



**Police and Crime Plan Priority:** Responding to National Threats

**Title:** Strategic Policing Requirement

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**Purpose of paper**

1. The purpose of the report is to provide the PCC and the Strategic Policing and Crime Board (SPCB) with assurance that the Force is effectively and efficiently engaged in addressing national policing threats as set out in the Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR), with a specific focus on:
  - ***Serious and Organised Crime***
  - ***Counter Terrorism***
  - ***Public Order***
  - ***Civil Emergencies***
  - ***The response to a national cyber security incident***
  - ***Violence Against Women and Girls***
  - ***Child Sexual Abuse***
  - ***Cross-Cutting Capabilities***

**Background**

2. This paper provides an update to the last briefing to SPCB on 25<sup>th</sup> January 2022.
3. Introduced in 2012, the SPR established the foundations for a national level policing response to identified threats. The objectives of the SPR are to set out existing and emerging threats, describe the required capabilities to counter them, and to provide a framework for a co-ordinated, aggregated response which are just as, if not more relevant today.
4. The SPR articulates the balance between local level policing and the need for collaboration at a national level in order to tackle identified threats and harms. In

response to Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) recommendation, the Requirement was reviewed in 2015 to ensure it remained relevant and effective. This review provided an updated threat profile, comprising: Terrorism, Serious and Organised Crime, A national cyber security incident, Threats to public order or public safety (that cannot be managed by a single force), Civil emergencies (requiring an aggregated response across police force boundaries) and Child Sexual Abuse.

5. The associated policing response to these threats in the 2015 SPR was articulated as the '5Cs': Capacity and Contribution; Capability; Consistency; and Connectivity.
6. February 2023 saw the publication of a revised SPR. This was informed by an extensive review and consultation exercise with key stakeholders and partners, and also reflected changes to the strategic and operational landscape such as the creation of the National Policing Board in 2019. The resulting revised SPR continues to provide a framework setting out the biggest threats to public safety, ensuring the police have the capabilities to deliver a robust, national response.
7. The 2023 SPR sets out seven identified national threats - six of which remain from the 2015 version (as set out above), and with the key addition of Violence against Women and Girls, reflecting the threat it presents to public safety and confidence.
8. The 2023 SPR also builds on and expands the 2015 iteration in other ways, for instance:
  - The Serious and Organised Crime threat response has been expanded to include reference to drugs trafficking, specifically the county lines model, and fraud which, highlighted during the review as threats that cross police force boundaries.
  - Providing strengthened detail around the action required from policing at the local and regional level to critical national threats.
  - Supporting Chief Constables and PCCs by clearly linking the local response to the national threat, highlighting the capabilities and partnerships policing needs to fulfil its responsibilities.
9. Moving forward, the SPR will be clearly referenced in police and crime plans, they will show how it has been considered in setting the strategic direction and objectives within forces and how these will contribute to tackling national priority threats.
10. In summary, the SPR remains a cornerstone of policing, identifying threats and providing a framework for response at both a local force level and from a national perspective. WMP welcomes the revised SPR as a framework for strategic planning and operational delivery; as a force we reflect all seven identified national threats in our service planning and delivery approach.
11. In particular, we highlight our role in tackling Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG): we are one of four pilot forces for Operation Soteria, transforming the way we investigate rape and serious sexual violence and putting victims at the very heart of the work we do, we also play a key role in tackling VAWG as part of the West Midlands Violence Reduction Partnership hand in hand with West Midlands PCC.

## **Serious and Organised Crime**

### ***The working relationship with the National Crime Agency, including day-to-day tasking and requests from the Director General to perform a task under Section 5(1)(a) Crime and Courts Act 2013.***

12. The National Crime Agency continues to embed staff within each Regional Organised Crime Unit (ROCU) and share a close working relationship. Regional Organised Crime Unit West Midlands (ROCUWM) continues to work closely with the National Crime Agency's (NCA's) Regional Organised Crime Co-ordinator (ROCC) attending weekly meetings to support our operational efficiency and effectiveness. Furthermore, the National Crime Agency continues to be a partner in the monthly Regional Tactical Tasking & Co-ordination (RTTCG) meeting. ROCUWM continues to be able to access National Crime Agency resources when necessary to support the challenges in tackling Serious Organised Crime (SOC).
13. The NCA support as a partner in the Strategic Governance Groups which are aligned to Commodities, Vulnerabilities and Prosperity priorities. These groups were reinstated in 2022 and produce, own and implement strategic action plans through de-confliction and rationalisation of national plans, whilst being cognisant of local priorities.
14. Any s.5(1)(a) Crime and Courts Act 2013 tasking actions received by the ROCUWM continue to be taken directly to the RTTCG meeting for both visibility and accountability purposes. The activity itself and progress is tracked through that forum.
15. In the past 12 months formal tasking under s.5(1)(a) of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 has continued to be related to national policing standards for organised immigration crime (OIC), an extension and continued focus of the previous 12 months. This most recent tasking has been mainly directed to forces. In brief it asks forces to build and respond to their intelligence base, support ROCUs to deliver regional assessments, increase mapped OCG disruptions and implement the debriefing of illegal migrants.
16. Through the ROCU Modern Slavery and Organised Immigration Crime (MSOIC) and the newly established Thematic Delivery Group (TDG) this tasking will be driven and then monitored through RTTCG.
17. To support the ongoing work in this area ROCU has implemented a WM Regional Proactive Organised Immigration Crime Intelligence Group, the aim to forge a proactive drive around OIC. This is made up of force and partner representatives from across the region.
18. The areas of focus for this group are:
  - Increase in OIC disruptions
  - Community engagement
  - Migrant debriefs
  - Financial investigation capacity
  - Enabling IT
  - Partnership working & database access

