



Strategic Policing and Crime Board

Date of meeting: 21st January 2020

Police and Crime Plan Priority:

Title: *Strategic Policing Requirement*

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Purpose of paper

1. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate to the board compliance with the statutory duties placed on the Police and Crime Commissioner and the Chief Constable relating to the Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR).

Background

2. The SPR was issued in 2012 (and reviewed in 2015) in execution of the Home Secretary's statutory duty to set out the national threats and the appropriate national policing capabilities required to counter those threats. While many threats can be tackled by individual police forces within their own force areas, national threats such as terrorism, civil emergencies, serious and organised crime, public order, a national cyber security incident and child sexual abuse/exploitation require a coordinated or aggregated response in which resources are brought together from a number of police forces. Forces often need to work collaboratively, and with other partners, national agencies or national arrangements, to ensure such threats are tackled effectively.
3. PCCs and Chief Constables are expected to plan and prepare together in support of national arrangements. The policing response that is required

nationally to counter these threats, in partnership with other national agencies sets out:

- The combined national capacity of all police forces to respond to these threats, expressed in terms of the outcomes sought – these are drawn, wherever possible, from publicly available national Government strategies. PCCs and Chief Constables must have regard to this aggregate capacity when considering the respective contributions they will make;
 - The capabilities that police forces, often working collaboratively, need to maintain in order to achieve these outcomes;
 - The requirement for consistency among forces for certain key specialist capabilities where the resources from more than one police force need to be integrated, or work effectively alongside each other. In some instances this requirement for consistency may need to involve other key emergency services and agencies;
 - The connectivity arrangements by which resources from several police forces may effectively be coordinated or mobilised, together and with those of other agencies – such as the Security Service or National Crime Agency (NCA).
 - The combination of consistency and connectivity forms the basis for interoperability between police forces and with other partners.
4. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) outline in the policing inspection programme and framework 2019/20 that they will undertake work to assess how police forces discharge their obligations to have regard to the Strategic Policing Requirement.
 5. PCCs are required to have regard to this SPR when issuing or varying their police and crime plans. They must keep the police and crime plan under review in light of any changes made to the SPR by the Home Secretary.
 6. The PCC and Chief Constable should follow the SPR unless they are satisfied that, in the particular circumstances, there are good reasons not to. They should not depart from it without good reason (and should be prepared to be able to justify any departure from it on a case by case basis).

Terrorism

Capacity, Contribution, Capability, Consistency & Connectivity

7. West Midlands Counter-Terrorism Unit (WMCTU) is a nationally funded, regional unit which works, as part of the national counter-terrorism policing network, with West Midlands Police and partners to deliver HM Government's national counter terrorism strategy, CONTEST, within the force area and region.
8. CONTEST is delivered under the four pillars of PURSUE, PREVENT, PROTECT and PREPARE.

Terrorism Threat to the West Midlands

9. On 4 November 2019, the UK threat level from terrorism was lowered to SUBSTANTIAL which means that a terrorist attack is likely.
10. Within the West Midlands force area, the threat from Islamist Terrorism remains the highest risk, despite the reduction in Da'esh capability. WMCTU investigations continue to identify the presence of Islamist ideology within the region. The move to lone actor, low sophistication methodology has continued to be observed, maintaining risk as the ability by authorities to detect these individuals is reduced. Some of those extremists who travelled overseas remain at large and would pose a significant risk to the region should they return.
11. Whilst small compared to Islamist related terrorism, right wing terrorism (RWT) is the fastest-growing terrorist threat in the UK. A quarter if all terrorism arrests in the UK in the past year were linked to far-right violence. Over the past twelve months the capability of right wing extremist ideologies to incite terrorism has been evidenced globally with attacks leading to mass casualties and subsequently damaging community cohesion. The presence of right wing extremism within the force area has increased.
12. Left Wing, Anarchist & Single-Issue Terrorism (LASIT) is a new overarching category of terrorism which focuses on a broad range of ideologies including militant animal rights, environmental activism, anti-fascism and anarchism. The threat from these groups within the force area continues to remain low.
13. The threat from Northern Ireland Related Terrorism (NIRT) within the region continues to be low.

14. Finally, national counter-terrorism policing continues to work with the security and intelligence services to respond to 'allied matters' including counter espionage, counter intelligence, counter-proliferation and hostile state actors.

Pursue terrorists and those that sponsor them

15. Currently, there are a record national number of just under 800 live counter-terrorism investigations focusing on a range of activities including fundraising, radicalisation and preparation of acts of terrorism. Demand on the national counter-terrorism policing network has increased by around a third, compared to the period prior to the 2017 terrorist attacks in London and Manchester. Since these attacks, national counter-terrorism policing and the security & intelligence services have stopped 24 terrorist attacks – 16 were Islamist related and eight Right Wing Terrorism (RWT)
16. WMCTU continues to deal with a significant proportion of this investigative demand across the counter-terrorism policing network. WMCTU expects this demand to continue and most likely increase, with a greater focus on partnership working with security and intelligence services.
17. WMCTU's Pursue capability includes the ability to conduct counter-terrorism investigations using counter-terrorism trained senior investigating officers (SIOs) and dedicated counter-terrorism investigators, specialist digital & financial investigators, forensic scene examiners and a purpose built counter-terrorism custody facility. Specially trained counter-terrorism family liaison officers provide support to the victims of a terrorist attack. The unit includes a dedicated 24/7 counter-terrorism intelligence hub alongside specialist intelligence and analytical staff. The unit gathers intelligence and evidence through specialist mobile & technical surveillance teams and human intelligence units.
18. WMCTU is able to call upon the national counter-terrorism policing network for additional capabilities or capacity and, equally, supports the wider network with resourcing under national co-ordination arrangements.
19. During times of national surge demand, WMCTU has developed and tested its 'pursue' interoperability with other Force, regional and national departments such as Force CID, the Regional Organised Crime Unit and the National Crime Agency.

