overt response in the past twelve months

28. Within the past twelve months, in response to national CT threat, the force has called upon the support of Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC) and Ministry of Defence (MoD) Police, in response to the activation of aspects of Op Temperer, namely the mobilisation of the Strategic Armed Policing Reserve.

29. During these increased periods of threat, the force moved quickly to twelve hour shifts to create capacity.

Specialist Firearms Commanders

30. WMP has a cadre of specialist tactical firearms commanders (TFCs), with one specialist strategic firearms commander (SFC).

Capability to respond

31. WMCTU has evolved to ensure it has the capability to respond to an emerging threat from within each pillar of contest. Enhanced on call capacity has been required to mitigate heightened threat since the Manchester attack. Additional staff have been placed on call with specialist capability for; forensic scene management, investigation, intelligence and covert resources. The Regional Protect and Prepare Board has developed to be able to bring together key personnel from across the region at short notice, including partners, in the event of a Terrorist attack.

Casualty Bureau

32. Within the past twelve months, WMP received multiple mutual aid requests to support the national response (e.g. Westminster Bridge and Manchester Arena). The WMP casualty bureau has been able to quickly and effectively meet the requests, this was supported by the fact that this could be managed from WMP/regional bases and did not require deployment out of force to support.

33. WMP also met national requests for support for detective constables and HOLMES staff by flexing resources across WMP and WMROCU.

Governance

34. Within WMP, the Force contest board (chaired by ACC Security) meets on a quarterly basis, and reviews the strategic approach to CT response both internally and nationally.

Exercising

35. WMP has undertaken significant testing and exercising of Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack (MTFA) capability in 2017. The force MTFA plan has recently been revised to account for current national guidance and was subject to a highly positive assurance visit by National Armed Policing in July.

Organisational Learning

36. WMP has a process that every major event that is undertaken will have a table top exercise (TTX) produced for it, which will incorporate current CT threats and identified tactics used by terrorists. Any TTX will then be facilitated with a structured debrief afterwards to collate learning.

37. Within the Strategic Coordination Centre there is currently Wi-Fi capability if required that can be deployed upon request. WMP Estates and Operations departments are reviewing the resilience of the Events Control Suite and Strategic Coordination Centre to consider future planning/build that can accommodate all requirements for these critical command platforms.

Public Order

38. The number of Public Order trained staff has reduced, as has our establishment, and this has been done in a way which is consistent to the risk of public order threat that WMP faces, alongside national requirements.

39. In 2016/17, WMP has mobilised its public order capability in response to the HMP Birmingham riots (*December 2016*), Aston unexploded bomb (*May 2017*) and then an increase in threat level (*June 2017*). The primary mobilisation was met, however maintaining it was difficult in terms of officer welfare; with the length of shifts and the inability to provide 11 hours between duties without having a secondary impact on Force Support Unit (FSU) and Response resources the next day.

40. In December 2016, Operation Breaking Point was run as a national (notional) exercise over five days, and replayed the 2011 national riots. WMP successfully nominated 36 Police Support Units (PSUs) meeting the requirements of the exercise, however it is noted that this is over and above our national commitment of 21 PSUs, and at 36 it is predicted that business as usual (BAU) including the ability to respond to emergency incidents would be significantly impacted. The logistics of the requirement would have also been very challenging due to the fleet capacity to transport those number of officers, however WMP has contingency plans where we would look to hire the necessary fleet, but if multiple forces were to do the same it may be a limited number of vehicle suppliers available to meet the demand.

41. Competing demands and location of equipment has become challenging over the last 12 months in the deployment of trained staff however we have still met our obligations as a region, and it is assessed that WMP has sufficient resilience to meet its primary mobilisation obligations for public order resources to respond to a national threat.

42. The response to a prolonged national public order threat, requiring a mobilisation beyond 3 PSUs is likely to reduce Neighbourhood Policing across the force as neighbourhood officers will be required to backfill departments where public order resources will have been deployed from, such as Force Response and the FSU.