**Consideration to be given to the indication from the National Crime Agency (NCA) of their ‘tilt’ upwards to more serious and international based SOC and the impact of this on ROCUWM and force**

19. The relationship with the NCA continues to be developed. The recent tilt in NCA development and sanctioning of investigations has had an impact. It has seen an increase in intelligence dissemination, however, the process established through 2022/23 have kept ROCUWM in a good place to accept this dissemination and deal with expeditiously, these being:

- Using the ROCUWM Gateway for support requests and dissemination of intelligence
- Use of the ROCUWM Head of Intelligence or on call duty arrangements for decision making
- The requests for support (only tasking takes place under s.5(1)(a) Crime and Courts Act 2013) assessed and taken to the ROCUWM weekly tasking process for agreement in terms of support or otherwise

**The resilience of the capacity and capabilities required for SPR compliance, including reference to vacancy rates**

20. ROCUWM has finalised its 2023/24 establishment having realigned 31 officer posts from 3<sup>rd</sup> April 2023 back into the force with a further six posts to follow on the 5<sup>th</sup> June 2023. The Priority Based Budgeting exercise has resulted in a further 21 staff posts being removed from the ROCUWM baseline. Due to the late finalisation of the budget, staff affected by the reductions will still be reflected in the strength however the posts removed from the establishment. This will rectify once the 45 days consultation period and subsequent notice period has passed.

23/24 headcount (Core and externally funded roles only)												
	Officer est	Officer headcount	Officer vacancies	Staff est	Police staff headcount	Police staff vacancies	Total est	Total headcount	Total vacancies	Officer vacancies	Staff Vacancies	Total
<b>WMP</b>	310	288	22	120.66	117	3.66	430.66	405	25.66	7%	3%	6%
<b>WK</b>	17.5	15	2.5	4	5	-1	21.5	20	1.5	14%	-25%	7%
<b>WM</b>	69	55	14	6	9	-3	75	64	11	23%	-50%	15%
<b>ST</b>	68.5	58	10.5	7	8	-1	75.5	66	9.5	15%	-14%	13%
<b>Total</b>	<b>465</b>	<b>416</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>137.66</b>	<b>139</b>	<b>-1.34</b>	<b>602.66</b>	<b>555</b>	<b>47.66</b>	<b>11%</b>	<b>-1%</b>	<b>8%</b>

**Counter Terrorism**

**Overview and threat**

21. Counter Terrorism Policing is a collaboration of the United Kingdom’s police forces working with the intelligence community to help protect the public and national security by preventing, investigating, preparing for and protecting against terrorist activity.
22. The threat to the UK from international terrorism is currently at SUBSTANTIAL, meaning an attack is likely. The West Midlands Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU), local force colleagues and intelligence services continue to work tirelessly and at pace to confront the threat, by delivering the 4P (Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare) CONTEST strategy to keep the public of the West Midlands region safe.

23. Working closely with partners, West Midlands CTU continues to prioritise its resources against cases that pose the most risk to the public. The CT policing network is currently working on a record number of more than 800 investigations. These investigations, focus on a range of activities, including fundraising, radicalising and preparing acts of terrorism.
24. Demands on CT Policing have continued to increase by around a third, compared to the period prior to the 2017 attacks and since then, CT Policing and UK Intelligence Services have disrupted 37 late stage terror plots.
25. Today's threat is dominated by increasingly fragmented ideologies, self-initiated terrorists operating independently from organised groups with increasingly personal ideologies and warped views used to justify violence. The reach of hateful online ideologies, especially into the lives of young people is significant. Individuals involved in planning attacks and other forms of extremism are often vulnerable due to a range of factors described as multi-complex needs.
26. Alongside UK Border Force and other partners, West Midlands CTU continues to carry out operational activity at Birmingham International airport (and other general aviation sites) every day to keep the public safe from potential terrorist threats. The threat posed by UK nationals seeking to return from areas of overseas conflict is something planned for and managed. Together with intelligence partners CTU uses the wide range of measures and powers available to mitigate this threat. Finally, convicted individuals in prison for terrorism or extremism offences, who are now being released into the community also add to an ever shifting and complex West Midlands threat picture.
27. There are a number of current national strategic factors and thinking in progress that may affect the future approach of the West Midlands Counter Terrorism Unit and the regions CT response. These factors include a refresh of the UK Governments Counter Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST), an Independent Review of Prevent led by William Shawcross, national learning and recommendations from the Manchester Arena Inquiry and new legislation such a Martyn's Law.