Prevent terrorism by tackling its causes

20. WMCTU's Prevent capabilities includes the regional Prevent co-ordination of force and local authority Prevent leads in order to deliver Force Prevent delivery plans. WMCTU delivers PREVENT case management using Regional Prevent officers and develops consequence management, community resilience and contact officers
21. Over recent years the approach to PREVENT has been changing. A number of these changes have been identified following recommendations arising out of the London and Manchester terror attacks in 2017 and recent HMICFRS inspections into '*the effectiveness of the counter-terrorism policing network in forming a bridge between national security and local policing*' and '*the effectiveness of the police contribution to the Prevent strategy*'
22. As the nature of terrorism risk becomes more complex, it is becoming increasingly difficult to define a clear delineation between PURSUE and PREVENT activity.
23. In 2017/18, the West Midlands region was one of three regions to pilot an ambitious new concept known as a multi-agency centres (MAC). The MAC pilots were designed to find new ways to improve information sharing between counter-terrorism policing, the UK security and intelligence services and statutory partners such as local authorities, health and education to identify and manage individuals at risk of re-engaging in violent extremism. The result was a blueprint for a new, national operating model which provides a single 'front door' for UK counter-terrorism to work with other Government departments and local partners which will be rolled out during the course of 2020/21.

Protect the public

24. WMCTU's Protect capability consists of Counter Terrorism Security Advisors, who provide physical security advice to businesses, premises and individuals at risk from terrorism and Counter Terrorism Awareness Advisors, who deliver terrorism security presentations to employees of businesses and premises.
25. The teams regularly visit crowded places (such as shopping centres), critical national infrastructure sites (such as major transport hubs) and hazardous substances sites (such as chemical factories) offering protective security advice

as well as conducting security reviews for locations and people deemed vulnerable to terrorist targeting.

26. The teams continue to undertake detailed planning for the Coventry City of Culture 2021, Commonwealth Games 2022, and HS2.
27. The CT Security Advisors are currently supporting a national Crowded Places review which may increase the number of designated crowded places. This is an opportunity to strategically protect more vulnerable locations.

Prepare for the consequences of a terrorist attack

28. WMCTU's Prepare capability is responsible for counter-terrorism organisational learning, testing and exercising within the region.
29. A new WMCTU Organisational Learning Board works with the national counter-terrorism policing Organisational Development Unit to review all national recommendations from operational debriefs, HMICFRS reports and public inquiries/inquests to identify those which are relevant to West Midlands Police.
30. The WMCTU Prepare capability works with West Midlands Police's Operations Resilience Unit to design and co-ordinate an annual timetable of force live-play and table-top exercises.
31. The teams oversee a host of internal mandated training and co-ordinate operational resource deployment across the WMCTU. Similar to PROTECT, PREPARE anticipate an increase in demand due to future events and the growth in staff that will require training.

Resourcing & Regionalisation

32. In accordance with national counter-terrorism policing requirements WMCTU is seeking to fill all established posts and, to date, has recruited to the majority of its vacant posts. All vacancies are advertised regionally to try to reduce the impact on West Midlands Police resources
33. Within the West Midlands Region, Staffordshire, West Mercia and Warwickshire police forces currently retain their own Special Branch departments which operate independently from but in close partnership with the West Midlands

Counter Terrorism Unit. The West Midlands Police Special Branch has already been fully amalgamated into WMCTU.

34. In June 2019 a new project was launched to develop an operating model for WMCTU to deliver counter-terrorism policing / Special Branch functions on behalf of Warwickshire Police, Staffordshire and West Mercia Police
35. Designed for implementation in 2020/21, the project will, for the first time, produce fully integrated counter-terrorism policing / Special Branch functions across the region, in order to improve intelligence sharing, join-up tasking & co-ordination and ensure greater consistency and quality of delivery.

Counter Terrorism Specialist Firearms Officers

36. West Midlands Police holds Counter Terrorism Specialist Firearms Officers (CTSFOs) within Force. These officers are trained to a single system and to the highest level to operate in the counter-terrorism environment anywhere in the country. They provided support in the wake of the Manchester and London terrorist attacks in 2017.
37. WMP Firearms Operations Unit continues to work towards the uplift in Counter Terrorism Specialist Firearms Officers. Training is provided to all Firearms Operations Unit officers with a wide array of courses including those that assist with national delivery of CTSFO up-skilling. The Armed Uplift Programme Funding ends in March 2021.
38. In May 2018, a British Transport Police authorised firearms officer hub opened in Birmingham to provide firearms resource for the rail network across the region. As there is a likelihood of the two teams working together, a memorandum of understanding and operational protocols have been developed and signed by BTP and WMP. WMP FOU has provided BTP with their training facilities while they undergo this major armed uplift.

Governance

39. WMCTU are represented at West Midlands Police's daily management meeting, monthly tactical delivery board and monthly strategic tasking & coordination group and are subject to a quarterly performance review.

40. A West Midlands Police CONTEST strategic governance board, chaired by ACC Security, meets on a quarterly basis to review the force's strategic response to the counter terrorism threat.
41. A quarterly counter-terrorism performance report and verbal update is provided to all regional Chief Constables and Police & Crime Commissioners.
42. An annual counter-terrorism report is provided to the West Midlands Strategic Policing and Crime Board.

