ID	Risk Name	Description	Impact	Key Controls and Activities	Q1 Trending	Q2 Trending	Q3 Trending	Residual Risk Rating
CRR18	Core Skills Resilience & Training Risk	There has been a drop in Police Officers trained in core skill areas, this has partly been due to COVID and self-isolation measures. This has led to a reduction in the percentage numbers and resilience of Police Officers trained in core skills such as Personal Safety Training, Diver Training, Public Order Skills and Taser. The reduced capacity has also led to a reduced offer from L&D.	The greatest risk is that of the Force to be unable to deploy sufficient numbers of staff to meet calls for service and demand. In addition to this is the length of time it will take to meet the backlog and bring us back in line with demand on courses and meet resilience targets.	We have invested in contingency funding to secure additional courses for Personal Safety Training, specifically targeting those officers who need to retain public order skills also. All other courses can begin to meet backlog and continue to address BAU demand as we now return to normal classroom sizes. We have greater scrutiny on course non-attendance to ensure our classrooms are filled to maximum capacity and with the greatest efficiency Task & Finish group set up to provide a 12-month plan to drive down this demand	N/A	New	→	Critical
CRR20	Probation Data Sharing & Disclosure	There is a risk that the Force does not have the appropriate oversight and a centralised process to deal with and record the information requests made by the Parole Board.	This could lead to legal costs and/or ICO fines due to a lack of accurate information. Possible lack of compliance with GDPR rules.	Probation Services & national FOI/DP team are close to finalising information sharing agreement which will control some of this better. Plans for mitigation - IT solution is under consideration.	N/A	N/A	New	Critical
CRR03		Op Plato Embedding There is a risk that Operational Officers fail to adopt the national Joint Operating Principles introduced to WMP in December 2020 in a timely manner. A new challenge with this risk is the lack of ownership locally now that ORU have rolled out the training to keep this an annual refresher on CPD days within departments. JESIP Command Training Limited roll out of the JESIP re-accreditation courses. This has been caused by insufficient access to training venues and JESIP trainers amongst the tri-service and could lead to a delay in re-accreditation of the JESIP Commanders and upskilling new staff.	There is a lack of CPD days within departments and prioritisation of training competes locally to complete the roll out. The risk is that the national doctrine has changed quicker than the ability and competency of officers in adopting these changes.	Op Plato next phase will be revisited with the Op Plato Working Group All firearms command have undergone CPD training incorporating Plato and Siege scenarios. JOPS2 updates have been briefled out to all operational staff and a video box embedded in the force intranet. Op Mooring findings and debrief conducted. Work ongoing to fully implement resulting recommendations. Manchester Inquest findings are being monitored and the training and exercising programme being amended accordingly for assurance. Op Mooring considerations have been embedded back into training and planning practises. ORU is rolling out NPU/dept. training with large tests conducted every 2 months within FCC (Ex Impertior). JESIP NCALTS - All staff awareness, Operational Command and Tactical Commander. Op Plato and Force Control Room Command exercising of JESIP Principles. OL&D and Ops in discussions to match demand with training needs.	New	→	÷	High
CRR15	S22 Governance	ROCU - If the current model - ARIS (Asset Recovery Incentivisation Scheme) is altered and assets seized were distributed across the region e.g. as per the current funding formula WMP OPCC would stand to lose 47% of current ARIS funding. There is a risk that if ARIS funding is not provided to other forces they may withdraw resource from the ROCUWM as they are not seeing equitable benefits from the regional agreement. CTU - There are two proposed options for the method of transferring Special Branch funding into CT Policing as part of the national SB Reform project. There is a risk that if Option 1 is chosen the transfer of SB funding into CT Grant will result in a 'top slice' from forces across the region that is not consistent with the actual spend of Special Branch. Option 2 would be a one-time adjustment. Based on this information, there is a risk that WMP will see their budget reduced by more than the actual cost of Special Branch.	adjustment meaning that forces' individual funding only decreases by their expenditure on	ROCU - WMP and the OPCC are currently in discussions to provide a regional solution to the current arrangement. A plan is being developed to discuss a way forward. CTU - A regional response has been sent to the Home Office detailing option 2 as the preferred method of transfer for the West Midlands region - Following an extensive engagement and consultation process with Chief Constables, Police & Crime Commissioners and Ministers, with strong endorsement from the CT Policing Network, the decision was taken by Ministers to approve option 2 and this will be actioned in Spring 2022 An Oversight Board was held in late November 2021 to discuss the next steps required to successfully implement the funding transfer next April 2022, which will also include the revision of the existing Section 22 agreement.	N/A	New	→	High
