

ID	Risk Name	Description	Impact	Key Controls and Activities	Q1 Trending	Q2 Trending	Q3 Trending	Q4 Trending	Residual Risk Rating
CRR18	Core Skills Resilience & Training Risk	There has been a drop in Police Officers trained in core skill areas, this has partly been due to COVID and self-isolation measures. This has led to a reduction in the percentage numbers and resilience of Police Officers trained in core skills such as Personal Safety Training, Driver Training, Public Order Skills and Taser. The reduced capacity has also led to a reduced offer from L&D.	The greatest risk is that of the Force to be unable to deploy sufficient numbers of staff to meet calls for service and demand. In addition to this is the length of time it will take to meet the backlog and bring us back in line with demand on courses and meet resilience targets.	- Continued investment in contingency funding to secure additional courses for Personal Safety Training, specifically targeting those officers who need to retain public order skills also. Currently eliminated the backlog of 1-day combined courses, focus now on the 2-day combined courses. Predicted to see a reduction in outstanding numbers by July 2022. - We have greater scrutiny on course non-attendance to ensure our classrooms are filled to maximum capacity and with the greatest efficiency. - A monthly breakdown of demand has been provided, which has been applied to the outstanding officer numbers and the planner has applied these when planning 6 months in advance. Only current risk is the impact of reduced numbers again due to COVID which had slightly affected Dec 2021/Jan 2022 figures. Going forward, we are planning to provide guidance to ensure we can still meet targets, once the reduced numbers have increased again, the original maximum course enrolments will be reinstated.	N/A	New	↔	↔	Critical
CRR20	Probation Data Sharing & Disclosure	There is a risk that the Force does not have the appropriate oversight and a centralised process to deal with and record the information requests made by the Parole Board.	This could lead to legal costs – the cost of wrongful imprisonment and/or ICO fines – lack of accurate information, threat to life, and/or damage to the force's reputation. Possible lack of compliance with GDPR rules.	Probation Services & national FOI/ DP team are close to finalising information sharing agreement which will control some of this better. Plans for mitigation- IT solution is under consideration.	N/A	N/A	New	↔	Critical
CRR03	Operational Training and Embedded Learning.	Op Plato Embedding There is a risk that Operational Officers fail to adopt the national Joint Operating Principles introduced to WMP in December 2020 in a timely manner. A new challenge with this risk is the lack of ownership locally now that ORU have rolled out the training to keep this an annual refresher on CPD days within departments. JESIP Command Training. Limited roll out of the JESIP re-accreditation courses. This has been caused by insufficient access to training venues and JESIP trainers amongst the tri-service and could lead to a delay in re-accreditation of the JESIP Commanders and upskilling new staff.	There is a lack of CPD days within departments and prioritisation of training competes locally to complete the roll out. The risk is that the national doctrine has changed quicker than the ability and competency of officers in adopting these changes.	- Increased number of Operational staff have completed the Plato NCALTs and Op Plato 2 hour input. Risk profile has improved, however, once the numbers completing the courses have increased to an acceptable level, it is anticipated that the residual risk score will reduce to medium. - Work is continuing to increase JESIP training numbers, prioritisation areas in CWG BE/BW/, CV and WV NPU's having the requalification as priority. - Plato working group continuing to monitor and manage the competing training challenges. - Op Plato next phase being managed by the Op Plato Working Group - JESIP NCALTS - All staff awareness, Operational Command and Tactical Commander. - Op Plato and Force Control Room Command exercising of JESIP Principles. - Continued discussions with OL&D and Ops to match demand with training needs.	New	↔	↔	↓	High
CRR08	Investigative and Criminal Justice Process and Outcome	- There is a risk that the case backlog that exists due to COVID may result in victims and witnesses losing faith in the Criminal Justice system. The backlog also puts at risk the cost recovery from Police Led Prosecutions. There is also the risk of an additional strain on CJS resources, particularly in Witness Care, due to the new court listings process. - Updates to the Attorney General's Guidelines on Disclosure which sits alongside the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act ("CPIA") 1996, has an impact on the working practices of investigations officers and staff, with a short turnaround time for adhering to the guidance.	- The impact is that justice is not served for victims and witnesses and WMP's reputation is at risk as a reduced number of cases are being heard by the Courts (including murder trials). The reduction of Courts will also result in a significant loss of income recovery from PLP. There may also be additional welfare issue for Witness Care staff due to the supplementary work required. - The new guidance has implications for how the police engages with other parts of the CJS, in terms of timeliness, mandatory disclosures and digital evidence. In particular, it increases the expectations on the recording of materials in the course of an investigation - extending requirements to unused material and provision of schedules for all Pre-Charge cases. The combined effect of these changes could result in an increase in the number of bail cases and CPS rejections, creating further demands on the force.	