Summary

43. The counter-terrorism threat within the West Midlands has continued to evolve over the past twelve months and will continue to evolve into the future. This evolving threat brings new challenges:
44. The terrorist threat now emanates from a much broader range of ideologies and is becoming increasingly more problematic to detect with lone actors being inspired online and moving through planning to attack phases quicker than ever before.
45. Terrorist methodologies continue to change and technological challenges remain in discovering, identifying and disrupting the threat.
46. Geo-political factors could result in unforeseen and significant changes to threat and demand. The Commonwealth Games 2022, BREXIT and changes in the demographics of the West Midlands will all impact on the work of WMCTU over the next four years and beyond.
47. WMCTU, working with policing, intelligence and community partners at a local, national and global level, remains well-placed to counter the threat posed by terrorism and extremism across our Region.

Public Order

48. The Force conduct a Public Order Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment (STRA) every 12 months to identify threat and risk pertaining to public order and the subsequent management of those identified risks at a regional level. This supports the National Public Order Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment (STRA).

Capacity, Contribution, Capability, Consistency & Connectivity

49. WMP is required nationally to be in a position to deploy 21 PSU's at any time. National guidelines recommend that forces train at a 3:1 ratio in order to accommodate shift patterns, sickness, and longer deployments. The annual target number of public order (PO) trained staff for WMP is therefore 1323 constables or 63 PSU's. All FSU officers are Public Order trained, with an aspiration that 80% of Response staff are also trained. Other specialist departments and Neighbourhood Teams provide additional resources. It is challenging to maintain the level of trained staff within Response and as such, through the Force Resilience Board, WMP are currently reviewing whether there are more sustainable options available. To support ensuring the right numbers of staff are trained Midland Regional Public Order Unit have developed a bespoke initial public order course, providing additional resilience. Primary mobilisation requires two PSUs within 1 hour. This is challenging overnight due to current vacancy rates within FSU and Response. Internal testing and exercising of mobilisation is ongoing to define and mitigate this risk. Although WMP can meet our national commitment of 21 PSUs as well as our own mobilisation demand, any mobilisation beyond 3 PSUs or for an extended period would certainly impact on our ability to conduct business as usual.
50. Firearms Operations Unit (FOU) officers offer a supporting role to public order. While no officers are public order trained, they have training in armed response and armed support (AEP) to public order as part of their minimum role profile, allowing the Force to address any major public order disturbance where specialist tactics or capabilities are required. WMP provide the regional capability with FOU and OSU officers having completed joint training in the delivery of the tactics again in 2019.
51. Football Policing remains the most frequent deployment for Public Order trained staff. Wolverhampton Wanderers are in the Europa League, which has brought with it some different challenges in relation to behaviour and risk of European fans as well as differences in policing style and approaches.
52. Work is currently underway to increase the cohort of Public Order Public Safety (POPS) Silver Commanders to ensure we have sufficient trained and experienced Commanders prior to the Commonwealth Games (CWG).

53. All Public Order trained officers now complete the nationally recognised fitness test and WMP are compliant and able to deploy nationally.
54. Vehicle fleet has undergone modernisation with 40+ public order carriers being delivered. The fleet map has been updated and is available out of hours.
55. WMP has officers trained in the new Public Order Medic Course. This gives the force the capability to deploy a medic team with every PSU, if mobilised and if necessary.
56. A review of PPE was carried out regarding helmets and overalls. Maintenance guidance has been circulated and damaged equipment has been replaced. All public order shields have been replaced and all spare stock is now held at Park Lane for easy access.
57. The force Event Control Suite (ECS) provides availability for other agencies to dock their systems during a time of public disorder, but poses logistical delivery challenges past 2019 in terms of its capacity and technology. A new ECS is in the planning phase and scheduled to be completed in 2021. This will provide a multi-agency environment capable of managing multiple events at one time.
58. WMP will connect to the national Emergency Services Mobile Communications Programme (ESMCP) in 2023/24, replacing the existing Airwaves system. The Force has been at the forefront of shaping this new technology nationally to ensure the maximum benefit for officers and staff and ultimately the people we serve. Due to delays in the national programme, a decision has been made to delay our adoption to enable uninterrupted delivery of the 2022 Commonwealth Games¹.

Serious and Organised Crime (SOC)

59. Serious and Organised Crime (SOC) is a substantial threat to the West Midlands, most evident within the urban conurbations of Birmingham, Coventry and Wolverhampton. The threat from serious organised crime is increasing in volume and in complexity – it affects more UK citizens, more often, than any other national security threat. SOC is defined as: Child Sexual Abuse & Exploitation; Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking; Organised Immigration Crime; Illegal Drugs and Firearms; Fraud, Money Laundering, Bribery and Corruption and Cyber Crime.

¹ http://intranet2/force_messages/2019_force_messages/national_emergency_services_ne.aspx

60. The Force approach now includes a focus on disrupting the commodity markets of drugs, firearms, people, accommodation and vehicles, commodities that organised criminals use to acquire wealth and power. This aligns with regional and national SOC strategies, and in doing so, helps to develop a whole system approach to tackle SOC.
61. WMP have combined the approach to tackling SOC and exploitation (SOCEX) and have established a SOCEX Board (Chaired by ACC Security) as well as drawing up Terms of Reference for the establishment of a SOCEX Hub which is being piloted in Birmingham and Coventry. To support this work a SOCEX threat grid has been introduced to inform decision making and prioritisation of operations/nominals. An update on progress of the SOCEX Hub will be briefed into the Combined Authority in January 2020, where support to roll this model out across the wider conurbation will be sought.