CRR09	Recruitment & Retention/Uplift	There is a risk of being unable to recruit staff across the Force in a timely manner and aligned with the strategic workforce planning requirements. The uplift targets and their associated entry routes (e.g. PEQF) create significant additional demand on WMP. The failure to meet recruitment targets will impact on the force's resilience and may potentially affect future funding from the Home Office. There is a risk that a number of student officers have been identified as potentially being at risk of dismissal due to repeated failures of university modules.	- WMP will not be able to recruit and retain sufficiently skilled people to deliver our service. Risk to service provision and accreditation status in some cases (e.g. Forensics). Longer-term employee relations impact. Potential loss of confidence from WMP colleagues who were anticipating additional resources to join them. - Due to the sheer volume of demand and complexity of entry criteria, WMP is not able to push through the uplift recruitment pipeline quickly enough resulting in missed targets or not meeting resourcing assumptions. Reputational (and potential financial) impact on WMP from the Home Office. - The impact is this may be significant for WMP and the government's confidence in us The impact of student officer repeatedly failing their modules, will lead to the student being dismissed from their university course, WMP currently has no other training programme available to see them though their probationary period.	- Workforce plan to meet targets to the end of March 2023 - Understanding of staff turnover and retirements to 2023 - Review where student officers are posted across organisation - Recognition of prior education/meeting entry criteria in an alternative way (e.g. via essays) - Some mitigation has been possible through engagement with the University to offer appeal and comment on operational competency. University offering additional support to at risk students and the opportunity to resubmit work, but in some cases even this intervention has not resolved concerns - This risk continues to be monitored, improved process of notification and communications with the University provide the opportunity to intervene now at the earliest stages.	→	→	ע	High
CRR13	Cybersecurity	Failure of the Force's IT&D systems (due to cyber-attack, hardware failure, loss of IT systems via IT services provider or other data security breaches) will lead to severe disruption to service delivery and response.	Loss of access to IT systems due to a failure in our cyber security for an extended period of time could adversely impact WMP's ability to continue service delivery and business operations. This could also lead to potential data breaches, an inability to access key systems and reputational damage.	IT&D operate a suite of mitigations to prevent Cyber Attack, this ensures we have a robust approach to security and helps defend our data and systems: - We "Secure by Design" - All designs for systems have oversight of both a Security Architect and Information Assurance experts who validate best design/secure practise in technology solutions before implemented. - We operate a multi-layer defence approach at our network boundary. - We patch our systems regularly in-line with enterprise recommendations. - We backup our data to prevent corruption, and this data is stored separate to the system by geographic resilience. We test our backup restore processes and document the outcomes.	N/A	New	→	High
CRR06	Corporate Health, Safety and Wellbeing	There may be an increase in employee related mental health and wellbeing issues which impacts WMP's ability to deliver and recover operational services during the post pandemic environment. There is a risk of post-Traumatic Stress Disorder to forensic services staff caused through constant exposure to trauma, death, violence and sexual scenes and evidence and the subsequent raw emotion of victims and families.	 Failure to look after the wellbeing of our staff could have a significant impact on employee confidence, poorer engagement, and increased sickness levels. Staff who are exposed to traumatic images and investigations over a prolonged period of time are likely to be at increased risk of experiencing detrimental impacts on their physiological wellbeing. 	Enhanced force approach to trauma risk identification and management (TRIM) - questionnaires to high risk roles, further engagement with occupational health, focus groups in place. Efficient signposting to Vivup, TRIM process, targeted clinical supervision, use of watchful waiting and line manager and colleague observations. Increased discussion and conversations regarding wellbeing taking place. Higher risk role assessment underway with more tailored support offered where identified.	→	→	→	High
CRR01		There is a risk that the increased identification of vulnerability in demand, and hidden crimes (includes child exploitation, modern day slavery, human trafficking, domestic abuse, missing people) poses a challenge to the Force to manage its complexity. The risk could also impact the response levels provided impacting the delivery of an effective service to those in need.	Increases in volumes or poor identification impacts on the force's capacity to prevent and respond, creating public confidence and safety concerns, and meet our overall requirement to prevent the unnecessary criminalisation of children and improve the overall quality of investigations involving vulnerable people.	- V&I officers have been identified across all geographic hubs. The officers perform a co-ordination role to ensure that FCID is responding to the statutory obligations within investigations. The FCID offer is nuanced across the hubs, with the Birmingham based officer embedded within a multi dept. function. In the long term FCID will form part of the SOCEX build - An escalation process for partners has been created, which allows escalation to the duty crime supt in urgent cases. This has been utilised by partners. - Missing from home lead now sits within FCID and regular and active Supervision of Missing investigations is now occurring. Regular performance monitoring daily/weekly/monthly in place. - Structured debriefs from recent operations involving vulnerability have provided organisational learning and resulting learning to be incorporated into learning logs. - Implementation of VSA audit approach, resulting in an enhanced audit and assurance function being established in force.	→	÷	→	High