### ***CONTEST Strategy Refresh***

28. It is vital that future strategy reflects the diversifying threat, the learning we have obtained from previous attacks and how we will need to continue to share information and collaborate with others to keep people safe. The government are now carrying out a refresh of the UK's counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. Although it is anticipated that there will not be significant change to the existing UK Counter Terrorism structures, this work, and a subsequent refresh of the National Counter Terrorisms Policing strategy, will undoubtedly adjust the approach to mitigate current and future threat and risk.

### ***Martyn's Law***

29. The new UK Protect Duty, now to be known as 'Martyn's Law' in tribute of Martyn Hett, who was killed alongside 21 others in the Manchester Arena terrorist attack in 2017, will reduce the risk to the public from terrorism by the protection of public venues.
30. The Bill places a requirement on those responsible for certain locations to consider the threat from terrorism and implement appropriate and proportionate mitigation measures. The legislation will ensure parties are prepared, ready to respond and

know what to do in the event of an attack. Better protection will be delivered through enhanced security systems, staff training, and clearer processes.

31. The new duty will require venues across the West Midlands to take steps to improve public safety, with measures dependent on the size of the venue and the activity taking place. Proposals for new legislation have been developed following public consultation and engagement across industry, charities, local authorities, security experts and with survivors.
32. For West Midlands CTU Protect it is forecast, based upon a pilot run in another region, that this will be a significant shift in approach and will create extra demand for CTU's Counter Terrorism Security Advisors and the wider team. The department will look to work alongside partners to ensure those with a share in this legislative responsibility can deliver to the greatest effect.

### ***Independent Review of Prevent***

33. Since the Prevent Strategy was introduced in 2006 the West Midlands CTU has played a vital role in stopping people from being drawn into terrorism and violent extremism. This unique contribution has been essential in boosting the UK's ability to counter the threat posed by terrorists, whilst at the same time helping build stronger and safer communities.
34. West Midlands CTU Prevent builds on existing strong relationships between police and professionals involved in other safeguarding work such as sexual abuse, neglect and other risks. The department's work covers all communities and all forms of extremist activity, including extreme right-wing behaviour.
35. The Independent Review of Prevent (IRP) was published in February 2023, and contains 34 recommendations, all of which have been accepted by the Home Office. It is important to note that this is a government-commissioned review into the Home Office's Prevent programme, of which policing is a key partner – it is not a review of CT Policing Prevent. Broadly, the IRP covers the following themes:
  - There is too much non-CT related work in our caseload. There a large number of referrals where there is no clear ideology and there is a low adoption into Channel for these case.
  - Ideology: Prevent should focus on people with ideological motivation not an individual grievance. There is also too much casework that focusses on the Extreme Right Wing compared to the Islamist threat.
  - Regional co-ordination of Prevent should be delivered by Homeland Security Group (HSG), with funding mechanisms over two-five years instead of one.
  - Prevent should engage with the anti-Prevent lobby more robustly. There should also be a standards and compliance unit set up.
  - Prevent should better understand and tackle anti-Semitism.
  - Prevent should better understand blasphemy as a drive for violent action.

HSG are in the process of planning how the recommendations will be implemented, along with the CONTEST Strategy refresh and a re-drafting of guidance to specified authorities to enable them to fulfil their prevent duty in the light of the diversifying threat ("Prevent Duty Guidance").

### ***Interventions***

36. As described earlier, there has been a continual shift in the threat West Midlands encounters, from network organised to self-initiated terrorist attacks, with individuals involved often considered vulnerable due to a range of factors described as multi-complex needs. To help mitigate this, Counter Terrorism Policing intends to more effectively divert those in the CT system away from terrorist activity by making the right interventions at the right time, in collaboration with the right partners.
37. Projects have been launched to examine and improve partnerships with access to multi-agency data for earlier intervention. Initial work is underway to explore the possibility of combining the best of the current Prevent and Nominal Management capabilities into a single capability under the proposed new name 'Interventions', moving towards a 'whole system' approach to managing risk in order to mitigate the terrorist threat. West Midlands CTU Prevent and Nominal Management departments will work with Headquarters on a potential design until December 2023. It is anticipated, if agreed, January 2024 onwards would see capabilities begin to transition.