Capacity, Contribution, Capability, Consistency & Connectivity

62. WMP contribute 57% of the regional funding contribution to the West Midlands Regional Organised Crime Unit (ROCU) in order to deliver the core SOC capabilities.
63. Tasking processes between WMP and ROCU are embedded and joint working ensures that relevant investigations are allocated to the most appropriate department within the ROCU (including the Serious Organised Crime Unit) based on the scale and nature of the threat. There is now a Force-level SOCEX meeting and process to secure ROCU assets for WMP investigations.
64. Monthly priority setting meetings are now in place between ROCU, Force Intelligence, Force CID, Neighbourhood Policing Units and the Public Protection Unit to ensure there is a shared understanding of the threat, risk and vulnerability and that a co-ordinated response is developed to meet this. WMP internal priority setting meetings and SOC priority setting meetings take place regularly and the WMP Force Tasking and Delivery Board (FTDB) cycle includes a tactical priority setting meeting.
65. Neighbourhood Policing Unit (NPU) based Lead Responsible Officers (LROs) manage OCGs within their geography, meeting on a 6 weekly basis with Force and regional colleagues to support priority setting and the tasking of resources against the greatest threat from organised crime groups. LROs are responsible

for the delivery against 4 P Plans (Prevent, Prepare, Protect and Pursue) which are created for each identified OCG.

66. ROCU has responsibility for all regional covert assets. These assets are accessed by LROs or SIOs via a well-defined tasking process.
67. Development of a number of ROCU capabilities have been supported by Police Transformation Funding (PTF), including the Regional Organised Crime Threat Assessment (ROCTA) team and the Regional Disruptions Team (RDT). The PTF funding for these capabilities will end in March 2020. Regional CC's and PCC's have agreed to fund these capabilities to ensure ROCU's core capabilities will be unaffected and current service levels will be maintained through 20/21.
68. Analytical capacity within the ROCU has been stretched by increased levels of support to complex investigations and requirements to provide analytical support to the ROCTA and RDT capabilities. This has limited the capacity to develop strategic products. A proposal to increase the analytical capacity, to cater for the additional demand, has been agreed in principle by the Regional CC's and PCC's.
69. A Strategic Workforce Group oversees planning for the force to ensure ROCU have sufficient numbers of detectives, surveillance officers and other specialist resources with appropriate skills and accreditation to tackle organised crime.
70. WMP produces tactical and strategic products to assist in assessing the threat posed by SOC. Force products are supported by regional products, for example County Lines Threat Assessments; Strategic Governance Groups (SGG) for Firearms, Modern Slavery, CSAE, County Lines and overarching vulnerabilities; an Economic Crime SGG is in its infancy.
71. The new data capabilities provided by the Data Driven Insights project (DDI) are being embedded and will continue to provide improved depth of analysis, scale of insight and a level of understanding to support policing demands. Alongside the provision of high quality data, DDI will realise significant efficiency savings.
72. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) 2018 PEEL inspection² judged the force as having "a good understanding of the threats posed by SOC....effective ways of assessing the threats and....an effective strategic assessment to address those threats".

² <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/peel-police-effectiveness-2017-west-midlands.pdf> (published 2018)

73. The Force was assessed as being good at investigating SOC, with almost double the rate of disruptions per 100 OCGs for all forces across England and Wales. Since the HMICFRS review, the Force has continued to show significant improvements in disruptions, with quarterly recorded disruptions consistently in excess of 150.
74. HMICFRS did not inspect WMP's effectiveness in tackling serious and organised crime during the 2018/19 PEEL assessment, therefore the judgement of "good" has been carried over³.
75. ROCU has developed a programme for the recording, storing and dissemination of data regarding OCG disruption activities, enabling standardisation of data, improved data quality and dissemination to relevant NPUs.
76. The SOCEX hub pilot, in the cities of Birmingham and Coventry, is exploring opportunities to enhance existing partnership arrangements with local authorities. The pilot is testing new ways of sharing information and developing coordinated operational responses to SOC and Exploitation threats. This includes the creation of a central hub within force intelligence and additional staff embedded into Multi Agency Safeguarding Hubs.
77. Serious and Organised Crime Local Profiles (SOCLPs) are being prepared for Birmingham and Coventry. These will be delivered later in the year and will provide a framework for LROs to formulate 4P plans that recognise the important role that Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) have in helping to undermine OCGs. SOCLPs for the remaining authorities will be commissioned in 2020.
78. A 4P approach to tackling SOC is achieved through partnerships including Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC), Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) and Trading Standards. Work is underway to implement information sharing agreements (ISAs) to progress this work further. LROs are encouraged to access the Government Agency Intelligence Network (GAIN) network and the Regional Disruptions Team via the ROCU. This has resulted in recent successes in OCG disruption.

National Cyber Security Incident (NCSI)

³ <https://www.justiceinspectrates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/peel-assessment-2018-19-west-midlands.pdf>

79. The threat of a national cyber security incident (NCSI) is assessed by the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) to be high and growing, with an expectation the UK will be hit by one or more Category 1 cyber incidents⁴. A Category 1 incident is defined as a cyber-attack which causes sustained disruption of UK essential services or affects UK national security, leading to severe economic or social consequences or loss of life.
80. Cybercrime is commonly differentiated between cyber-enabled crimes (those where the scale, scope and impact of the harm is enhanced through use of computers, networks and online access) and cyber-dependent crimes (those that can only be committed using computers etc, such as 'hacking'). The cyber priorities for the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) Specialist Capabilities Programme during 2019 have been to focus on delivery of cyber-dependent investigation capabilities at a local level, so that there is less dependence by local forces on regional and national capability. This has been supported by the delivery of the national Cybercrime Hub⁵ to assist with coordination and tasking across the national, regional and local boundaries. It has also been supported by the delivery of a Cyber Tools App which is available now to all front line officers and staff, giving guidance on how to deal with mainstream cybercrimes and cybersecurity incidents without the need for recourse to specialists.
81. HMICFRS have undertaken thematic inspections of cyber-crime⁶ during 2019, involving 11 forces and the corresponding ROCUs.
82. The WMP cyber strategy is delivered through a Strategic Governance Group (SGG), which includes representation from the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner (OPCC). There are four workstream leads who each report into the SGG; those workstreams being cut across the '4Ps' in line with the overarching national serious organised crime strategy; namely for Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare. The strategy is being refreshed in 2020.

