ID	Risk Name	Description	Impact	Key Controls and Activities	Q2 Trending	Q3 Trending	Q4 Trending	Q1 Trending	Residual Risk Rating
CRR20	Probation Data Sharing & Disclosure	Since the implementation of the Parole Board Rules 2019, there is a risk that the Force does not have the appropriate oversight and a centralised process to deal with and record the expanded requirements regarding information requests made by the Parole Board.	This could lead to legal costs – the cost of wrongful imprisonment and/or ICO fines – lack of accurate information, threat to life, and/or damage to the force's reputation. Possible lack of compliance with GDPR rules.	- The Parole Board and NPCC are finalising an MOU to define the specific reasons and means of sharing personal data between the Parole Board and Police Forces of England & Wales, which will control this risk more effectively. - Work has been undertaken by Information Management (IM) with the relevant departments to communicate best practice and introduce safe procedures to professionally share intelligence with our partners, and is ongoing. Plans for mitigation- IT solution is under consideration.	N/A	New	↔	↔	Critical
CRR03	Operational Training and Embedded Learning	**Op Plato Embedding** There is a risk that Operational Officers fail to adopt the national Joint Operating Principles introduced to WMP in December 2020 in a timely manner. A new challenge with this risk is the lack of ownership locally now that ORU have rolled out the training to keep this an annual refresher on CPD days within departments. **JESIP Command Training.** Limited roll out of the JESIP re-accreditation courses. This has been caused by insufficient access to training venues and JESIP trainers amongst the tri-service and could lead to a delay in re-accreditation of the JESIP Commanders and upskilling new staff.	There is a lack of CPD days within departments and prioritisation of training competes locally to complete the roll out. The risk is that the national doctrine has changed quicker than the ability and competency of officers in adopting these changes.	- Total 2791 staff and Officers trained in the Operation PLATO classroom input as of 07/04/2022. Additional Inputs are planned up to the commonwealth games. Delivery volume is a challenge. A train the trainer programme is underway but support is still required from the ORU to manage quality and training records. The speed of delivery has slowed with the ORU requirement to support other exercises and Major Incident Topics. - Before 01/09/2021 we had a total of 29 JESIP command trained. Between 01/09/2021 and 23/05/2022 we have trained an additional 204 commanders on the JESIP course. - NCALTS for JESIP and PLATO are still being managed through the OP Plato Working Group, now renamed the 'Major Incident (Non-specialist responders) working group'.	↔	↔	↓	↔	High
CRR08	Investigative and Criminal Justice Process and Outcome	- There is a risk that the case backlog that exists due to COVID may result in victims and witnesses losing faith in the Criminal Justice system. The backlog also puts at risk the cost recovery from Police Led Prosecutions. There is also the risk of an additional strain on CJS resources, particularly in Witness Care, due to the new court listings process. - Updates to the Attorney General's Guidelines on Disclosure which sits alongside the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act ("CPIA") 1996, has an impact on the working practices of investigations officers and staff, with a short turnaround time for adhering to the guidance.	- The impact is that justice is not served for victims and witnesses and WMPs reputation is at risk as a reduced number of cases are being heard by the Courts (including murder trials). The reduction of Courts will result in potential loss of income recovery from PLP. There may also be additional welfare issue for Witness Care staff due to the supplementary work required. - The new guidance has implications for how the police engages with other parts of the CJS, in terms of timeliness, mandatory disclosures and digital evidence. In particular, it increases the expectations on the recording of materials in the course of an investigation - extending requirements to unused material and provision of schedules for all Pre-Charge cases. The combined effect of these changes could result in an increase in the number of bail cases and CPS rejections, creating further demands on the force.	- The magistrates court listings have returned to pre-covid levels. Areas nationally being explored at present are considering to allow Magistrates to manage cases that would incur 12 months sentences so less referrals to crown court. - The crown court delay is approx. 2 years. Additional staff have been recruited into witness care units to support victims. The staff have been provided with additional trauma informed training to better support vulnerable victims and RASSO / DA cases. Aspects of the new charging model have yet to be agreed locally with CPS for red cases to agree cases that woulbe be defined based on threat/ risk cases and the SLA for discretional Green cases. - The government changes likely to be implemented around Section 28 allowing cross examination for all DA victims – will have significant impact for force around capacity and capability (training of staff for VRI- ABE). This is being managed through the Portfolio governance and the NPCC lead is attending relevant governance forums. Currently 25% compliant with DG6. Governed through SIM. Addressed with PPU / FCID through their SLT & SIMs. Target of 5% increase per month improvement.	↔	↔	↑	↔	High