- The magistrates court listings have returned to pre-covid levels. Areas nationally being explored at present are considering to allow Magistrates to manage cases that would incur 12 months sentences so less referrals to crown court. - The crown court delay is approx. 2 years. Additional staff have been recruited into witness care units to support victims. The staff have been provided with additional trauma informed training to better support vulnerable victims and RASSO / DA cases. Aspects of the new charging model have yet to be agreed locally with CPS for red cases to agree cases that would be defined based on threat/ risk cases and the SLA for discretionary Green cases. - The government changes likely to be implemented around Section 28 allowing cross examination for all DA victims – will have significant impact for force around capacity and capability (training of staff for VRI- ABE). This is being managed through the Portfolio governance and the NPCC lead is attending relevant governance forums.	↔	↔	↔	↑	High
CRR15	S22 Governance	ROCU - If the current model - ARIS (Asset Recovery Incentivisation Scheme) is altered and assets seized were distributed across the region e.g. as per the current funding formula WMP OPCC would stand to lose 47% of current ARIS funding. There is a risk that if ARIS funding is not provided to other forces they may withdraw resource from the ROCUWM as they are not seeing equitable benefits from the regional agreement. CTU – There are two proposed options for the method of transferring Special Branch funding into CT Policing as part of the national SB Reform project. There is a risk that if Option 1 is chosen the transfer of SB funding into CT Grant will result in a 'top slice' from forces across the region that is not consistent with the actual spend of Special Branch. Option 2 would be a one-time adjustment. Based on this information, there is a risk that WMP will see their budget reduced by more than the actual cost of Special Branch.	ROCU - If the current model was altered and assets seized were distributed across the region e.g. as per the current funding formula WMP OPCC would stand to lose approximately 47% of current ARIS funding. This would have a significant impact on the funding of the WMP Economic Crime Team (ECT) and funds available for POCA initiatives. CTU - The impact of option 1 is that there is a possibility that the force will see their budget reduced by more than the current expenditure for Special Branch. Option 2 would be a one-time adjustment meaning that forces' individual funding only decreases by their expenditure on Special Branch.	ROCU - WMP and the OPCC are currently in discussions to provide a regional solution to the current arrangement. A plan is being developed to discuss a way forward. CTU - Following an extensive engagement and consultation process with Chief Constables, Police & Crime Commissioners and Ministers, with strong endorsement from the CT Policing Network, the decision was taken by Ministers to approve Option 2 and this will be actioned in Spring 2022. - All funding and the MOU has now been approved and this has no impact on the current CTU funding. Regionally we have a finance group that will review expenditure across the whole region to ensure we are in line with the budget.	N/A	New	↔	↔	High
CRR09	Recruitment & Retention / Uplift	There is a risk of being unable to recruit staff across the Force in a timely manner and aligned with the strategic workforce planning requirements. The uplift targets and their associated entry routes (e.g. PEQF) create significant additional demand on WMP. The failure to meet recruitment targets will impact on the forces resilience and may potentially affect future funding from the Home Office. There is a risk that a number of student officers have been identified as potentially being at risk of dismissal due to repeated failures of university modules.	- WMP will not be able to recruit and retain sufficiently skilled people to deliver our service. Risk to service provision and accreditation status in some cases (e.g. Forensics). Longer-term employee relations impact. Potential loss of confidence from WMP colleagues who were anticipating additional resources to join them. - Due to the sheer volume of demand and complexity of entry criteria, WMP is not able to push through the uplift recruitment pipeline quickly enough resulting in missed targets or not meeting resourcing assumptions. Reputational (and potential financial) impact on WMP from the Home Office. - The impact is this may be significant for WMP and the government's confidence in us. -The impact of a student officer repeatedly failing their modules, will lead to the student being dismissed from their university course, WMP currently has no other training programme available to see them through their probationary period.	- Recruitment and onboarding activity is progressing well through to mid-April (after which point there is a CWG break in intakes). The current recruitment forecast will see WMP recruit c60 officers in excess of the 21/22 national uplift target - There is an ongoing Gold group focusing on Uplift recruitment, representation and retention - Staffs Uni (and WMP) have been subject to a successful OFSTED audit - We are working closely with Staffs Uni to implement programme improvements and are continuously improving the WMP elements of the student officer programme based on colleague feedback - There is a named retention SPOC in Ops L&D to support and retain student officers - We are advertising for DC DHEP intakes and have recently advertised for a DIPP intake (pre-join degree holders), with an anticipated intake in September	↔	↔	↓	↓	High