### ***Strategic Efficiencies and Reinvestment Review***

38. The Strategic Efficiencies and Reinvestment Review (SE&RR) was a recent national Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters review of all CT capabilities across the network to address the changing operational, economic, and strategic need.
39. The most significant reduction for the West Midlands concerned the CT Investigations department. SE&RR required a downsizing of 17 detective constables with a view to saving around £1.1 million. All CTUs were affected differently, for example another CTU of similar size had a significant downsizing of Intelligence assets, whilst the national communications capability saw an uplift across the network.
40. As West Midlands CTU Investigations has not recruited to vacancies since the SE&RR project, this has allowed the department to restructure existing assets to meet the required reductions without redeploying officers or staff out of unit. Engagement with the police federation and staff unions, and formal consultation with current Investigations staff is complete. West Midlands CTU Investigations is confident that service levels across the region will not be affected by this reconfiguration, especially with its ability as part of the national CT network to flex investigative capacity into the region if required.

### ***Collaboration***

41. The implications of the National Special Branch Review and funding transfer for Strategic Policing Review compliance were minimal as anticipated, with strong and effective Counter Terrorism collaboration across the region continuing. Last year, the West Midlands Office for the Police and Crime Commissioner conducted an independent audit to provide assurances that consistent operating arrangements were in place for those Special Branch functions that integrated into West Midlands CTU. The audit focused on governance and funding arrangements, performance monitoring and operational practices across the 4P workstreams. The findings of the audit were very positive, with a good level of assurance obtained.

### ***Preparedness and National Recommendations Relating to Recent Terror Attacks***

42. The Counter Terrorism Policing network continue to invest heavily in implementing learning from terrorist attacks. Since 2017 more than 200 recommendations have been implemented across the CT network, including the creation of the world's first multi-organisational Counter Terrorism Operations Centre in London. West Midlands CTU are linked in with the National Organisational Development Unit and continue to play their part in efficiently and effectively implementing recommendations from official inquiries, national and regional tests and exercises.
43. Marauding terrorist attacks (MTA) are fast-moving, violent incidents where assailants move through a location aiming to find and kill or injure as many people as possible. West Midlands preparedness to deal with these incidents is mature and well exercised. The CTU Prepare Department has worked hard to build and strengthen capabilities so the Unit can respond effectively, optimising our ability to respond to a PLATO type attack of this nature (Operation PLATO is the agreed national identifier for the multi-agency response to an ongoing MTA). This has been achieved through the training, testing and exercising of people and plans, ensuring that in the event of a major incident, the CTU along with other emergency service colleagues, military and local authorities come together and respond in partnership.
44. The relationship between national learning and West Midlands is strong, with national guidance routinely converted into local enhancement and appropriate recommendations docked into existing governance groups for delivery, oversight and assurance. For example, recommendations generated by The Manchester Arena Inquiry Volume 2 (The Emergency Response) were reported directly into the West Midlands Police Force Executive Team. These recommendations have been reviewed, the detail of which, is outlined in paragraph 62.
45. Action plans and realistic timelines for delivery, in line with the National Portfolio's inquiry review timeline are being developed, all to be tracked and managed centrally. Work of this nature will be governed through the West Midlands Major Incident Readiness Board (MIRB) that then feeds Force Resilience Thematic Board (FRTB).
46. From a regional perspective, learning from local test and exercises informed the recently rewritten CTU Primed Emergency Plan. The refreshed approach has also been tested, providing Duty Superintendents and other key personnel with the confidence to ensure an appropriate response to an incident quickly and effectively activated. New roles and functions within the CTU have been created to ensure even better connectivity.
47. Specific work to bridge gaps with other forces in the West Midlands region and Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters has also been undertaken, focusing on connectivity, roles, responsibilities and how we can work together better to be prepared for an incident of this nature. Outside of the police family, work also continues with regional Local Authorities with a programme of support in place building on the successful Regional Protect and Prepare conference in November 2023.

### ***CTU Strategy***

48. As highlighted earlier, in addition to mitigating threat and risk on a daily basis the CT network also has a number of key strategic factors and thinking in play that will undoubtedly evolve the regions long term response to countering terrorism in the



future. In the short to medium term, the CTU has developed its own robust unit strategy.