Capacity, Contribution, Capability, Consistency & Connectivity

83. The NPCC Specialist Capabilities Programme's priority has been to build specialist cybercrime units within forces that are regionally managed, locally delivered and fully networked into the regional and national response. This local

⁴ Specialist Capabilities Programme Capability Strategy & Annual Plan 2019 (CC Peter Goodman, 29th November 2018) p8

⁵ Specialist Capabilities Programme Capability Strategy & Annual Plan 2019 (CC Peter Goodman, 29th November 2018) p3

⁶ Letter from Matt Parr HMICFRS to Chief Constables and PCCs (29th August 2018) and

<https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/hmicfrs-inspection-programme-2019-20.pdf>

to national collaboration is referred to as 'Team Cyber UK' and WMP are an integral part of Team Cyber UK. The wider Capability Strategy & Annual Plan (2019)⁷ has enabled forces to set up such cyber-dependent investigation teams through provision of additional funding. WMP have taken advantage of this offer.

84. As an early adopter of the national development programme⁸, WMP was allocated £64,600 from the Police Transformation Fund to support the initial set up of a cyber-dependent investigation team. Most of the strategic priorities are now well developed within WMP and are improving capacity and capability. This has been coordinated through the WMP2020 Cybercrime Project. A coordinator role has now been established and recruited into⁹. Training has been delivered to equip WMP officers to carry out cyber-dependent investigation. In addition, WMP has secured £24,740 through the national project to purchase the requisite technical tools to undertake such investigations.
85. The Operations Resilience Unit highlight vulnerabilities in preparedness to a national cyber-security threat and has moulded cyber resilience within Business Continuity and Emergency Planning portfolios to meet industry standards. The unit also enables WMP to draw upon available national support and develops organisational understanding of the roles of key agencies able to assist in any response to a cyber-security incident. The Unit have built a plan to respond to cyber terrorism and national cyber attacks. That plan was then exercised at the launch of the new WMP Force Cyber Plan in September. Every leader in the force at the rank or equivalent grade to Chief Inspector attended this exercise (Exercise Control-Alt-Delete) as a requirement of their continual professional development programme.
86. The NPCC Specialist Capabilities Programme's national project team have delivered the Cyber Investigations Manual. This will be available through the new Cybercrime Hub which can be accessed through the Police ICT Company's Knowledge Hub, which in turn is now available to every member of the Police Service. The Cyber Tools App is being rolled out nationally¹⁰ and WMP has been instrumental in supporting wider adoption in partnership with the WMP2020 Mobility Project team¹¹. At the end of September, this app became available on all WMP mobility devices¹². WMP established its own local Force cyber-

⁷ Specialist Capabilities Programme Capability Strategy & Annual Plan 2019 (CC Peter Goodman, 29th November 2018) p3

⁸ Specialist Capabilities Programme feedback form (December) completed by WMP

⁹ Specialist Capabilities Programme feedback form (September) completed by WMP

¹⁰ Specialist Capabilities Programme Capability Strategy & Annual Plan 2019 (CC Peter Goodman, 29th November 2018) p3

¹¹ Specialist Capabilities Programme feedback form (September) completed by WMP

¹² <http://www.news-beat.co.uk/?p=72774>

dependent capability on 29 January 2019 and subsequently hosted the launch of the national NPCC campaign to promote and extend such capability to other forces, in April¹³.

87. It has been recognised nationally that capacity and capability development presents challenges around resourcing constraints and the identification, training and retention of staff¹⁴. The WMP cyber-dependent investigation team is now established within the Economic Crime Unit (ECU). The team are in a phase of up-skilling and knowledge transfer. In the meantime the Regional Organised Crime Unit (ROCU) hosts the regional cybercrime unit (RCCU), which meets regional requirements and has the capability to investigate, secure and preserve digital forensic opportunities. It also has access to support and advice from across the ROCU network, the National Crime Agency (NCA) and the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC). WMP can continue to access NCA and ROCU resources and NCSC advice via Mission Support whilst the upskilling of our own cyber-dependent investigation team progresses. Additional training for staff will be nationally procured, with the NPCC Specialist Capabilities Programme providing guidance to forces regarding the type of equipment and tools required to maintain national consistency and appropriate capability.
88. WMP no longer fund a relationship with GetSafeOnline (GSOL). Practices previously supported by GSOL are now fully embedded and the force is self-sufficient in delivering annual public events in partnership with the OPCC and local/national businesses. WMP are currently arranging support from companies including Lloyds, Santander, PWC and KPMG.
89. Through delivery against the cyber strategy, WMP continues to develop its capability to tackle this growing threat.

Civil Emergencies

90. The Operations Resilience Unit (ORU) is custodian of the forces Secret National Risk Assessment which contains the details of methodology and capability of top threats and hazards. With multi agency partners, it conducts a 2 year assessment on these threats which produces local threats and hazards. ORU received the latest National Security Risk Assessment from the government in

¹³ <http://www.news-beat.co.uk/?p=68339>

¹⁴ Specialist Capabilities Programme Capability Strategy & Annual Plan 2019 (CC Peter Goodman, 29th November 2018) p8-10

August 2019. The Local Resilience Forum (LRF) Risk Assessment Working Group (RAWG) reformed and met on the 16th December 2019 to assess and allocate ownership of risks. The West Midlands resilience forum community risk register holds seven risks that are considered likely to require a civil emergency response:

- Influenza type disease
- Flooding
- Severe Weather
- Environmental Pollution and Industrial Accidents
- Loss of Critical Infrastructure
- Fuel Shortages
- Transport Accidents

91. These risks will remain the same until RAWG has produced the latest iterations from the national NSRA.

Capacity, Contribution, Capability, Consistency & Connectivity

92. WMP has plans to deal with a national civil emergency. ORU are a key stakeholder within the LRF, at force thematic boards and with regional colleagues, as required under the Civil Contingencies Act. The Unit develops the force's capacity to respond to civil emergencies by identifying threats and hazards.