CRR13	Cybersecurity	Failure of the Force's IT&D systems (due to cyber-attack, hardware failure, loss of IT systems via IT services provider or other data security breaches) will lead to severe disruption to service delivery and response.	Loss of access to IT systems due to a failure in our cyber security for an extended period of time could adversely impact WMP's ability to continue service delivery and business operations. This could also lead to potential data breaches, an inability to access key systems and reputational damage.	IT&D operate a suite of mitigations to prevent Cyber Attack, this ensures we have a robust approach to security and helps defend our data and systems: - We Secure by Design – All designs for systems have oversight of both a Security Architect and Information Assurance experts who validate best design/secure practise in technology solutions before implemented. - We operate a multi-layer defence approach at our network boundary. - We patch our systems regularly in-line with enterprise recommendations. - We backup our data to prevent corruption, and this data is stored separate to the system by geographic resilience. We test our backup restore processes and document the outcomes. - Colleagues reminded about being vigilant online and when receiving emails, due to the heightened possibility of cyber-attack from overseas (given the Russia-Ukraine conflict).	N/A	New	↔	↔	High
CRR06	Corporate Health, Safety and Wellbeing	- There may be an increase in employee related mental health and wellbeing issues which impacts WMP's ability to deliver and recover operational services during the d post pandemic environment. COVID - the risk of staff infection and backlog of rest days and leave, as well as the need to deliver against national and local objectives could lead to placing additional challenging demands on the workforce, outside of their normal business.	- Failure to look after the wellbeing of our staff could have a significant impact on employee confidence, poorer engagement, and increased sickness levels. COVID -Workforce resilience and ability to serve the public as part of business as usual. This may be significantly more impactful in a post lockdown environment as the demand is not static and is going up/reverting to normal levels. There may also be some unintended consequences of new ways of working e.g. Virtual Remand Hearings.	- Enhanced force approach to trauma risk identification and management (TRIM) - questionnaires to high risk roles, further engagement with occupational health, focus groups in place. - Efficient signposting to Vivup, TRIM process, sporadic clinical supervision, use of watchful waiting and line manager and colleague observations. Increased discussion and conversations regarding wellbeing taking place. COVID - Measures implemented across WMP estate and improved physical protective measures and staff awareness in place. - WMP continue to encourage workforce to take part in the COVID vaccination programme. - We've now updated our CoVID guidance following the lifting of all CoVID rules nationally Until the end of March, we'll be keeping some measures in place. However, mask wearing is now optional. From 1 April we expect to see all colleagues back in the workplace.	↔	↔	↓	↔	High
CRR01	Vulnerability and Hidden Crimes	There is a risk that the increased identification of vulnerability in demand, and hidden crimes (includes child exploitation, modern day slavery, human trafficking, domestic abuse, missing people) poses a challenge to the Force to manage its complexity. The risk could also impact the response levels provided impacting the delivery of an effective service to those in need.	Increases in volumes or poor identification impacts on the force's capacity to prevent and respond, creating public confidence and safety concerns, and meet our overall requirement to prevent the unnecessary criminalisation of children and improve the overall quality of investigations involving vulnerable people.	- T3 Pilot has commenced to better manage front end demand including some DA and vulnerability offences. A paper is currently being developed for FET to agree an option for the future structure. - PWC have just concluded a 16 week programme of work with the force called Perform Plus. Perform Plus focuses on wellbeing, capacity, capability and victim attrition in the PPU Adult Complex Investigation Teams. Their work will continue to embed as the force moves forward and the outcomes should mitigate this risk to a degree. - Uplift programme - There has already been an investment of additional FTE into DA and the Child Investigation Team establishment shortly. In addition, negotiations have commenced in the portfolio to transfer a proportion of the Major crime Team agreed uplift in to Adult complex to mitigate against the increase reported rape demand seen in this area. - Capability. Since September 2021 there has been a significant investment of experienced senior investigating officers in to PPU. Pre September 2021 PPU had 1 qualified PIP3 accredited SIO, there are now 5.	↔	↔	↔	↔	High