CRR15	S22 Governance	**ROCU -** If the current model - ARIS (Asset Recovery Incentivisation Scheme) is altered and assets seized were distributed across the region e.g. as per the current funding formula WMP OPCC would stand to lose 47% of current ARIS funding. There is a risk that if ARIS funding is not provided to other forces they may withdraw resource from the ROCUWM as they are not seeing equitable benefits from the regional agreement. **CTU** – There are two proposed options for the method of transferring Special Branch funding into CT Policing as part of the national SB Reform project. There is a risk that if Option 1 is chosen the transfer of SB funding into CT Grant will result in a 'top slice' from forces across the region that is not consistent with the actual spend of Special Branch. Option 2 would be a one-time adjustment. Based on this information, there is a risk that WMP will see their budget reduced by more than the actual cost of Special Branch.	**ROCU -** If the current model was altered and assets seized were distributed across the region e.g. as per the current funding formula WMP OPCC would stand to lose approximately 47% of current ARIS funding. This would have a significant impact on the funding of the WMP Economic Crime Team (ECT) and funds available for POCA initiatives. **CTU -** The impact of option 1 is that there is a possibility that the force will see their budget reduced by more than the current expenditure for Special Branch. Option 2 would be a one-time adjustment meaning that forces' individual funding only decreases by their expenditure on Special Branch.	**ROCU -** WMP and the OPCC are currently in discussions to provide a regional solution to the current arrangement. A plan is being developed to discuss a way forward. **CTU** - Following an extensive engagement and consultation process with Chief Constables, Police & Crime Commissioners and Ministers, with strong endorsement from the CT Policing Network, the decision was taken by Ministers to approve Option 2 and this is currently being actioned. - All funding and the MOU has now been approved and this has no impact on the current CTU funding. Regionally we have a finance group that will review expenditure across the whole region to ensure we are in line with the budget.	New	↔	↔	↔	High
CRR09	Recruitment & Retention / Uplift	There is a risk of being unable to recruit staff across the Force in a timely manner and aligned with the strategic workforce planning requirements. The uplift targets and their associated entry routes (e.g. PEQF) create significant additional demand on WMP. The failure to meet recruitment targets will impact on the forces resilience and may potentially affect future funding from the Home Office. There is a risk that a number of student officers have been identified as potentially being at risk of dismissal due to repeated failures of university modules.	- WMP will not be able to recruit and retain sufficiently skilled people to deliver our service. Risk to service provision and accreditation status in some cases (e.g. Forensics). Longer-term employee relations impact. Potential loss of confidence from WMP colleagues who were anticipating additional resources to join them. - Due to the sheer volume of demand and complexity of entry criteria, WMP is not able to push through the uplift recruitment pipeline quickly enough resulting in missed targets or not meeting resourcing assumptions. Reputational (and potential financial) impact on WMP from the Home Office. - This may be significant for WMP and the government's confidence in us. - The impact of a student officer repeatedly failing their modules, will lead to the student being dismissed from their university course, WMP currently has no other training programme available to see them though their probationary period.	- Recruitment and onboarding activity has now paused for the CWG break in intakes. The current recruitment forecast will see WMP recruit c60 officers in excess of the 21/22 national uplift target - There is an ongoing Gold group focusing on Uplift recruitment, representation and retention - Staffs Uni (and WMP) have been subject to a successful OFSTED audit - We are working closely with Staffs Uni to implement programme improvements and are continuous improving the WMP elements of the student officer programme based on colleague feedback - There is a named retention SPOC in Ops L&D to support and retain student officers - We are advertising for DC DHEP intakes and have recently advertised for a DIPP intake (pre-join degree holders), with an anticipated intake in September	↔	↓	↓	↔	High