93. WMP maintain a Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) capacity, which includes; 1 strategic, 5 tactical and 5 operational commanders supported with 24/7 tactical advice delivered by 13 advisors. There are additional commanders and advisors who are currently seconded out of Force (mainly to the National CBRN centre). The Skills Database shows the Force as having 224 responders (as at 10th October), which is a rolling number due to the training packages run throughout the year and is subject to change. This was forecasted to be 307 responders by December, taking WMP over the current national requirement of 300, which form part of the 525 responders made up of WMP, Staffordshire Police, Warwickshire and West Mercia Police. WMP are the impetus behind the regional Multi Agency Specialist Assessment Team staffed by police, fire and ambulance specialists which is deployed to planned events where there is an increased threat of a CBRN incident.

94. Officers and certain critical staff roles undergo Continuing Professional Development (CPD) including emergency planning and business continuity training, with further development offered through the LRF. Operational commanders and specialists have received Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP) training, and attendance at annual CPD events is strongly encouraged and supported. There is a developing training strategy being rolled out for civil emergencies. This strategy complements the national JESIP programme and the College of Policing's (CoP) training offer.
95. The ORU quality assures training and delivers in collaboration with relevant Subject Matter Experts, dependent upon the topic and capacity. The core training needs have been proposed and are being incrementally rolled out. Regular amendments are made to take account of new priorities or organisational learning.
96. ORU places great emphasis on testing and exercising the Force to ensure it can deliver against the SPR and respond to emerging threats and hazards while continuing to be a key participant within West Midlands Conurbation Local Resilience Forum (LRF). Lessons identified through exercising are subject to our embedding process, which follows the industry model.
97. ORU have undertaken a new initiative to partner with a local university for graduate placements, bringing fresh industry thinking and perspective to the Unit. Additionally, ORU have provided exercising opportunities for universities and are active in the Force's work experience events. The Unit has also developed an inter-disciplinary approach within the Business Continuity and Emergency Planning Portfolios. This has allowed the Unit to keep the work broad, dynamic and provide a wider offer of experience to staff.
98. Force-issued emergency planning doctrine have been digitised and made interactive on the intranet and a mobile app is being developed for use on force mobility devices. The ORU are modernising emergency planning doctrine by utilising new technology, including mobile devices, apps and new command platforms.
99. The ORU are consistently reviewing and developing emergency plans in line with new changes. The Unit has also adopted a robust version control to demonstrate where a plan has had due regard to a review or debrief but may not require an update.

100. HMICFRS has previously¹⁵ found that the force “carefully debriefs all training exercises and major incidents”. Key areas of debriefing have been: EU Exit (January 2020), Mobilisation, Mutual Aid, Operation Plato (Kerslake, Centrum Point, Claudetite, Blackbirder and Adenalty).
101. ORU hosts the Joint Organisational Learning (JOL) SPOC who reviews national learning and brings it back into force. JOL provides lessons which could be queried in WMP arrangements and notable practise. JOL also offers incremental changes to operational areas such as scene management, briefing, and tri-service command learning. These are continually reviewed within WMP and forwarded to the Training and Exercising Sub Group for consideration.
102. ORU works alongside local authorities, ‘blue-light’ partners, other partner-agencies and regional policing colleagues. The West Midlands Conurbation LRF provides the overarching framework within which these collaborative arrangements are made and which facilitate the development of plans for responses to major events and civil emergencies.

Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (CSE/A)

103. The 2017 HMICFRS PEEL inspection published in March 2018¹⁶ found that the Force has a good understanding of the nature and scale of vulnerability and has completed profiles for child sexual exploitation. The 2018/9 inspection¹⁷ echoes this, as well as recognising that there are “clear structures for agreeing priorities, plans and decisions for understanding and identifying vulnerability”. HMICFRS acknowledge that there is governance in place that supports protecting people from harm, and that WMP “exchanges data and works with partner agencies to review and analyse different types of vulnerability. These include child sexual exploitation and domestic abuse.”
104. In the 2018/9 HMICFRS PEEL inspection it was identified that particular areas of focus for improvement included managing missing and absent children and safeguarding missing people. The force has a force wide dedicated Missing Persons Unit (the Locate Team) and has now implemented the College of Policing Approved Professional Practice (APP) on 7th May 2019. Progress and

¹⁵ <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/peel-police-effectiveness-2017-west-midlands.pdf> (published 2018)

¹⁶ <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/peel-police-effectiveness-2017-west-midlands.pdf> (published 2018)

¹⁷ <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/peel-assessment-2018-19-west-midlands.pdf>

use are being monitored by the Vulnerability Improvement Board through the Missing Operations Group. The removal of the absent category has ensured that all missing cases are shared with local authorities (LAs). The demand this places on WMP and its partners to provide timely interventions is being monitored closely following some initial concerns of delays in referrals due to volume increases. In response to a recent PCC joint Internal Audit, these issues have been progressed and presented to HMICFRS who have confirmed that the force has a good understanding of the issues raised in its response to the audit report. HMICFRS¹⁸ acknowledges improvements in how the Force manages missing persons investigations