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CRR02	Serious Violence in Under 25s	There is a risk that interventions to address multiple risk factors/indicators are not impactful or effective. The increase in volume of serious youth crime and serious violence (gun and knife crime) in the under 25s could lead to the cumulative risk around community safety. There could be a perceived failure that the Force is not responding adequately to prevent and respond to crime involving young people.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increases in volumes impacts on the force's capacity to prevent and respond to increased demand. - Increases in serious youth violence reporting in the media could undermine community confidence in policing and contribute to safety concerns. - Demand pressures could have an impact on crime prevention initiatives. Force response becomes more reactive than preventative. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Guardian Grip funding established. Taskforce numbers are now increased to full strength - Integrated force violence strategy being implemented - Managed through FTDB, Performance Panel and Strategic Tasking structures plus dedicated ACC led performance meeting - PH approach launched and working with VRU to deliver. - Additional funds have been channelled to tasking processes (WTAM) to support NTE resources. - Taskforce continue to achieve positive results and deep dives into NPU problem solving progressing - Interim strategy presented and internal PH review of processes ongoing - New Violence Board is focusing on tiered offender processes, school exclusions and referrals plus exempt accommodation. 	↔	↔	↔	↔	High
CRR05	Demand Management	There is a risk that the Force fails to respond to and manage the effective and efficient policing requirements of the region as a result of the increased volume and complexity in demand. The nature of the rise requires an increasing level of sophistication to understand how it moved through the system and may be compounded by resourcing constraints.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Impacts on our ability to create and execute effective plans to ensure effective and efficient delivery of policing. Example: Demand and the management of risk within the P2 grade, which has a service level at 60 minutes. Currently a minority of case are being carried over beyond 24 hours. This is a concern in relation to risk management, service delivery, victim support and impacts on stress to WMP staff seeking to manage this risk when unresourced. Return to 'new normal' at the tail-end of the pandemic creates additional complexity/uncertainty. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Incoming demand has continued to be higher than normal seasonal average. At the end of Nov 21 a T3 Pilot commenced to deal with today's business today and remove the P4/P5 scheduled appointments, this concept proved successful, continues and is currently subject of a formal review. - A Force Contact Improvement Plan has now been approved by the FET, which will see an uplift in 30 new police staff posts, 37 restricted PCs and 15 PS to form a 24/7 Vulnerability Desk. These staff will deal with the vulnerability calls rather than call handlers which will provide capacity for call handlers to deal with greater number of calls. (Vulnerability calls often take in excess of one hour to complete). - Due to the forthcoming CWG a further temporary uplift in officers and staff has been approved to facilitate the resources needed each day during the CWG in addition to BAU. BTT and POD support in place using a fast track methodology over 6 weeks to deliver the Improvement Plan. Medium term scoping of a greater integrated solution including Force Contact, FCID and PPU has been commissioned. 	↑	↔	↔	↔	High
CRR17	Organisational Learning	<p>Organisational learning is obtained across the force via its various learning hotspots (i.e., IA / HMIC recommendations, debriefs, inquiries (Manchester Arena bombings), IOPC reports etc). There is no current organisational learning structure across the force to ensure once learning is identified, it is evaluated and shared across the Force to positively impact policy practise and outcomes.</p> <p>There is a risk that WMP lacks the oversight required to analyse strategic, cross cutting and/ or operational organisational learning to ensure risks and opportunities are managed and evaluated in showing learning and ideas have a route to action including integration into operational practice.