49. The approach focuses on four strategic lenses. The first will ensure that the CT estate and its infrastructure is future proofed, joined up and optimised enabling all aspects of the regional counter terrorism operation. Being prepared for potential CT savings as part of public sector austerity will also be key to this lens. A full establishment of healthy, productive officers and staff who consistently deliver to the highest standards is also vital, work will be prioritised to fill vacancies, working with WMP and the national CT Recruitment and Retention Programme. The workforce optimisation framework will identify and address future resourcing risks, and will facilitate succession planning for key roles. The strategy also identified the importance of the legitimacy of CT policing supported by maintaining the trust and confidence of all communities across the region. Finally, adopting a smarter, flexible and adaptive response to predicted future demand, with seamless regional interoperability to deliver consistent quality and value for money will be at the heart of West Midlands Counter Units '4P' CONTEST delivery.
50. Other essential activities will be undertaken throughout the year: recognition and appreciation, people and leadership development, cadre management, surveillance academy, health & safety and the security board will continue to contribute to the smooth running of the CTU. The governance framework and the financial reporting frameworks within the region remain largely unchanged. Financial data monitored quarterly and sent to CTPHQ in the form of Financial Reporting and Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Monitoring Statements supporting Revenue, Capital and FTE allocations. This data will be collated into quarterly Financial Management Information Packs (FMIPs), which are used to inform the financial management of the Grant.

***The resilience of the capacity and capabilities required for SPR compliance, including reference to vacancy rates***

51. Retaining and recruiting officers and staff into Counter Terrorism is difficult. West Midlands CTUs establishment is currently at 88% and although it is recognised as a potential risk, especially if the vacancy rate continues to decline, it is not currently impacting significantly on service delivery. However, around a third of the posts in Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters are vacant and other units around the UK are experiencing similar challenges.
52. A new National Counter Terrorism Policing Recruitment and Retention Programme has set out to address these strategic recruitment challenges. It will focus on attracting and retaining talent, making the onboarding and vetting processes more efficient, broadening the entry points into the organisation to speed up the candidate selection process for each role.

***Maintenance of the CT armed uplift capability beyond March 2023***

53. The Firearms Operations Unit (FOU) has an establishment of 258 Authorised Firearms Officers (AFOs). WMP provide a service level agreement of 10 Armed Response Vehicles (ARVs) on a 24/7 basis, along with the Tactical Firearms Team (TFT) of Counter Terrorism Specialist Firearms Officers (CTSFOs). CTSFOs provide the force's response to planned deployments and on-call response to both internal force requirements and any national Intervention Response Team (IRT) requirements from the CT Network on a 24/7 basis.

54. The strength of the FOU currently sits at 233, which is 25 constables under establishment. FOU strength remains under establishment following a number of promotions, retirements and restricted officers posted to other departments. FOU currently have three Initial Firearms Courses (IFC) being delivered and planned. By July 2023 the FOU anticipate strength will be at or near establishment dependant successful students.
55. The CTSFO numbers in force currently sit at 43, against an establishment of 56. The strength has increased over the past 12 months but the process to gain CTSFO role profile is slow. There are currently seven Specialist Firearms Officers (SFOs) qualified in force, who are capable of providing all in-force responses, but are not qualified to provide national (CT) responses, four of which have completed a CTSFO upskill course in January 2023 (7-week course). There are also four Mobile Armed Support to Surveillance (MASTS) trained officers who can deploy on WMP MASTS operations, it is anticipated they will do a Dynamic Search course later in 2023 to gain SFO role profile.
56. In addition to those current SFOs, an ongoing process of identifying new candidates for Pathway courses (taking AFOs from ARV to SFO and then on to CTSFO) is in hand. This process can take 12-18 months as all Pathway courses are delivered through the National training Team of the CT Network. A number of student officers have been highlighted through Strategic Workforce with significant military experience and a desire to be CTSFO's. A number of these officers are posted to Initial Firearms Course 1, Initial Firearms Course 2 and Initial Firearms Course 3, these will total an 11 week course re-named from the previous ARV course.
57. All of the FOU SLA requirements, both internal and external, are maintained through business as usual. The staffing picture means that the strength of the FOU will increase over the next 12 months, and the number of CTSFOs will also increase (depending on people passing their pathway courses). Confidence is high that the maintenance of the armed uplift will not diminish beyond March 2023.

### ***Multi-agency preparedness for a marauding terrorist attack***

58. The threat of a MTA remains a prominent risk within the National Security and Risk Assessment published in 2022. As such, WMP continues to refine its preparedness through planning and exercising with our partners since we began this work in 2010.
59. In 2022, a number of exercises took place in preparation for the Commonwealth Games which tested a number of aspects in the response to a MTA, including the command, control and communications aspect of the response. These exercises involved physical deployments, commanded from our C3 Facility.
60. WMP also continues to test the initial activation phase of the response to a MTA by leading on a series of live control room exercises between the three blue light services and British Transport Police. These look to test the accurate sharing of information between the three services, the relay of information to assets attending the scene, the use of airwave interoperability talk groups, the ability of commanders to co-locate at a Forward Command Post and the use of Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP) principles across all three control rooms and by on-scene commanders.
61. March 2022 saw a live exercise at Birmingham New Street railway station which tested the response to a MTA on the platforms of the station. This exercise tested

the interoperability of British Transport Police with WMP as well as the execution of the overall response by all emergency services.