CRR02		There is a risk that interventions to address multiple risk factors/indicators are not impactful or effective. The increase in volume of serious youth crime and serious violence (gun and knife crime) in the under 25s could lead to the cumulative risk around community safety. There could be a perceived failure that the Force is not responding adequately to prevent and respond to crime involving young people.	Increases in volumes impacts on the force's capacity to prevent and respond to increased demand. Increases in serious youth violence reporting in the media could undermine community confidence in policing and contribute to safety concerns. Demand pressures could have an impact on crime prevention initiatives. Force response becomes more reactive than preventative.	Guardian Grip funding established. Taskforce numbers increased to full strength as of Sept 2021. Integrated force violence strategy being implemented Managed through FTDB, Performance Panel and Strategic Tasking structures plus dedicated ACC led performance meeting Public health (PH) approach launched and working with VRU to deliver. Additional funds have been channelled to tasking processes (WTAM) to support NTE resources. Taskforce continue to achieve positive results and deep dives into NPU problem solving progressing Interim strategy presented and internal PH review of processes ongoing New Violence Board is focusing on tiered offender processes, school exclusions and referrals plus exempt accommodation.	→	→	→	High
CRR05	Demand Management	There is a risk that the Force fails to respond to and manage the effective and efficient policing requirements of the region as a result of the increased volume and complexity in demand. The nature of the rise requires an increasing level of sophistication to understand how it moved through the system and may be compounded by resourcing constraints.	Impacts on our ability to create and execute effective plans to ensure effective and efficient delivery of policing. Example: Demand and the management of risk within the P2 grade, which has a service level at 60 minutes. Currently a minority of case are being carried over beyond 24 hours. This is a concern in relation to risk management, service delivery, victim support and impacts on stress to WMP staff seeking to manage this risk when unresourced. Return to 'new normal' at the tail-end of the pandemic creates additional complexity/uncertainty.	DDI Dashboards to give better access to management information to inform decisions Gold group task to look at journey maps for incident types to identify pinch points and give insight into what could be done to make the process more efficient Closely linked to Control Works and Connect Exploring opportunities to increase the sophistication of our demand modelling and forecasting approach. Increased understanding of resource levels, however further work required to understand resource to demand capacity especially on late turn. Review being undertaken into baseline responsibilities for Force Contact staff and where ownership of the P2 risk and demand should be.	71	→	→	High

CRR17	Organisational Learning	Organisational learning is obtained across the force via its various learning hotspots (i.e., IA / HMIC recommendations, debriefs, inquiries (Manchester Arena bombings), IOPC reports etc). There is no integrated organisational learning structure across the force to ensure once learning is identified, it is evaluated and shared across the Force to positively impact policy practise and outcomes. There is a risk that WMP lacks the oversight required to analyse strategic, cross cutting and/or operational organisational learning to ensure risks and opportunities are managed and evaluated in showing learning and ideas have a route to action including integration into operational practice. Data migration into CONNECT could lead to loss of relevant information transferring over from	Failing to embed the learning across the Force could lead to reputational damage should major incident occur across the region and learning available. Increased scrutiny from external regulators – such as HMICFRS - The impact of this risk may be that data in the back records is missing from the transfer to	- OL Working Group ran from April-June 2021 Standardised Learning Log template agreed Governance flows and business rules drafted Assessment criteria under development Risk prioritisation of debrief recommendations agreed in principle and review of previous structured debriefs ongoing Increase in trained structured debriefs in force being overseen by Strategy & Direction (S&D). Debrief policy redraft being considered Governance, Risk and Assurance Snr Mgr from S&D engaged with all Portfolios to support risk management approach, which incorporates critical/high risk learning identification and embedding. - CONNECT team continuing to work through system architecture and integration issues with Northgate as	N/A	New	→	High