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lack of coordinated dissemination of knowledge and learning across the Force. - No consistent approach to capturing and sharing OL, no ability to draw out themes - No clear governance or accountability for structured debriefs - Failing to embed the learning across the Force could lead to reputational damage should major incident occur across the region and learning available. - Increased scrutiny from external regulators – such as HMIC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - New MIRB set up to coordinate delivery of Major Incident readiness across West Midlands Police functional leads across various departments at a strategic level. - The key themes arising from the backlog have been identified and developed into workstreams for the MIRB. Themes and subsequent learning activities have been risk assessed awaiting action plans to implement the recommendations. - S&D continue to be in close contact with Portfolios/departments with high risk areas coordinated via the risk management process. - Work is ongoing within S&D to develop a consolidated approach to managing and overseeing how learning and areas for improvement are integrated into operational practice and operational knowledge is embedded across the Force 	N/A	New	↔	↔	High
CRR04	CONNECT Legacy/BRC Data	Data migration into CONNECT could lead to loss of relevant information transferring over from legacy systems into CONNECT. Data loss/gaps could lead to the Force being unable to accurately access historic audit data.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -The impact of this risk may be that data in the back records is missing from the transfer to CONNECT. This could lead to certain data fields in things like DBS historic checks being excluded – e.g. crime reference numbers. -The impact of this risk could lead to potential reputational damage if information provided in DBS certificates do not adequately reflect all current and historic data. -CONNECT Legacy/ BRC Data- Significant issues with this content- not all relevant information has been brought over into CONNECT, plus there are gaps in some outcomes/ markers that did not exist on legacy systems- for example, over 140K post 2018 DA records are no longer identified correctly, and there is currently no solution for accessing audit data. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CONNECT team continuing to work through system architecture and integration issues with Northgate as part of usual programme management business. - BRC Issue is under investigation by the Project/IT&D/Northgate - until this is resolved WMP cannot delete legacy data. - DBS staff and others involved in investigation and disclosure are aware and are currently checking legacy systems to ensure all relevant information is considered. - The risk and associated issues are well monitored by CONNECT Project- Decommissioning workstream is tracking these data pots successfully. Risk is being monitored by CONNECT Project Board. 	↔	↔	↔	↔	High
CRR21	Cannabis Disposal Storage Capacity	Due to a substantial increase in cannabis growth in the region, there has been an increase in the quantity of cannabis seized by Officers. The rapid increase could lead to an inability to manage the disposal capacity effectively.	This has led to insufficient cannabis storage capacity to manage the increased quantity seized. Increase in the health and safety risk to staff with excessive quantities being held on site.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Staff overtime being used to clear backlog. - Increase skip capacity - A formal proposal to clear the back log has been submitted to shared services - Discussions with Fleet Management currently underway to utilise van capacity - A working group has been assembled to implement a number of actions to mitigate and reduce the risk to the Force 	N/A	N/A	N/A	New	High
CRR19	WMP Website – Server Capacity	Due to server capacity issues of the WMP website the site can be prone to crashing. There is a risk should the live chat function be unavailable during a major incident.	The total number of people accessing the site if redirected would cause the website to crash. This would lead to members of the public being unable to report crimes and any other issues via the live chat function.	<p>DEC Resilience</p> <p>There are issues with the resilience of DEC when we see a spike in usage, in order to provide greater resilience we are expanding the infrastructure that DEC utilises (we're making it bigger). This is a BAU activity, work starts on 4th Jan and is estimated to take 6-8 weeks to complete</p> <p>DEC re-hosting</p> <p>We are moving DEC from UKCloud (cloud hosting company) to AWS (the company we use for DDJ); the Home Office have recommended that all forces that currently utilise services from UKCloud move to an alternative provider.</p>	N/A	N/A	↔	↔	High