CRR13	Cybersecurity	Failure of the Force's IT&D systems (due to cyber-attack, hardware failure, loss of IT systems via IT services provider or other data security breaches) will lead to severe disruption to service delivery and response.	Loss of access to IT systems due to a failure in our cyber security for an extended period of time could adversely impact WMP's ability to continue service delivery and business operations. This could also lead to potential data breaches, an inability to access key systems and reputational damage.	- IT&D operate a suite of mitigations to prevent Cyber Attack, this ensures we have a robust approach to security and helps defend our data and systems: - We Secure by Design – All designs for systems have oversight of both a Security Architect and Information Assurance experts who validate best design/secure practise in technology solutions before implemented. - We backup our data to prevent corruption, and this data is stored separate to the system by geographic resilience. We test our backup restore processes and document the outcomes. - Colleagues reminded about being vigilant online and when receiving emails, due to the heightened possibility of cyber-attack from overseas (given the Russia-Ukraine conflict). - The 1st Cyber Exercise day (A simulated real-world dynamic cyber-attack) was performed with IT&D staff as part of our proactive cyber preparedness/response. This was completed end of 2021. IT&D have looked at the findings and output from the Cyber exercise and have firmed up "post attack" action planning. In addition, all threats continued to be reviewed and analysed against the WMP technical estate when threats are detected either via the National Monitoring Centre or Internally at WMP.	New	↔	↔	↔	High
CRR06	Corporate Health, Safety and Wellbeing	- There may be an increase in employee related mental health and wellbeing issues which impacts WMP's ability to deliver and recover operational services during the d post pandemic environment.	- Failure to look after the wellbeing of our staff could have a significant impact on employee confidence, poorer engagement, and increased sickness levels.	- Enhanced force approach to trauma risk identification and management (TRIM) - questionnaires to high risk roles, further engagement with occupational health, focus groups in place. - Efficient signposting to Vivup, TRIM process, sporadic clinical supervision, use of watchful waiting and line manager and colleague observations. Increased discussion and conversations regarding wellbeing taking place.	↔	↓	↔	↔	High
CRR23	JTAI Connect Risk	Following the Joint Targeted Area Inspection (JTAI) earlier in the year, inspectors raised a concern in relation to the data held within the Connect system. This was specifically in relation to multiple and/or incomplete records held against the same person. There is a risk that incomplete records within Connect could lead to at risk individuals not being linked and identified in a timely manner against individuals who could pose a risk to them.	This risk means that when officers and staff research 'Connect', they may miss important information. This could also pose a huge reputational risk to the Force should the risk materialise.	The current mitigation incorporates a manual intervention and checks/searches on multiple systems (e.g. cross-referencing insight search data against the intelligence system). This is time consuming and relies on the Officers performing the searches on multiple systems.	N/A	N/A	N/A	New	High
CRR18	Core Skills Resilience & Training Risk	There has been a drop in Police Officers trained in core skill areas, this has partly been due to COVID and self-isolation measures. This has led to a reduction in the percentage numbers and resilience of Police Officers trained in core skills such as Personal Safety Training, Driver Training, Public Order Skills and Taser. The reduced capacity has also led to a reduced offer from L&D.	The greatest risk is that of the Force to be unable to deploy sufficient numbers of staff to meet calls for service and demand. In addition to this is the length of time it will take to meet the backlog and bring us back in line with demand on courses and meet resilience targets.	- Continued investment in contingency funding to secure additional courses for Personal Safety Training, specifically targeting those officers who need to retain public order skills also. Currently eliminated the backlog of 1-day combined courses, focus now on the 2-day combined courses. Predicted to see a reduction in outstanding numbers by July 2022. - We have greater scrutiny on course non-attendance to ensure our classrooms are filled to maximum capacity and with the greatest efficiency. - The Physical Training Team is now up to full establishment, enabling us to maximise opportunity to schedule courses as required by the wider Force. Greater scrutiny at FLC of Force attendance and support from HODs resulting in steadily improving attendance figures.	N/A	New	↔	↓	High