***The police response to the Manchester Inquiry volume two, particularly interoperability and preparedness with other blue light services.***

62. Immediately following the release of volume two of the Manchester Arena Inquiry report, WMP’s Operations Resilience Unit conducted a self-assessment against the report’s recommendations.
63. Of the 149 recommendations, WMP has divided them into five categories. Those which:

Require no action by WMP - owned by other agency	86
Are suspended, pending action by government agency or professional body, following which a product will require roll-out by WMP	30
Have sufficient measures already in place	10
Have measures partially in place but further work is required to fulfil the needs of the recommendation	16
Have no measures in place that address the recommendation and remedial work is required	7

64. The remedial action around these recommendations will be monitored by the force’s Strategy, Delivery and Assurance department which will report to the MIRB, chaired by the Operations Chief Superintendent.
65. The MIRB reports into the FRTB, chaired by the Assistant Chief Constable of Operations.
66. Fast track mitigation has already been implemented by the MIRB with oversight by FRTB.

**Public Order**

***The capacity and capability of West Midlands Police to meet and sustain the commitment in the National Policing Requirement for public order policing.***

***The recovery of public order training post COVID19 and the current status within WMP of suitably trained officers***

67. WMP provides just under 55% of the regional contribution towards the National Policing Requirement for public order policing. This amounts to the following:
- A required capability of just under 18 Police Support Units (PSU’s) which consist of one Insp, three Sgts and 21 PC’s
  - In officer numbers our required contributions equate to 54 PSU Commanders (Inspectors), 159 Sgts and 371 PC’s
  - In order to ensure we can deploy this capability we have a recommended training target of three times this number and therefore in totality seek to have 1326 officers trained to the required ‘Level 2’ standard

68. This training requirement is subject to monthly reviews through the FRTB, chaired by the Assistant Chief Constable of Operations. WMP are currently at 82% of the recommended target trained.
69. A full training schedule for 'Level 2' Public Order is provided through the Midlands Regional Tactical Training Centre (MRTTC) and the training calendar is currently operating to maximise the capacity across all areas of tactical training including Taser and CBRN. There are no longer any restrictions in place on course or trainer availability or capped numbers of students on each course. Over the past 12 months the total number of officers trained in public order has fluctuated between 80-90% of the target number and therefore we would assess no legacy impact from the COVID19 pandemic and a full recovery has been made in terms of training delivery.
70. As a Force we continue to develop and increase specialist capability within public order including an increase in officers trained as Police Liaison Teams, Evidence Gatherers, Public Order Medics and this year have also developed our own Protest Removal Capability. This will support both the regional and national capability within this area of public order policing as we see ever increasing demand from protest groups such as Just Stop Oil and Animal Rebellion.
71. Command capability and resilience continue to be maintained with 24/7 rotas in place for all Public Order Public Safety command roles and overall numbers continue to be reviewed through the Cadre Review board and any shortfalls anticipated in advance and addressed through the delivery of command courses at the MRTTC.
72. Demand for public order, public safety remains high and the past 12 months saw large scale deployments both internally for the Commonwealth games and Conservative party conference in Birmingham, in addition to a busy football schedule but also supporting national and regional asks such as sustained periods of protest from Just Stop Oil and Operational London Bridge in both Windsor and London. In 2023 we continue to assess that Football and the events industry will place continuing and at times significant demands on public order policing including the ongoing risk of strategic protest. Groups such as Just Stop Oil, Extinction Rebellion and Animal Rebellion are likely to continue their campaigns which are likely to feature targeted disruption both on a national basis but also locations within the West Midlands region. It is also anticipated that we will be asked to support with mutual aid requests for events including King Charles III Coronation in May 2023 but this is still to be confirmed.

## **Civil Emergencies**

### ***A summary of the learning from the past year from civil emergencies in the Force area and how this is being implemented, any gaps or challenges***

73. Over the last 12 months, the West Midlands area has been fortunate enough not to experience any civil emergencies within the scope of the National Security and Risk Assessment and the term's legal definition:
  - "An event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare or the environment of a place in the UK, or war or terrorism which threatens serious damage to the security of the UK."
74. There has been organisational learning identified from both critical and major incidents, which has been captured through a structured debrief process. WMP

has invested in a lead for Organisational learning within the Strategy, Direction and Assurance department. This person will collate all organisational learning and ensure there is a methodology for tracking and progressing identified recommendations/learning objectives, for delivery through the appropriate forum. This will then be reported into the Organisational Learning Board, chaired by the Deputy Chief Constable.