CRR04	CONNECT Legacy/BRC Data	legacy systems into CONNECT. Data loss/gaps could lead to the Force being unable to accurately access historic audit data.	CONNECT. This could lead to certain data fields in things like DBS historic checks being excluded – e.g. crime reference numbers. The impact of this risk could lead to potential reputational damage if information provided in DBS certificates do not adequately reflect all current and historic data. - CONNECT Legacy/BRC Data- Significant issues with this content- not all relevant information has been brought over into CONNECT, plus there are gaps in some outcomes/ markers that did not exist on legacy systems- for example, over 140K post 2018 DA records are no longer identified correctly, and there is currently no solution for accessing audit data.	part of usual programme management business. - BRC Issue is under investigation by the Project/IT&D/Northgate - until this is resolved WMP cannot delete legacy data. - DBS staff and others involved in investigation and disclosure are aware and are currently checking legacy systems to ensure all relevant information is considered. - The risk and associated issues are well monitored by CONNECT Project- Decommissioning workstream is tracking these data pots successfully. Risk is being monitored by CONNECT Project Board.	New	→	→	High
CRR08	Investigative and Criminal Justice Process and Outcome	- There is a risk that the case backlog that exists due to COVID may result in victims and witnesses losing faith in the Criminal Justice system. The backlog also puts at risk the cost recovery from Police Led Prosecutions. There is also the risk of an additional strain on CJS resources, particularly in Witness Care, due to the new court listings process. - Updates to the Attorney General's Guidelines on Disclosure which sits alongside the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act ("CPIA") 1996, has an impact on the working practices of investigations officers and staff, with a short turnaround time for adhering to the guidance.		- Magistrates Backlogs have reduced to 3% of the pre-covid caseloads. The Crown remains at an increase of 49%. - CJ has secured home office funding to maintain the 5 additional temporary staff, upskill witness care staff in accredited trauma training, fund RASSO gatekeeper post to increase the file quality and timeliness of precharge cases sent to CPS. - CJ is hosting a series of meetings with the Crown Courts to establish/review the current listing process. CJ have applied for 3 additional posts through the home office secondary funding specific to special measure advocates. The unit continues to move work around ensuring an even spread of cases for the team. - Comprehensive learning package to be rolled out across the Force in December/January providing guidance for the D66 changes. WMP will receive the first iteration of the guidance as we have been involved in the development of the new national guidance. - Considerable amount of training and checking of disclosures from other departments undertaken. - Recruitment is ongoing in CMU to increase the current establishment, it is envisaged that the roles will be filled in qtr 4 (2021/22)	→	÷	÷	High
CRR14	Alarms Management	There is a risk that alarm notifications may fail at Force Control C3 due to the unreliability of receiver equipment and delays in replacing it.	Alarm notifications may fail at Force Control C3 due to the unreliability of receiver equipment and delays in replacing it. While the receivers are not upgraded the force runs the risk of the loss of alarm messages and the consequential failure to act on them.	Migration to C3 has further raised the risk as equipment could be adversely affected by relocation and reconnection. This would leave the Force potentially unable to monitor and therefore respond to alarm calls. The risk still remains though as the equipment is old and has the potential to fail. The residual score remains static as Shared Services urgently need to assess business requirements so the work can be prioritised and resources from IT&D and Property Services can be committed to enable replacement.	N/A	New	→	High
CRR16	Police Cadet Leaders - Safeguarding	There is a risk that WMP Police Cadets policies, procedures and process fail to comply with the National Safety and Safeguarding guidelines (UKYSSF). The guidelines are set out by the National VPC who advises that WMP aligns its practice to the UK Youth Safer Spaces Framework (UKSSF) backed by the NPCC Enforcement.	- Increased spotlight on other Forces could increase media focus on all Police Force's across the country including WMP If WMP does not ensure compliance with the safeguarding practices around recruitment of Police Cadet Leaders, this could increase the likelihood of having a negative impact on public confidence and legitimacy in safeguarding Police Cadets.	- Working with national VPC to support writing policies that are fit for purpose Safeguarding being reviewed. Mandatory training compliance being actively managed, currently and has increased from 60% to 81%. Cadet Leaders who have not had the training by 31/12/2021 will be paused pending completion of the training workshop Safer Recruitment process remains at 100% compliant	N/A	New	ĸ	Medium