CRR01	Vulnerability and Hidden Crimes	There is a risk that the increased identification of vulnerability in demand, and hidden crimes (includes child exploitation, modern day slavery, human trafficking, domestic abuse, missing people) poses a challenge to the Force to manage its complexity. The risk could also impact the response levels provided impacting the delivery of an effective service to those in need.	Increases in volumes or poor identification impacts on the force's capacity to prevent and respond, creating public confidence and safety concerns, and meet our overall requirement to prevent the unnecessary criminalisation of children and improve the overall quality of investigations involving vulnerable people.	- T3 Pilot has commenced to better manage front end demand including some DA and vulnerability offences. A paper is currently being developed for FET to agree an option for the future structure. - PWC have concluded their programme of work called Perform Plus. Perform Plus focuses on wellbeing, capacity, capability and victim attrition in the PPU Adult Complex Investigation Teams. Their work will continue to embed as the force moves forward and the outcomes should mitigate this risk to a degree. - Uplift programme - There has already been an investment of additional FTE into DA and the Child Investigation Team establishment shortly. In addition, negotiations have commenced in the portfolio to transfer a proportion of the Major Crime Team agreed uplift in to Adult complex to mitigate against the increase reported rape demand seen in this area. - Capability. Since last year there has been a significant investment of experienced senior investigating officers in to PPU.	↔	↔	↔	↔	High

ID	Risk Name	Description	Impact	Key Controls and Activities	Q2 Trending	Q3 Trending	Q4 Trending	Q1 Trending	Residual Risk Rating
CRR02	Serious Violence in Under 25s	There is a risk that interventions to address multiple risk factors/indicators are not impactful or effective. The increase in volume of serious youth crime and serious violence (gun and knife crime) in the under 25s could lead to the cumulative risk around community safety. There could be a perceived failure that the Force is not responding adequately to prevent and respond to crime involving young people.	- Increases in volumes impacts on the force's capacity to prevent and respond to increased demand. - Increases in serious youth violence reporting in the media could undermine community confidence in policing and contribute to safety concerns. - Demand pressures could have an impact on crime prevention initiatives. Force response becomes more reactive than preventative.	- Guardian Grip funding established. Taskforce numbers are now increased to full strength - Integrated force violence strategy being implemented - Additional funds have been channelled to tasking processes (WTAM) to support NTE resources. - Taskforce continue to achieve positive results and deep dives into NPU problem solving progressing - New Violence Board is focusing on tiered offender processes, school exclusions and referrals plus exempt accommodation. - NPU refresh of Serious Youth Violence Plans – to launch internal comms programme including Target Guardian Patrols to frontline staff and Rimush community engagement principles – to commence post CWG - App in development with Thames Valley to deliver Randomised Patrol Methodology (tasking and activity recording) for Targeted Guardian Patrols within hotspots. Supported by geofencing for improved assurance and impact evaluation - Investment in investigations resources (PSI,PSIOS to enhance OOCD and outcomes) - NPU SYV Reduction Plans to include Public Health and Multi Agency SARA approach underpinned by CSP Violence Board structures. - Round Midnight Virtual Reality Schools program wider roll out being scoped with County Lines lead	↔	↔	↔	↔	High