105. To assist in delivering a consistent approach to identifying and responding to risk across the force area, WMP has worked with safeguarding leads for the seven LAs to devise an 'exploitation screening tool' which allows decision makers to identify and gauge risk for strands of exploitation.
106. WMP has identified a link between CSE/A and SOC¹⁹ and are mapping and identifying organised crime groups (OCGs) involved in such exploitation. The force's Serious and Organised Crime and Exploitation Strategies have been written to bring consistency and connectivity to these overlapping areas of policing. There are opportunities to streamline and rationalise effort to mitigate risks being missed, and to improve consistency across agencies, partners and geographies. WMP is developing a new High Harm Coordination Team (HHCT) that incorporates SOC and exploitation (SOCEX).
107. Representing the region at the NPCC board for child abuse means that WMP are uniquely placed to develop knowledge of national best practice, supplemented by hidden crime specialists aligned to CSE/A.
108. It is recognised that CSE/A is underreported within the West Midlands and nationally. Increases in CSEA demand continue to be significant. The first six months of 2019 saw a further 30.6% increase in child abuse compared to 2018. PPU are revisiting performance data to understand where increases are being experienced. It is believed that increased reporting of wilful assault and neglect is largely responsible for this, however there have been 764 CSA offences recorded in the last quarter, which is higher than regional partners. The impact of each crime area is being mapped as part of PPU's ongoing performance

¹⁸ <https://www.justiceinspectors.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/peel-assessment-2018-19-west-midlands.pdf>

¹⁹ Op Scimitar, Op Annan and Op Candidate refer.

management discussions. HMICFRS²⁰ recognise that WMP's initial response to incidents involving vulnerable people is adequate, although high demand remains a problem.

109. The redesigned PPU function was implemented in February 2019, with a full review of the change programme to be concluded early 2020. The new operating model aligns staff to CSE/A and builds resilience to better address the expected continued increase in crime and demand.
110. Operation Encompass is a nationally recognised early intervention and prevention model where police notify schools of children who have been present during domestic abuse (DA) and ensures the necessary support is in place. This recognises the importance and influence schools can have in assisting the child. This national initiative is now in use in all areas of the Force except Birmingham, where a brief pilot has been run and implementation is being considered. The majority of schools in the areas who use Operation Encompass are signed up, although some schools have requested they not be included specifically.
111. The roll-out of Body Worn Video has been used to good effect with child abuse investigations, allowing the capture of digital evidence.
112. Multi Agency Safeguarding Hubs (MASH) have seen an increase in establishment to facilitate screening and case strategy discussions. As MASHs have settled into the child protection infrastructure, HMICFRS have previously recognised growing consistency across the force area, whilst allowing for local flexibility²¹ and most recently found WMP to work well with local authority, NHS and other partners in the seven MASHs²².
113. Multi-Agency Enquiry Teams (MAET)²³ are now embedded in every local authority, and have a separate management and supervision structure. These teams work effectively with partners, to ensure reports that require joint agency attendance are identified and progressed in a timely fashion.
114. Work continues with partners to improve attendance at child protection conferences for all partners including the Police. WMP continue to employ dedicated and expert Case Conference Attenders. A recent PPU internal audit

²⁰ <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/peel-assessment-2018-19-west-midlands.pdf>

²¹ 'All MASH's generally function well, with no backlogs. Our previous inspections found that working practices differed between each MASH, due to varying demand across the force area. This is still the case, although the practices are now more aligned and the differences are appropriate to the resource levels and demand for services within each MASH'

²² <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/peel-assessment-2018-19-west-midlands.pdf>

²³ a dedicated team to conduct joint visits and deal with lower level volume crime and sexting

and PCC Joint Inspection has highlighted areas for improvement with regard to standardising the format of reports submitted, better training and support for staff, as well as working with Local Authorities to better coordinate meeting notifications to match Police availability to ensure effective decision making for vulnerable children in the area. This is being tracked through child abuse performance meetings and data is being collated for an evaluation by March 2020.

115. The continuing increase in the ease of access to digital devices challenges WMP's ambition to pre-emptively reduce threat, harm and risk by safeguarding vulnerable individuals, particularly minors, against cyber-enabled crimes including online-grooming and CSE. A strategic lead has been assigned within WMP to incorporate such challenges within a wider cyber strategy. A key element of that strategy is 'Protect' with the force's Digital PCSO working closely with young people to build resilience and raise awareness so that levels of vulnerability are reduced. In addition the strategy seeks to develop the capabilities within force so that frontline officers and staff are effectively equipped to deal with reporting and secure and preserve evidence during the stages of primary investigation, and so that specialist teams within public protection and digital forensics are appropriately trained and equipped and working in partnership with the Regional Organised Crime Unit, National Crime Agency and Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre.
116. WMP has a specialist Child Abuse function within the Public Protection Unit. The change programme and the redesigned PPU is still to be reviewed to gain a full understanding of its impact. Interim reports suggest that although demand remains a very significant issue, the dedicated complex teams have been effective in focussing efforts around complex CSE offending. The Child Abuse function is led by a dedicated Detective Superintendent and comprises dedicated Multi Agency Safeguarding and Enquiry Teams for each area and four 'hubbed' child abuse investigation units and 4 complex child investigation teams for more serious criminal investigations. Additionally, there is a dedicated Online CSE Team (OCSET) and a 'Priorities and Vulnerability Team' offering a proactive capability to respond to vulnerable child and adult related exploitation.
117. The Force ensures that staff are aware of the risk factors and identifiers for CSE. Child Abuse investigators receive training and accreditation (SCADIP), further supported by departmental led development days and joint partnership training. These inputs ensure practitioners are informed, improve the

consistency of service and ensure the quality and spread of skills within the workforce are appropriately aligned.