CRR12	Mutual Aid & Resourcing	There is a risk that significant resources abstractions (police officers and staff) will be required from operational business and duties during the operational period of the Commonwealth Games. There is a risk that a local, regional or national critical incident could see Mutual Aid and / or WMP officers and / or vehicles abstracted to resource the incident response.	The impact of this risk may be that WMP will have gaps in the Games staffing model, potentially causing a security / public safety risk. Should vehicles be unavailable, then officers' ability to perform their roles may be impacted and / or alternative transport may need to be found at short notice and with additional cost.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Explore scenario / resilience in Business Continuity / Testing & Exercising. Three recent T&E events have already been conducted. - Engage with recruitment Uplift programme to assess opportunities. - Working with the operation to build an abstraction and deployment model and approach to identify with the organisation where resources will be taken from and for how long. - CWG are currently in a period where resource planning is being fleshed out, with the consideration of BAU capacity. - CWG SLT engaging with FET in December to ask Leads to work with their departments to confirm staffing requirements. The MACA was submitted to government in October for Mutual Aid resources with a decision expected by end January. 	N/A	New	↔	↔	Medium
CRR07	Workforce Representation	Failure to attract, recruit and retain a diverse and representative workforce across the Force and support their progression within the organisation to deliver our services to our diverse communities.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A less representative Force may affect the level of trust and confidence in some communities. - The impact may be that the legitimacy and trust in WMP is diminished. The impact of not meeting both the PCC's and WMP's target of recruiting more female and BAME officers and staff may lead to reputational damage. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - WMP have also been involved in pilot programmes with the College of Policing looking at tailored and targeted actions to address retention of underrepresented groups within the Force. - Discussions underway with the Staff Network Chairs around supporting the work to mitigate this. Utilisation of Staff Associations and force leaders to ally and endorse representation plans - Pro-active comms to workforce around the Force's representation ambition via intranet and internet (CH). - Risk to be considered as part of updated D&I Strategy - Gold Strategy continues to operate to ensure a robust delivery plan - Risk profile is improving and we continue to monitor the progress and impact of the mitigating actions. 	↔	↔	↔	↓	Medium
CRR10	Financial Management	<p>i. There is a risk that WMP's finances are not sustainable over the medium term and/or efficiency savings required may adversely impact the operational services. Whilst the police grant has increased for 22/23 to fund increase in officer numbers, there are still unfunded inflationary pressures.</p> <p>ii - There is also a risk that as mandated/national initiatives develop (e.g. ESMCP, National Enabling Programme), the actual costs for delivery far exceed the estimated costs within the affordability envelope.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Impact on overall funding position. Medium term financial plan (MTFP) sets out strict budgeting envelope that must be met. - The inability to finance all component projects, or needing to de-prioritise other projects within the portfolio if the national changes are mandated. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Influence National debate on Police Funding Formula - Review and continue to scrutinise financial planning and prudence in managing long term commitments - Revised MTFP and focus on benefit maximisation and continued efficiencies - Build in scenario planning, with potential savings / investment options available - National Horizon scanning by R & C Manager to ensure we have full visibility of emerging national programmes. - Financial Resilience continues to be a risk for the force, whilst we face pressures from growing demand and tighter finances. The savings required to plug the gap increases year on year, which has been included in the budget report to the Police & Crime Panel at the start of the year. 	↔	↔	↔	↔	Medium