CRR05	Demand Management	There is a risk that the Force fails to respond to and manage the effective and efficient policing requirements of the region as a result of the increased volume and complexity in demand. The nature of the rise requires an increasing level of sophistication to understand how it moved through the system and may be compounded by resourcing constraints.	Impacts on our ability to create and execute effective plans to ensure effective and efficient delivery of policing. Example: Demand and the management of risk within the P2 grade, which has a service level at 60 minutes. Currently a minority of case are being carried over beyond 24 hours. This is a concern in relation to risk management, service delivery, victim support and impacts on stress to WMP staff seeking to manage this risk when unresourced. Return to 'new normal' at the tail-end of the pandemic creates additional complexity/uncertainty.	- Incoming demand has continued to be higher than normal seasonal average. - A Force Contact Improvement Plan has now been approved by the FET, which will see an uplift in new police staff posts, restricted PCs and PS to form a 24/7 Vulnerability Desk. These staff will deal with the vulnerability calls rather than call handlers which will provide capacity for call handlers to deal with greater number of calls. (Vulnerability calls often take in excess of one hour to complete). - Due to the forthcoming CWG a further temporary uplift in officers and staff has been approved to facilitate the resources needed each day during the CWG in addition to BAU. BTT and POD support in place using a fast track methodology to deliver the Improvement Plan. Medium term scoping of a greater integrated solution including Force Contact, FCID and PPU has been commissioned.	↔	↔	↔	↔	High
CRR17	Organisational Learning	Organisational learning is obtained across the force via its various learning hotspots (i.e., IA / HMIC recommendations, debriefs, inquiries (Manchester Arena bombings), IOPC reports etc). There is no current organisational learning structure across the force to ensure once learning is identified, it is evaluated and shared across the Force to positively impact policy practise and outcomes. There is a risk that WMP lacks the oversight required to analyse strategic, cross cutting and/ or operational organisational learning to ensure risks and opportunities are managed and evaluated in showing learning and ideas have a route to action including integration into operational practice.	- Lack of coordinated dissemination of knowledge and learning across the Force. - No consistent approach to capturing and sharing OL, no ability to draw out themes - No clear governance or accountability for structured debriefs - Failing to embed the learning across the Force could lead to reputational damage should major incident occur across the region and learning available. - Increased scrutiny from external regulators – such as HMIC	- The capability review bringing together the Strategy and Direction and Business Transformation departments will develop a new assurance framework which will incorporate a new organisational learning process. - This work will be allocated to the new Performance and Assurance Team and work is currently underway to develop process maps for organisational learning. - Recommendations, efficiencies and benefits raised as a resulted of the learning will be tracked and documented in learning logs. These will be managed by a dedicated OL resource in the new team. The results of the learning will be reported to the newly formed DCC Portfolio Risk and Learning Board for additional scrutiny. - A system will be created to capture and share learning and move towards ensuring future events can be managed more effectively using the good practice from the learning activities.	New	↔	↔	↔	High
CRR04	CONNECT Legacy/BRC Data	Data migration into CONNECT could lead to loss of relevant information transferring over from legacy systems into CONNECT. Data loss/gaps could lead to the Force being unable to accurately access historic audit data.	-The impact of this risk may be that data in the back records is missing from the transfer to CONNECT. This could lead to certain data fields in things like DBS historic checks being excluded – e.g. crime reference numbers. -The impact of this risk could lead to potential reputational damage if information provided in DBS certificates do not adequately reflect all current and historic data. -CONNECT Legacy/ BRC Data- Significant issues with this content- not all relevant information has been brought over into CONNECT, plus there are gaps in some outcomes/ markers that did not exist on legacy systems- for example, over 140K post 2018 DA records are no longer identified correctly, and there is currently no solution for accessing audit data.	- CONNECT implementation & assurance board involving a wide range of internal stakeholders (mostly departmental heads) overseeing implementation of system. - CONNECT team continuing to work through system architecture and integration issues with Northgate as part of usual programme management business. - DBS staff and others involved in investigation and disclosure are aware and are currently checking legacy systems to ensure all relevant information is considered. - Issue is under investigation by the Project/ IT&D/ Northgate as a whole and will need to be raised with CONNECT Gold/ Silver & SIMB- until this is resolved WMP cannot delete legacy data. - Second BRC load has completed and is due to be signed off imminently. Some manual migration is still underway to complete the migration of a small number of records. Risk of missing P1 data is now substantially reduced, risk of missing P2 and P3 data is being monitored and a fix/ migration is in progress.	↔	↔	↔	↔	High