Capacity, Contribution, Capability, Consistency and Connectivity

43. It is assessed that WMP can fulfil a commitment of 21 PSUs from trained staff cadre. Primary mobilisation in force, and out of force, requires initially three PSUs this is achievable with current response and FSU officers within the required timescales. There will be some challenges if we cannot maintain the FSU establishment, however there is a current recruitment plan into the department and we have sufficient resilience within other departments; either by trained individuals or utilising for backfill.

44. We assess that WMP has sufficient and appropriate equipment available to support a primary mobilisation; with new public order shields in place and currently replacement fleet being rolled out.

45. WMP equipment does meet the national standard and the content of our training exceed college of policing requirements, as assessed in April and June 2017. There is an issue identified that WMP is not compliant with national fitness test requirement for mutual aid deployments. This is currently being managed and progressed by the Learning and Development department with a proposal to begin testing in April 2018.

46. WMP conducts structured debriefs of individual operations by Intelligence (Risk Assurance and Organisational Learning) and any learning is disseminated back into the Operations department for implementation.

47. Nationally and Regionally all forces run MERCURY which is a National IT system to record manage and co-ordinate all mutual aid requests and record the force capacity in key skill areas. This is managed through the Regional Information Coordination Centre (RICC) within the Operations Planning department of which WMP lead on for the Region.

48. As a Region we host quarterly regional Planning Meetings and attend the quarterly RICC Tactical meetings; both of which 'horizon scan' on the SPR threats.

49. Although the force Events Command Suite (ECS) provides availability for other agencies to dock their systems during a time of public disorder, to provide a partnership coordinated support it has been identified that the Event Control Suite (ECS) poses logistical delivery challenges past 2019 in terms of its capacity and technology. This is seeking to be addressed by the longer term Estates Management plan.

Serious and Organised Crime

50. The West Midlands hosts a significant threat from serious and organised crime. A number of factors drive this threat, including the ability of its diverse communities to easily source commodities from overseas, the transport links that run through the region which easily facilitate the distribution of commodities and the transiting of those involved in organised crime. Factors such as social deprivation, lack of opportunities or adverse childhood experiences increase the risk of an individual becoming involved in organised crime.

51. WMP manages its response to Serious and Organised Crime (SOC) through the force Serious & Organised Crime governance board and a number of themed sub groups.

52. WMP continues to use the 4P approach to tackling SOC:

- Pursue – prosecute and disrupt people engaged in serious and organised criminality,
- Prevent – prevent people from engaging in serious and organised crime,
- Protect – increase protection from serious and organised crime and
- Prepare – reduce the impact of this criminality where it takes place.

53. WMP has invested resource into developing its partnership intelligence capability in order to facilitate closer working relationships with key partners.

54. WMP links into the regional and national tasking mechanism to ensure connectivity across partners and regional forces in understanding and responding to the SOC threat.

55. WMROCU has a SOC strategy for the region and all Chief Constables and PCCs in the region sign up to this strategy. Over the last twelve months ROCU has developed the following capabilities in order to improve its response to Serious and Organised Crime:

- Regional Organised Crime Threat Assessment (ROCTA) teams – focussed on improving the understanding of the threat from organised crime through the regionalisation of the Organised Crime Group Mapping (OCGM) database.

- Assisting offender debrief teams – focussed on increasing police use of Sections 71 to 75 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (SOCPA) to debrief offenders who have offered to assist with the investigation or prosecution of offences committed by others.

- SOC disruption teams – focussed on developing links with the GAIN network to lead a multi-agency approach to disrupting organised crime groups in support of, and in addition to, seeking criminal justice outcomes.

- On line undercover activity – with a particular emphasis on tackling child sexual abuse and exploitation.

Capacity, Contribution, Capability, Consistency and Connectivity

56. WMP utilises its own internal tasking mechanisms in order to recognise investigations that would stretch the force's resource and capability. It is assessed there is an ability to reprioritise in ROCU to be able to support significant SOC investigations within the West Midlands should the capacity of WMP be tested.

57. WMROCU intends to recruit to establishment within the next twelve months. The service offer to all regional forces and capacity commitment has been subject of an efficiency review by WMROCU, and this has outlined the service offer which does not change significantly.