CRR21	Mutual Aid & Resourcing	There is a risk that significant resources abstractions (police officers and staff) will be required from operational business and duties during the operational period of the Commonwealth Games. There is a risk that a local, regional or national critical incident could see Mutual Aid and / or WMP officers and / or vehicles abstracted to resource the incident response.	The impact of this risk may be that WMP will have gaps in the Games staffing model, potentially causing a security fublic safety risk. Should vehicles be unavailable, then officers' ability to perform their roles may be impacted and/or alternative transport may need to be found at short notice and with additional cost.	Explore scenario / resilience in Business Continuity / Testing & Exercising. Three recent T&E events have already been conducted. Engage with recruitment Uplift programme to assess opportunities. Working with the operation to build an abstraction and deployment model and approach to identify with the organisation where resources will be taken from and for how long. CWG are currently in a period where resource planning is being fleshed out, with the consideration of BAU capacity. CWG SLT engaging with FET in December to ask Leads to work with their departments to confirm staffing requirements. The MACA was submitted to government in October for Mutual Aid resources with a decision expected by end January.	New	→)	Medium
CRR07	WMP Demographics and Representation	There is a risk that a failure to attract, recruit and retain a diverse and representative workforce across the force that is less representative of the communities we serve could create risk to public confidence. Failure to attract and retain a diverse and representative workforce (both officers and staff) required at every level of the Force to deliver our services to our diverse communities.	A less representative force will lack legitimacy in some communities, hampering its ability to achieve positive outcomes. The impact may be that the legitimacy and trust in WMP is diminished. The impact of not meeting the PCC's target of recruiting 1000 BAME officers may lead to reputational damage.	- New Diversity & Inclusion strategy currently being developed Review of recruitment and promotions processes - Departmental D&I plans are in place and each dept. has a local D&I governance board. The D&I plans are reviewed as part of QPR process and any key risks are escalated to the Business Partners. The plans are reviewed bi-annually internally and will also be externally reviewed annually Key part of recruitment uplift project team Gold Strategy continues to operate to ensure a robust delivery plan. The new Police & Crime Plan has the target of 1000 to be achieved by March 2025 (originally March 2023).	÷	→	÷	Medium
CRR10	Financial Management	I. There is a risk that WMP's finances are not sustainable over the medium term and/or efficiency savings required may adversely impact the operational services. Whilst the police grant has increased for 22/23 to fund increase in officer numbers, there are still unfunded inflationary pressures. ii - There is also a risk that as mandated/national initiatives develop (e.g. ESMCP, National Enabling Programme), the actual costs for delivery far exceed the estimated costs within the affordability envelope.	I - Impact on overall funding position. Medium term financial plan (MTFP) sets out strict budgeting envelope that must be met. Ii - The inability to finance all component projects, or needing to de-prioritise other projects within the portfolio if the national changes are mandated.	Influence National debate on Police Funding Formula Review and continue to scrutinise financial planning and prudence in managing long term commitments Revised MTFP and focus on benefit maximisation and continued efficiencies Build in scenario planning, with potential savings / investment options available National Horizon scanning by R & C Manager to ensure we have full visibility of emerging national programmes. Work ongoing to provide portfolio leadership to assess current demand and financial picture Regional working to ensure integrated planning (on ESMCP) We have commenced our 2 yr. Priority Based Budgeting process, with phase 1 completed in October 2021. In addition, we have adopted a zero-based budgeting approach to review some elements of non-pay expenditure.	→	→	→	Medium
CRR11	Safeguarding - Local Policing	There is a risk that the Force fails follow safeguarding processes to protect the needs of the most vulnerable members of our community. There is also a risk that the Force fails to fully understand the safeguarding needs and experiences of citizens - young and old due to increased demand pressures and the challenging range of commissioned and partner-driven arrangements operating across the region.	Poor identification impacts on the force's capacity to prevent and respond, creating public confidence and safety concerns. Risk to vulnerable members of the community. Potential reputational damage if risk not adequately mitigated.	- Neighbourhood Policing Units (NPUs) have appointed a Superintendent as their local safeguarding & vulnerability champion to drive service improvement and consistency. The Superintendent also engages at a Regional level via the regional uniform users' group to consolidate learning, address identified risks and respond to feedback and areas for improvement presented at a National and Regional level and from Ambulance, Fire and Local Authority attendees. - Bespoke training and tailored briefings are delivered to supplement the role out of the National College of Policing Approved Force wider Safeguarding and Vulnerability training. NPU vulnerable persons officers have been able to reflect upon the above training, complement this with localised good practice and update their geographic 'Intranet' pages with updated guides, act as local SPOCs to give assistance.	÷	÷	÷	Medium