CRR21	Cannabis Disposal Storage Capacity	Due to a substantial increase in cannabis growth in the region, there has been an increase in the quantity of cannabis seized by Officers. The rapid increase could lead to a inability to manage the disposal capacity effectively.	This has led to insufficient cannabis storage capacity to manage the increased quantity seized. Increase in the health and safety risk to staff with excessive quantities being held on site.	- Staff overtime being used to clear backlog. - Increase skip capacity - A formal proposal to clear the back log has been submitted to shared services - Discussions with Fleet Management currently underway to utilise van capacity - A working group has been assembled to implement a number of actions to mitigate and reduce the risk to the Force.	N/A	N/A	New	↔	High
CRR19	WMP Website – Server Capacity	Due to server capacity issues of the WMP website the site can be prone to crashing. There is a risk should the live chat function be unavailable during a major incident.	The total number of people accessing the site if redirected would cause the website to crash. This would lead to members of the public being unable to report crimes and any other issues via the live chat function.	- IT&D have carried out the initial load & performance testing locally, using specific software (K6) that enables the user to simulate multiple concurrent connections to our website. - To progress further IT&D need to procure a K6 Professional license. Funding has now been secured (as of w/c 16/05) and a supplier has been approached about providing a route to market. Once the license is procured this will enable IT&D to perform increased simulations of up to 3000+ concurrent connections. The results from testing will determine whether changes need to be made to the server sizing (at cost) and caching of data which is the planned approach to the mitigation of this risk. The plan is that this work will be complete by the end of June 2022. **DEC re-hosting** We are moving DEC from UKCloud (cloud hosting company) to AWS (the company we use for DDI); the Home Office have recommended that all forces that currently utilise services from UKCloud move to an alternative provider.	N/A	↔	↔	↓	High
CRR12	Mutual Aid & Resourcing	There is a risk that significant resources abstractions (police officers and staff) will be required from operational business and duties during the operational period of the Commonwealth Games. There is a risk that a local, regional or national critical incident could see Mutual Aid and / or WMP officers and / or vehicles abstracted to resource the incident response.	The impact of this risk may be that WMP will have gaps in the Games staffing model, potentially causing a security / public safety risk. Should vehicles be unavailable, then officers' ability to perform their roles may be impacted and / or alternative transport may need to be found at short notice and with additional cost.	- Mutual Aid to Civilian Authorities (MACA) approved January 2022. - WMP continues to work with National Colleagues (NPoCC) to capture MA nominations; anticipated that all MA nominations will be confirmed by end of May – anticipated shortage of bikes due to national shortage, options being explored. - WMP internal resourcing – An ACC has been appointed as BaU Gold, working with their Silver to ensure resourcing levels are met for the Games whilst ensuring BaU is sufficiently resourced. Recent exercise undertaken to predict the demand has taken place. - Explore scenario / resilience in Business Continuity / Testing & Exercising. - Engage with recruitment Uplift programme to assess opportunities. - Working with the operation to build an abstraction and deployment model and approach to identify with the organisation where resources will be taken from and for how long.	New	↔	↔	↔	Medium
CRR07	Workforce Representation	Failure to attract, recruit and retain a diverse and representative workforce across the Force and support their progression within the organisation to deliver our services to our diverse communities.	- A less representative Force may affect the level of trust and confidence in some communities. - The impact may be that legitimacy and trust in WMP is diminished. The impact of not meeting both the PCC's and WMP's target of recruiting more female and BAME officers and staff may lead to reputational damage.	- WMP have also been involved in pilot programmes with the College of Policing looking at tailored and targeted actions to address retention of underrepresented groups within the Force. - Discussions underway with the Staff Network Chairs around supporting the work to mitigate this. Utilisation of Staff Associations and force leaders to ally and endorse representation plans - Pro-active comms to workforce around the Force's representation ambition via intranet and internet. - Risk to be considered as part of updated D&I Strategy. - Uplift Gold strategy continues to operate to ensure a robust delivery plan. - National Race & Inclusion plan launched in Q1 22/23.	↔	↔	↓	↔	Medium