Establishment within WMP to manage SOC threat

58. FCID has a diverse mix of skill-sets within the department, with specialist disciplines across teams such as Serious & Organised Crime, Homicide, Economic Crime and Force Priorities. FCID is able to flex staff across its build to ensure that resilience and demand are met. However, where there is a requirement to deliver priority investigations requiring additional resources this may impact upon the department's ability to deliver against demand in other areas.

59. There are some resilience issues within FCID at the PIP3 and PIP4 investigation levels and a PIP succession plan is being formulated internally managing future PIP3 and PIP4 SIO candidates against course availability to ensure that WMP is in a position to respond to any continuing and future SOC threats.

Management of SOC internally

60. WMP acknowledges that the role of Lead Responsible Officer (LRO) carries significant workload and risk, this is particularly evidenced in Birmingham where there is now one LRO compared to four prior to the November 2016. Since this time the threat has evolved in Birmingham and work is underway to balance the LRO workload more effectively with, for example, responsibility for lower tiered OCGs being allocated to alternative LROs.

Understanding the threat and partnership working

61. WMP has produced Serious and Organised Crime Local Profiles (SOCLPs) which have significantly enhanced the partnership relationship in regards to SOC with local authority areas. This has also seen the creation of partnership delivery plans in the effort to tackle Serious & Organised Crime.

Covert Assets

62. WMROCU holds responsibility for all covert assets across the region. Due to the size of WMP and scale of organised crime, SIOs and LROs are versed in the use of covert tactics. A robust prioritisation process is applied against bids for covert assets, both at a force and regional level.

Firearms response to SOC threat

63. WMP has the capacity within the Firearms Operations unit (FOU) to respond to SOC threats. ARVs provide a spontaneous response, with tactical teams available for pre-planned incidents. There is also a capability out of hours to respond to a firearms incident. These capabilities have been tested within the past twelve months in response to the increasing firearms threat within the force and regional area which has impacted on the capacity of Tactical Firearms Commanders (TFCs) in force.

National Cyber Security Incident (NCSI)

64. WMP has not had a requirement to respond to an NCSI within the past twelve months. The response to the 'Wannacry' incident was predominantly handled by the National Crime Agency (NCA).

65. WMP utilises Cyber Crime profiles to identify the communities of the West Midlands that may be vulnerable to becoming cybercrime victims. This is supported by National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) data analysis.

66. WMP has recognised the need for a cybercrime unit based on the current threat assessment. Any response to cybercrime within the force area would be resourced by the WMROCU, dependent on resourcing demands elsewhere across the region in

response to a cyber-incident. In the forthcoming twelve months, WMP via the WMROCU will be creating and hosting a Dedicated Cyber Crime Unit.

67. The force has a strategic governance group (SGG) for cybercrime. WMP assesses it would have the capacity to respond to a NCSI, albeit this would be quickly supported by WMROCU and/or NCA. The national reporting model for NCSI was tested in July 2017, as part of Exercise Winter Storm. The exercise included the initial investigative response from FCID for any local cyber-dependent crime.

68. The Local Resilience Forum (LRF) conducted an exercise into cyber threats in October 2017, Exercise Ctrl-Alt-Del, which tested the multi-agency response to a cyber-incident affecting a number of local authorities. The exercise was well attended and is in the process of being debriefed.

Capacity, Contribution, Capability, Consistency and Connectivity

69. WMROCU hosts the regional cybercrime unit (RCCU). Through this team WMROCU meets the NPCC regional requirements and the TICAT process. This team has the capability to investigate offences as well as securing and preserving digital forensic opportunities. The team also has access to support from across the ROCU network and the NCA.

70. NCA and ROCU resources would link in to WMP via Mission Support, which under the direction of the duty Superintendent has autonomy over the deployment of WMP resources to support any response. The response to a NCSI would be managed through the national tasking mechanism, and is also outlined in the NPCC expectations of what a force should do in response to NCSI within its geography.

71. WMP recognises that whilst also having the necessity to respond to a NCSI, that a significant factor of that ability to respond is also the protection of its own cyber infrastructure. In late 2016, WMP recruited a new Head of Information Security & Assurance who has undertaken a comprehensive review of the WMP infrastructure security and processes.