## **National Cyber Security Incidents**

### ***Information on the planning expectations within the force to respond to a major cyber incident.***

75. WMP has a bespoke Cyber response plan, Force Cyber Business Continuity Plan and Disaster Recovery planning within Information Technology and Digital (IT&D). These arrangements collectively allow WMP to acknowledge the unique impacts that a cyber incident would pose to both force resilience and the public. Large scale high impact cyber incidents require a unique command structure and differs to those implemented for traditional civil emergency command incidents. Awareness of roles and how to respond to the initial cyber incident are outlined within the planning arrangements so that commanders can draw upon the expertise quickly during the initial stages. Cyber resilience planning takes into consideration the potential for an internal (Business Continuity disruption) and external (Civil Emergency) command structure which could be established and coexisting at the same time and therefore are mutually recognised.
76. Cyber dependent crimes are managed through a Local to National 'tiered' system, and relate to crimes where the offending relies upon the use of the cyber space to commit offending, this includes attacks on organisations' cyber security systems, and often leads to the damage or loss of data as a result of the offender's actions. All cyber dependent crimes are reported via the National Action Fraud line and assessed, being placed into a category system and allocated accordingly. The WMP Cyber Team are allocated and manage the lower risk and lower complexity investigations (Category 5&6), with the ROCU's Regional Cyber Crime Unit (RCCU) taking responsibility for the investigation and response into all WMP based category 3&4 cases on behalf of the Force. The highest risk and complexity cases, and those that have a national impact are allocated to and managed by the National Crime Agency. The RCCU also contain a Dark Web team proactively scanning the dark web for WMP related threats and supporting both WMP and ROCU investigators.
77. Through the summer of 2022 the RCCU and WMP Cyber Crime team worked in conjunction with the Commonwealth Games team to ensure any cyber related threats were monitored and managed accordingly in partnership with the NCA and Home Office. Both WMP's Cyber team and the RCCU work together to ensure there are established response plans in place to effectively coordinate the force's response to a cyber-attack in collaboration with the NCA, and local stakeholders.
78. There is a national and co-ordinated system for the response to all Cyber incidents contained within the National Categorisation System. The National Categorisation System determines which organisation(s) will respond dependent upon the size and scale of the cyberattack.

## Cyber Attack National Categorisation System

79. The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) provides a single, central body for cyber security at a national level and is the UK's technical authority on cyber. It manages national cyber security incidents, carries out real-time threat analysis and provides tailored sectoral advice. GCHQ is the parent body for the centre, meaning that it can draw on the organisation's world-class skills and sensitive capabilities.
80. The incident category definitions give increased clarity on response mechanisms for incidents by identifying what factors would happen to activate a specific classification, which organisation responds and what actions they would take, table below:

	Category definition	Who responds?	What do they do?
<b>Category 1</b> <b>National cyber emergency</b>	A cyber attack which causes sustained disruption of UK essential services or affects UK national security, leading to severe economic or social consequences or to loss of life.	Immediate, rapid and coordinated cross-government response. Strategic leadership from Ministers / Cabinet Office (COBR), tactical cross-government coordination by NCSC, working closely with Law Enforcement	Coordinated on-site presence for evidence gathering, forensic acquisition and support. Collocation of NCSC, Law Enforcement, Lead Government Departments and others where possible for enhanced response.
<b>Category 2</b> <b>Highly significant incident</b>	A cyber attack which has a serious impact on central government, UK essential services, a large proportion of the UK population, or the UK economy.	Response typically led by NCSC (escalated to COBR if necessary), working closely with Law Enforcement (typically NCA) as required. Cross-government response coordinated by NCSC.	NCSC will often provide on-site response, investigation and analysis, aligned with Law Enforcement criminal investigation activities.
<b>Category 3</b> <b>Significant incident</b>	A cyber attack which has a serious impact on a large organisation or on wider / local government, or which poses a considerable risk to central government or UK essential services.	Response typically led by NCSC, working with Law Enforcement (typically NCA) as required.	NCSC will provide remote support and analysis, standard guidance; on-site NCSC or NCA support may be provided.
<b>Category 4</b> <b>Substantial incident</b>	A cyber attack which has a serious impact on a medium-sized organisation, or which poses a considerable risk to a large organisation or wider / local government.	Response led either by NCSC or by Law Enforcement (NCA or ROCU), dependent on the incident.	NCSC or Law Enforcement will provide remote support and standard guidance, or on-site support by exception.
<b>Category 5</b> <b>Moderate incident</b>	A cyber attack on a small organisation, or which poses a considerable risk to a medium-sized organisation, or preliminary indications of cyber activity against a large organisation or the government.	Response led by Law Enforcement (likely ROCU or local Police Force), with NCA input as required.	Law Enforcement will provide remote support and standard guidance, with on-site response by exception.
<b>Category 6</b> <b>Localised incident</b>	A cyber attack on an individual, or preliminary indications of cyber activity against a small or medium-sized organisation.	Automated Protect advice or local response led by Law Enforcement (likely local Police Force).	Remote support and provision of standard advice. On-site response by exception.