CRR10	Financial Management	i. There is a risk that WMP's finances are not sustainable over the medium term and/or efficiency savings required may adversely impact the operational services. Whilst the police grant has increased for 22/23 to fund increase in officer numbers, there are still unfunded inflationary pressures. ii - There is also a risk that as mandated/national initiatives develop (e.g. ESMCP, National Enabling Programme), the actual costs for delivery far exceed the estimated costs within the affordability envelope.	i - Impact on overall funding position. Medium term financial plan (MTFP) sets out strict budgeting envelope that must be met. ii - The inability to finance all component projects, or needing to de-prioritise other projects within the portfolio if the national changes are mandated.	- Influence National debate on Police Funding Formula - Review and continue to scrutinise financial planning and prudence in managing long term commitments - Financial Resilience continues to be a risk for the force, whilst we face pressures from growing demand and tighter finances. The savings required to plug the gap increases year on year, which has been included in the budget report to the Police & Crime Panel at the start of the year. - We have now completed phase two of the PBB exercise and identified £5.3 million of savings with no loss of services. The next phase will start in the Autumn.	↔	↔	↔	↔	Medium

ID	Risk Name	Description	Impact	Key Controls and Activities	Q2 Trending	Q3 Trending	Q4 Trending	Q1 Trending	Residual Risk Rating
CRR11	Safeguarding - Local Policing	There is a risk that the Force fails follow safeguarding processes to protect the needs of the most vulnerable members of our community. There is also a risk that the Force fails to fully understand the safeguarding needs and experiences of citizens - young and old due to increased demand pressures and the challenging range of commissioned and partner-driven arrangements operating across the region.	- Poor identification impacts on the force's capacity to prevent and respond, creating public confidence and safety concerns. - Risk to vulnerable members of the community. - Potential reputational damage if risk not adequately mitigated.	- Following on going work and review of safeguarding processes in their entirety we are reassured that officers are making referrals appropriately on the internet portal as a result of the CONNECT being closed. An interim solution is being sought by CONNECT team which should be up and running in April 2022. The longer-term fix requires system recoding and a significant technical upgrade which is planned for April 2023. - A dip sample of the legacy referrals on the portal found that so far is that the risk appears low/medium but further sampling required to be able to make the most informed decisions on how to manage this going forward. - A new form with enhanced functionality within Connect will provide greater capability and be more effective in understanding and meeting safeguarding of vulnerable people. - For Adults, the innovative delivery strategy looks to (6 strands in line with the key principles of the Care Act 2014) address the gaps and challenges of demand pressures across the Force and ensure more consistency in the range of commissioned services and partnership arrangements.	↔	↔	↔	↔	Medium
CRR22	Non-Compliance with CPIA biometric data retention	A previous Biometric Commissioner's Office audit in 2019 highlighted the need for WMP to ensure a cohesive and robust audit process for CPIA samples. These recommendations have not been fully implemented and it is likely the Force will be subject to an audit later this year as part of the national cyclical audit plan. There is a risk that WMP may not be fully compliant with the CPIA. There is a risk that a new audit by the Biometric Commissioner's Office could highlight weaknesses in WMP's management of the relevant data.	- Significant weaknesses highlighted in an audit by the Biometric Commissioners Office. - Trust and confidence of our stakeholders in relation to our processes around biometric information. - Non- compliance with the CIPA and the potential notification to the Home Office.	- A working group has been set up and the terms of reference is being finalised. The group aims to bring together key stakeholders to develop a procedure to ensure a compliant and ethical biometric data storage process. - Working group will work to implement Biometric Commissioner's recommendations made as a result of findings from a recent national report.	N/A	N/A	New	↔	Medium