118. The Force CSE strategy developed in 2016 focused on brigading resources to maximise impact and WMP continues to work with safeguarding leads across the region to develop multi agency responses to all forms of exploitation. Partnership disruption approaches address criminal exploitation, trafficking, slavery in addition to sexual exploitation. The most recent HMICFRS²⁴ PEEL inspection recognised that joint working arrangements with partner agencies are effective in sharing information and taking action to protect people where necessary. WMP use civil options such as Sexual Risk Orders (SRO) in support of criminal investigations to ensure multiple options to disrupt and prevent offending are explored. Within the new PPU Operating Model a police staff investigator focuses on enhancing the expertise and use of civil interventions across CSE/A.
119. WMP has the ability to conduct complex CSE/A investigations within the Child Abuse Investigation Team (CAIT). Establishing a Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES) supported team means PPU can manage the most complex of investigations. The 'complex' teams within the new operating model will dedicate resource to deal with multiple victim/offender CSE/A, suspicious child death/other complex cases. The model allows for a more professional and efficient way of dealing with complex cases, however, 2019 saw a 30.6% increase in child abuse investigations from the previous year. The impact of this increased demand will be considered as part of the PPU Redesign evaluation in 2020.
120. The PPU continues to face challenges in terms of staff work loads and retention and recruitment. To ensure the department has sufficient staffing levels, WMP has taken the decision to employ Police Staff Investigators for a 12 month period as well as accredited agency investigators after which they will be replaced by the new uplift in Police Officers in 2020.
121. PPU are supporting the recruitment and development of student officers through its newly formed Student Officer Development Unit to encourage longer term recruitment and experience into the department, as well as supporting the capability of front line officers in primary investigations.

²⁴ <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/peel-assessment-2018-19-west-midlands.pdf>

122. Technology investment in the child abuse image database (CAID) has enabled collaboration with wider UK policing partners and global law enforcement agencies to identify suspected child abuse victims faster and safeguard the most vulnerable by bringing offenders to justice. WMP has a dedicated Visual Identification Officer (VID).
123. There is a programme of dip sampling of investigations, peer review of teams and monthly performance reviews within PPU to ensure consistency of practice and identify common performance themes to share the learning around these reports. This work is supported by WMP's evidence-based policing unit to produce a more rigorous framework for peer review feedback.
124. Feedback is a further valuable means to improve operational practice. Internal reviews are improved through structured partnership debriefs and close working relationships with the CPS. This helps to improve practice and deliver a consistent service. Child Abuse Teams across the force take part in multi-agency audits through local safeguarding boards and share learning to ensure continual improvement and a child-centred approach. The use of scrutiny panels that consist of members of the public and magistrates have been used to review the rationale of investigators for out of court disposals, allowing for specific feedback and supporting consistency across decision makers.
125. Escalation procedures for CSE/A cases are in place for all Local Safeguarding Children Boards (LSCB).
126. There is a statutory requirement for multi-agency working within child abuse investigation. Within all local authorities, MASHs and MAETs enable PPU staff to sit alongside staff from children services, health, education and other partners. Neighbourhood Policing Senior Leaders are equally connected into the Early Help and Intervention agenda.
127. Overlapping exploitation and SOC, alongside plans for a SOCEX Hub within Intelligence, reflects the aim of WMP to bring together all strands of exploitation. Three workshops were held last year with partners to understand the confluence between CSE, County Lines and trafficking, aiming to agree approaches with the CPS and social care and other statutory partners. This work formed the basis of the Exploitation Strategy. The function of these workshops has now been assumed into the SOCEX Board.
128. As part of this strategy, Police work with partners in all areas through Multi Agency Child CSE (MASE) meetings and CSE Missing Operational Groups

(CMOG) to manage offenders and the risk around children who go missing where there are also concerns around CSE.

129. Neighbourhood officers share the responsibility of tackling CSE alongside colleagues in the PPU. Investigation teams are represented at Local Tactical Delivery Boards (LTDB) and bring CSE victims, offenders and locations that require NPU support.
130. Strong relationships exist between ROCU and West Mercia, Warwickshire and Staffordshire and the regional agreements for OCSET, CSE coordination and modern slavery all facilitate connectivity around this threat area. ROCU have developed an 'Exploitation' Strategic Governance Group (SGG) to bring together work taking place in the thematic SGG's of County Lines, CSE/A, Modern Slavery and Firearms. WMP attend all groups and currently chair 4 of the 5 groups.

Conclusion

131. WMP continues to face a number of challenges and there remain funding and resource issues. The government's announcement of 20,000 new officers over the next three years translates as an initial allocation of 366 officers (in addition to planned recruitment) by March 2021²⁵. However, the government acknowledges that these figures have been based on the current funding formula model and that the formula needs revision "to ensure a fairer allocation of officers across all forces"²⁶.
132. Planning for the 2022 Commonwealth Games is underway and the Force has a dedicated Commonwealth Games planning team with a clear schedule of growth. WMP has a dedicated Brexit plan (Operation CARVEN) that supports national planning for the UK's exit from the European Union²⁷.
133. The new PPU function was implemented in February 2019, and a review will commence in November 2019. In addition to the existing detective and surveillance academies, the Intelligence Department is creating an Intelligence Academy which will further enhance Force capabilities to disrupt SOC. The

²⁵ <http://www.news-beat.co.uk/?p=73115>

²⁶ <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/home-office-announces-first-wave-of-20000-police-officer-uplift>

²⁷ <https://www.westmidlands-pcc.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/190917-SPCB-Item-8-Brexit-paper-1.pdf>

proposed SOCEX Hub recognises the importance of a whole systems approach to drive such activity.

134. The Operations Resilience Unit positions the force proactively in planning for national incidents, placing strong emphasis on testing and exercising and has moulded cyber resilience within Business Continuity and Emergency Planning portfolios to meet industry standards.
135. The Force is able to mobilise to a national threat, however, to do so beyond an initial period would impact on our ability to deliver business as usual services to our communities.

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