72. WMP has increased the number of tests it conducts internally to assure its resilience against any form of incursion (physical or technical), and organisational learning has been derived from these tests. Appropriate improvements have been made where necessary to ensure WMP is resilient in response to daily business, as well as resilient at times of vulnerability around a national threat escalation.

73. A WMP programme, taken in partnership with Accenture, has capitalised on the force's IT abilities to deliver protective security. This has been addressed since the Wannacry attack, and cyber security preparedness has been significantly enhanced.

Civil Emergencies

74. The West Midlands resilience forum, community risk register holds seven risks within it that are considered likely to enact civil emergencies response:

- Influenza type disease
- Flooding
- Severe Weather
- Environmental Pollution and Industrial Accidents
- Loss of Critical Infrastructure
- Fuel Shortages
- Transport Accidents

75. As part of the emergency planning process, WMP continually reviews its emergency response plans which are designed to mitigate against national threats and hazards. WMP considers the learning from national and local incidents and exercise debriefs to inform this process which supports the ability of the force to mobilise more effectively and efficiently in the future, as threats evolve. This was particularly evidenced following the recent Parson's Green terror attack when the response of the force to a change in the national threat level was more efficient than during previous incidents. WMP is actively involved in the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) as required under Civil Contingencies Act.

Capacity, Contribution, Capability, Consistency and Connectivity

76. Operational commanders and specialists have received Joint Emergency Service Interoperability Programme (JESIP) training, and attendance at annual continuous professional development events are encouraged. There is no additional training available for JESIP, however a number of online packages support JESIP.

77. WMP assess that we are highly likely capable of deploying staff easily in response to a civil emergency, all force incident managers (FIMs) and Bronze leads are JESIP trained.

78. WMP has recorded all relevant trained staff through the National Police Coordinating Centre (NPoCC) process and WMP understands who is trained and deployable; including CBRN Responders and we have sufficient numbers to support our national requirement.

79. WMP undertakes Table Top Exercises (TTX) to try and address the issues that may emerge from particular scenarios. A training and exercise plan is being prepared for 2018 to address all existing and emerging threats.

80. All plans are shared with partners via resilience direct and via consultation during the planning process, to ensure consistency in response is understood by all partner agencies.

Child Sexual Abuse (CSA)

81. WMP has identified a link between CSA/Child Sexual Exploitation (CSE), and SOC, as can be seen in recent investigations. Where we have seen SOC focussing in both online abuse, wider familial issues and CSE/trafficking.

82. WMP has a regional problem profile on Child Sexual Exploitation (CSE), some neighbourhood police unit (NPUs) have a local profile depending on the identified threat from this area.

83. Regionally, local authority and WMP monitor CSE and CSA through a variety of forums and products. Local Child Safeguarding Boards (LCSB) monitor levels of CSA within their local tasking forums, and WMP is a key stakeholder in these forums.

84. Nationally, there is a recognition that CSA is underreported, and this is consistent with the assessment of WMP. When the WMP Public Protection Unit (PPU) Child Abuse model was devised in 2014 there were 12,080 crimes and non-crimes (April 2013 – March 2014). This has increased to 21,352 in the period of April 2016 – March 2017.

85. As such the PPU is under review to refine their service offering; to become more efficient in dealing with demand; utilising the most suitable resource and providing a better service to the public; and offering greater prevention and intervention opportunities. However, continued rise in demand would present challenges in how we respond appropriately.

Capacity, Contribution, Capability, Consistency and Connectivity

86. The creation of Multi Agency Safeguarding Hubs (MASH) has seen an increase in establishment to facilitate screening and case strategy discussions. The operating model has continued to adapt to meet emerging trends in CSE. Both the CSE investigator and Coordinator establishment have been increased to allow for a proactive central investigative team and coordinators working alongside all of the Local Authorities playing a key role in our joint response.

87. All Local Safeguarding Children Boards have escalation procedures for CSA/CSE cases within WMP. In additional there is continual process of case reviews, performance tracking and annual assessment also allow for the identification and resolution of issues.

88. Within Birmingham and Coventry, a Multi-Agency Enquiry Team (MAET) is live, and is a dedicated team to conduct joint visits and deal with lower level volume crime and 'sexting'. Initial indications suggest a small team can deal with up to 40% of their workload.