CRR16	Police Cadet Leaders - Safeguarding	There is a risk that WMP Police Cadets policies, procedures and process fail to comply with the National Safety and Safeguarding guidelines (UKYSSF). The guidelines are set out by the National VPC who advises that WMP aligns its practice to the UK Youth Safer Spaces Framework (UKSSF) backed by the NPCC Enforcement.	- Increased spotlight on other Forces could increase media focus on all Police Force's across the country including WMP. - If WMP does not ensure compliance with the safeguarding practices around recruitment of Police Cadet Leaders, this could increase the likelihood of having a negative impact on public confidence and legitimacy in safeguarding Police Cadets.	- Working with national VPC to establish the safer spaces framework. - Compliance has increased to 95% completing mandatory safeguarding training. - Safer Recruitment process remains at 100% compliant.	New	↓	↓	↔	Medium

Risk Trend key - Improved (↓), Worsened (↑) or is Unchanged (↔)

RISK SCORING GUIDANCE

Risk Scoring = Impact x Probability

Impact	Service	Performance	Finance	Reputation	Legal	Safety	Human Rights / Diversity	Wellbeing
5	Major impact on a critical service area or multiple service areas with widespread and sustained disruption	Significant impact on performance resulting in not achieving more than one of the key Force performance objectives	Costs over £2m	Sustained national media coverage over sustained period / Removal of Command Team member / External inquiry	Prosecution. Major Claims/fines against the Force.	Multiple fatalities or multiple permanent injuries	Major unjustified impacts or interference	Very likely to have a significant impact on officer/staff wellbeing and will require coordinated response and referral to support services.
4	Serious impact on key services with a noticeable impact for the public	Large impact on performance resulting in not achieving a key Force performance objectives	Costs of between £1m and £2m	Sustained adverse local media coverage	Serious Claims/fines against the Force.	Single Fatality or severe injury to several people	Serious unjustified impacts or interference	Likely to have a serious impact on officer/staff wellbeing and will require coordinated response and referral to support services.
3	Impact on non-critical service or short term disruption	Impact on performance resulting in potential difficulties in achieving key Force performance objectives but where corrective action can still be taken	Costs of between £500k and £1m	Some local adverse publicity	Significant Litigation /claims against the Force. Within insurance cover	Major injury	Some limited unjustified impact or interference	Likely to impact officer/staff wellbeing and require referral to support services.
2	Slight impact on service delivery	Impact on performance resulting in small impact on key Force performance objectives but which can be managed	Costs of between £100k and £500k	Short term customer dissatisfaction	Claims, minor complaints Within insurance cover	Minor or slight injury	Impact of interference is manageable with existing resources	May impact officer/staff wellbeing and could require referral to support services.
1	Impact is easily manageable or is of little concern to public	Short Term impact on performance but not to the extent where the achievement of key force performance objectives are impacted	Costs of below £100k	Manageable customer dissatisfaction	Unlikely to lead to a claim	Unlikely to have any safety implications	No impact on diversity / human rights	Negligible impact on officer/staff wellbeing and unlikely to require referral to support services.

Probability	Description	Detailed Description	% Chance	Relative	Frequency
5	Very Likely	Has regularly occurred within the Force / Area / Department or there are strong indications that the risk will happen	80% or more	As certain as we can be that it will happen	More than once a year
4	Likely	Has previously occurred within the Force / Area / Department or there are indications that the risk will happen	50% - 80%	More likely to happen than not to happen	Once every 1 to 2 years occurrence
3	Some likelihood	Some indications that the risk will happen	20% - 50%	More likely not to happen than to happen	Once every 2 to 5 years occurrence
2	Unlikely	Limited indications at this point that the risk will happen	5% - 20%	Unlikely to happen but possible	Once every 5 to 10 years occurrence
1	Remote	No indications at this point that the risk will happen	0% - 5%	Extremely Unlikely	Once every 10 years or more occur

Risk Scores

	5	10	15	20	25
	4	8	12	16	20
Probability	3	6	9	12	15
	2	4	6	8	10
	1	2	3	4	5
	Impact				

For grading risk, the scores obtained from the risk matrix are assigned grades as follows

1 - 4	Low risk
5 - 10	Medium risk
12 -16	High risk
20 - 25	Critical risk

Calculate the risk rating by multiplying the impact score by the probability score:

Impact x Probability = risk rating/score