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CRR11	Safeguarding - Local Policing	<p>There is a risk that the Force fails follow safeguarding processes to protect the needs of the most vulnerable members of our community.</p> <p>There is also a risk that the Force fails to fully understand the safeguarding needs and experiences of citizens - young and old due to increased demand pressures and the challenging range of commissioned and partner-driven arrangements operating across the region.</p>	<p>- Poor identification impacts on the force's capacity to prevent and respond, creating public confidence and safety concerns.</p> <p>- Risk to vulnerable members of the community.</p> <p>- Potential reputational damage if risk not adequately mitigated.</p>	<p>- Neighbourhood Policing Units (NPU's) have appointed a Superintendent as their local safeguarding & vulnerability champion to drive service improvement and consistency. The Superintendent also engages at a Regional level via the regional uniform users' group to consolidate learning, address identified risks and respond to feedback and areas for improvement presented at a National and Regional level and from Ambulance, Fire and Local Authority attendees.</p> <p>- Bespoke training and tailored briefings are delivered to supplement the role out of the National College of Policing Approved Force wider Safeguarding and Vulnerability training. NPU vulnerable persons officers have been able to reflect upon the above training, complement this with localised good practice and update their geographic 'Intranet' pages with updated guides, act as local SPOC's to give assistance.</p> <p>- Following a recent Joint Targeted Area Inspection (JTAI), the Force is committed to working with relevant partners to improve and to safeguard children. Following the JTAI, a number of proposed actions will be shared with the lead inspectorate (Ofsted) during Qtr 1 2022/23 and WMP is actively contributing towards this.</p>	↔	↔	↔	↔	Medium
CRR22	Non-Compliance with CPIA biometric data retention	<p>A previous Biometric Commissioner's Office audit in 2019 highlighted the need for WMP to ensure a cohesive and robust audit process for CPIA samples. These recommendations have not been fully implemented and it is likely the Force will be subject to an audit later this year as part of the national cyclical audit plan.</p> <p>There is a risk that WMP may not be fully compliant with the CPIA. There is a risk that a new audit by the Biometric Commissioner's Office could highlight weaknesses in WMP's management of the relevant data.</p>	<p>- Significant weaknesses highlighted in an audit by the Biometric Commissioners Office.</p> <p>- Trust and confidence of our stakeholders in relation to our processes around biometric information.</p> <p>- Non-compliance with the CIPA and the potential notification to the Home Office.</p>	<p>- A working group is due to be set up by the end of March 2022. The group aims to bring together key stakeholders to develop a procedure to ensure a compliant and ethical biometric data storage process.</p> <p>- Working group will work to implement Biometric Commissioner's recommendations made as a result of findings from a recent national report.</p>	N/A	N/A	N/A	New	Medium
CRR16	Police Cadet Leaders - Safeguarding	<p>There is a risk that WMP Police Cadets policies, procedures and process fail to comply with the National Safety and Safeguarding guidelines (UKYSSF). The guidelines are set out by the National VPC who advises that WMP aligns its practice to the UK Youth Safer Spaces Framework (UKSSF) backed by the NPCC Enforcement.</p>	<p>- Increased spotlight on other Forces could increase media focus on all Police Force's across the country including WMP.</p> <p>- If WMP does not ensure compliance with the safeguarding practices around recruitment of Police Cadet Leaders, this could increase the likelihood of having a negative impact on public confidence and legitimacy in safeguarding Police Cadets.</p>	<p>- Non compliant leaders have been identified and if they have not booked to attend a workshop by 28th February they will be suspended from supporting the Cadet Scheme until they have completed training.</p> <p>- This training is delivered centrally by the National VPC team, this is not always easily accessible due to dates being booked far in advance so the WMP team have been trained to deliver these workshops centrally in WMP.</p> <p>- Safer recruitment practices we are 100% compliant. Safety we are approx. 80% compliant with residual review of policies being required. We are consistently reviewing policies in relation to safety and safeguarding.</p>	N/A	New	↓	↓	Medium