89. We have dedicated CA investigators across the force, part of their role is to investigate CSE. We're currently piloting an approach in Coventry with a team of dedicated CSE investigators working alongside CSE co-ordinators and Social Care. The benefits of the dedicated team appear to be significant with a series of successful convictions.

90. In contrast other teams deal with CSE along with other CA investigations. The future PPU build is exploring the creation of dedicated CSE teams across the region.

91. WMP has the ability to conduct complex CSA/CSE investigations within the Child Abuse Investigation Team (CAIT). The establishment of a HOLMES supported team has given PPU the provision to manage the most complex of investigations.

92. Strong relationships exist between WMP, WMROCU and the regional forces; the regional agreements of OCSET, CSE coordination and Modern Slavery all facilitate connectivity around this threat area.

93. WMP has specialist CA capability within the PPU, FCID and within the online team (OCSET). WMP will shortly recruit a Victim Identification Officer (VID) to support our CA investigations and the identification and safeguarding of children who have been abused and images posted on the internet. CSE expertise is developing with an ambition of dedicated investigators.

94. WMP anticipate challenges in the forthcoming period, thus the need for a new operating model that will recognise the current and future requirements of CSA/CSE. The staffing of serious and complex investigations, including large scale inter familial abuse, CSE and Sudden Infant Death continues to present challenges to West Midlands Police, and that challenge is being met by focusing resources in the areas that have the greatest impact.

Conclusion

95. WMP has evidenced in the past twelve months, including via our regional units, that the force has faced significant challenges in terms of responding to the step change in the terrorist landscape, and the change in demand on policing as a result of public services restructuring and rationalising.

96. Funding and resourcing remains the most significant challenge to WMP in terms of its ability to respond to national threats outlined in the SPR. The force is in a position that it could mobilise to a national threat in the initial phases, however, it would be challenging for the force for a prolonged and sustained period.

97. WMP has made significant steps in the past twelve months to uplift its Firearms capacity, which has benefited both the CT and SOC areas of business and as such WMP recognised the need to increase its Firearms Command capability and a programme of delivery is underway.

98. When HMIC Inspected the SPR in autumn 2016, it was beyond their scope on whether WMP was capable of responding to the 6 national threats, but they did find that WMP had effective arrangements in place to test our preparedness for dealing with these threats and fulfil our national policing responsibilities.

99. This is currently in line with the police and crime plan where one of the objectives is for WMP to continue to play its part in responding to local and national threats.

Next Steps

100. **The Board is asked to acknowledge WMP's recommendations for the 2018/19 approach to SPR and for the PCC to have due regard to the contents of the report.**

1. **Child Sexual Abuse:**

   Chief Constable to continue supporting the review of a new PPU operating model and implement necessary changes to manage the increasing demand.

2. **Serious and Organised Crime:**

   Chief Constable to support the continued development of our Serious and Organised Crime operating model through the WMROCU change programme and that it effectively aligns to WMP2020.

3. **NCSI:**

   Chief Constable to continue supporting the delivery of the dedicated Cyber Team capability within WMROCU.

4. **Terrorism:**

   Chief Constable to consider the implementation of learning, once concluded, from national Counter Terrorism reviews of the UK Terrorist attacks.

5. **Public Order and Civil Emergencies:**
   Chief Constable to implement a robust exercising and testing regime within WMP for Public Order and Civil Emergencies, to ensure we have sufficient skills and resources within the force to maintain national responsibilities, linking the outcomes from the Organisational Risk and Learning Board.

6. **WMP Intelligence** to timetable delivery of STRA's in each threat area within the next twelve months to help understand further the issues effecting each area and the ability of WMP to respond to those threats.

7. **WMP Intelligence** to review all contributions made to support the SPR for any organisational risks that require escalation to the Organisation Learning and Risk Board.

8. **The Force Executive Team** to continue to take cognisance of the potential impact of the WMP2020 programme in meeting our local, regional and national responsibility under the Strategic Policing Requirement.

9. **The Executive Team** to note the contents of this report and the full assessments and incorporate the recommendations into their strategic planning.

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