Risk Trend key - Improved (↓), Worsened (↑) or is Unchanged (↔)

Closed Risks

ID	Risk Name	Description	Impact	Key Controls and Activities	Closed Rationale	Closed Date	Closure reported @ JAC
CRR14	Alarms Management	There is a risk that alarm notifications may fail at Force Control C3 due to the unreliability of receiver equipment and delays in replacing it.	Alarm notifications may fail at Force Control C3 due to the unreliability of receiver equipment and delays in replacing it. While the receivers are not upgraded the force runs the risk of the loss of alarm messages and the consequential failure to act on them.	<p>- Migration to C3 has further raised the risk as equipment could be adversely affected by relocation and reconnection. This would leave the Force potentially unable to monitor and therefore respond to alarm calls. The risk still remains though as the equipment is old and has the potential to fail.</p> <p>- The residual score remains static as Shared Services urgently need to assess business requirements so the work can be prioritised and resources from IT&D and Property Services can be committed to enable replacement.</p>	Following discussions at the Commercial Services SLT, it was agreed that a review of this risk will be undertaken by the Portfolio. A decision will be made over the next few months on whether to manage this as an issue of significant concern at Portfolio level. Following a review this may reappear on the CRR if necessary.	08/03/2022	31/03/2022

RISK SCORING GUIDANCE

Risk Scoring = Impact x Probability

Impact	Service	Performance	Finance	Reputation	Legal	Safety	Human Rights / Diversity	Wellbeing
5	Major impact on a critical service area or multiple service areas with widespread and sustained disruption	Significant impact on performance resulting in not achieving more than one of the key Force performance objectives	Costs over £2m	Sustained national media coverage over sustained period / Removal of Command Team member / External inquiry	Prosecution. Major Claims/fines against the Force.	Multiple fatalities or multiple permanent injuries	Major unjustified impacts or interference	Very likely to have a significant impact on officer/staff wellbeing and will require coordinated response and referral to support services.
4	Serious impact on key services with a noticeable impact for the public	Large impact on performance resulting in not achieving a key Force performance objectives	Costs of between £1m and £2m	Sustained adverse local media coverage	Serious Claims/fines against the Force.	Single Fatality or severe injury to several people	Serious unjustified impacts or interference	Likely to have a serious impact on officer/staff wellbeing and will require coordinated response and referral to support services.
3	Impact on non-critical service or short term disruption	Impact on performance resulting in potential difficulties in achieving key Force performance objectives but where corrective action can still be taken	Costs of between £500k and £1m	Some local adverse publicity	Significant Litigation /claims against the Force. Within insurance cover	Major injury	Some limited unjustified impact or interference	Likely to impact officer/staff wellbeing and require referral to support services.
2	Slight impact on service delivery	Impact on performance resulting in small impact on key Force performance objectives but which can be managed	Costs of between £100k and £500k	Short term customer dissatisfaction	Claims, minor complaints Within insurance cover	Minor or slight injury	Impact of interference is manageable with existing resources	May impact officer/staff wellbeing and could require referral to support services.
1	Impact is easily manageable or is of little concern to public	Short Term impact on performance but not to the extent where the achievement of key force performance objectives are impacted	Costs of below £100k	Manageable customer dissatisfaction	Unlikely to lead to a claim	Unlikely to have any safety implications	No impact on diversity / human rights	Negligible impact on officer/staff wellbeing and unlikely to require referral to support services.

Probability	Description	Detailed Description	% Chance	Relative	Frequency
5	Very Likely	Has regularly occurred within the Force / Area / Department or there are strong indications that the risk will happen	80% or more	As certain as we can be that it will happen	More than once a year
4	Likely	Has previously occurred within the Force / Area / Department or there are indications that the risk will happen	50% - 80%	More likely to happen than not to happen	Once every 1 to 2 years occurrence
3	Some likelihood	Some indications that the risk will happen	20% - 50%	More likely not to happen than to happen	Once every 2 to 5 years occurrence
2	Unlikely	Limited indications at this point that the risk will happen	5% - 20%	Unlikely to happen but possible	Once every 5 to 10 years occurrence
1	Remote	No indications at this point that the risk will happen	0% - 5%	Extremely Unlikely	Once every 10 years or more occur

Risk Scores

Probability	5	10	15	20	25
	4	8	12	16	20
	3	6	9	12	15
	2	4	6	8	10
	1	2	3	4	5
	Impact				

For grading risk, the scores obtained from the risk matrix are assigned grades as follows

1 - 4	Low risk
5 - 10	Medium risk
12 -16	High risk
20 - 25	Critical risk

Calculate the risk rating by multiplying the impact score by the probability score:

$Impact \times Probability = risk\ rating/score$