*National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC): Cyber Attack National Categorisation System (2018)*

## Violence Against Women and Girls

81. The WMP Violence, Abuse and Intimidation Against Women and Girls (VAIWG) strategy is set in the context of the recommendations made by HMICFRS and compliments the NPCC national framework for delivery. Neither strategy attempts to encompass the whole VAWG landscape, rather they focus on those areas that have had limited attention to date, or that require improved coordination. For example, while domestic abuse is not explicitly called out as a strand in its own right in the WMP VAIWG strategy, many aspects of the strategy enhance the WMP

response to domestic abuse, especially within the criminal justice and offender & suspect management strands.

82. The WMP VAIWG strategy is informed by the following key principles;
- Violence, abuse, and intimidation against women and girls in any form is unacceptable and will not be tolerated. This includes against WMP officers and staff
  - Every public space and education establishment should be a safe place for all women and girls
  - Women and girls should feel confident to report their experiences of harm to the police directly or indirectly, safe in the knowledge that they will be taken seriously and that they will be treated with dignity and respect. This includes when women and girls present to police as offenders
  - The lived experiences of women and girls will be heard and their opinions respected
  - WMP expect the highest standards of professional behaviour from all officers and staff. WMP recognise that a small number of officers and staff abuse their position of power for sexual or emotional gain. When this occurs, WMP will ensure those responsible are held to account and that the results of both criminal and disciplinary processes are publicised whenever possible. WMP recognises this as a driver of its continued legitimacy against a media landscape of police perpetrated violence and abuse

***The involvement and engagement of men and boys in tackling VAIWG is vital***

83. The ambition articulated by the WMP VAIWG strategy is to make the West Midlands a place where women and girls can live, work, study, socialise, and travel safely and confidently, free from fear, violence, abuse, intimidation, and harassment. The WMP approach to achieving this ambition is;
- Ensure tackling VAIWG is everyone's business
  - Be perpetrator and prevention focused
  - Make the best use of data to inform understanding of the issues, shape responses, and evaluate activities and progress
  - Employ a precision in policing approach where appropriate
  - Be clear on tone and language, avoiding victim blaming, and setting clear standards and expectations
  - Ensure that WMP listen to the lived experiences of women and girls
  - Involve men and boys in the solution

***Understand that offending takes place online as well as in the real world***

84. The voices, and lived experiences, of women and girls must be what drives improvement in service delivery and WMP recognises that intersectional location significantly affects a victim's journey and access to justice. As such, the WMP response to VAIWG adopts an intersectional and trauma informed approach throughout, acknowledging that VAIWG itself can be scaffolded by institutionalised harm and imbalances of power between victims and societal structures, including the police.

85. WMP has a comprehensive understanding of perpetrator behaviour, which allows for targeted interventions and effective safeguarding to disrupt offending and prevent harm. Furthermore, the WMP approach to VAIWG recognises that as well as listening to women and girls, involving men and boys in behavioural and societal change must be part of the solution.
86. The WMP VAIWG strategy is comprised of six priority strands, each with an action plan for delivery, driven by a senior police leader;
  - Safety in Public
  - Criminal Justice
  - Offender and Suspect Management
  - Our Behaviours
  - Be Intelligence and Data Informed

### ***Engagement, Insight and Communication***

87. A seventh priority strand, 'Recording of Crimes and Incidents' was originally included in the WMP VAIWG strategy and was referred to in the paper submitted to the SPCB in March 2023. At the time, police forces were awaiting national guidance following the 2021 decision by the Law Commission to reject proposals to make misogyny a hate crime. Rather than making misogyny a hate crime, the Law Commission recommended that HM Government introduce a specific offence of public sexual harassment. However, it was the view of HM Government that behaviour amounting to public sexual harassment was already covered by existing criminal offences and a private members' Hate Crime (Misogyny) Bill, which would have required police forces to record hate crimes and incidents motivated by misogyny, did not progress past a second reading in the House of Commons. As such, the WMP VAIWG strategy incorporated the 'Recording of Crimes and Incidents' strand into the Criminal Justice strand and progress will be reported through that strand until national conditions dictate otherwise.
88. The governance of the WMP VAIWG strategy is through the VAIWG board, chaired by the force strategic lead within the force executive team. Each strand of the strategy is led by a senior police leader. Each strand lead is responsible for translating their strand of the WMP VAIWG strategy into a deliverable action plan. Actions within these plans are owned by named individuals at an operational level, who are accountable to their strand lead.
89. Overall delivery against the WMP VAIWG action plan is managed by the WMP tactical lead for VAIWG, who is also a senior police leader. The WMP tactical lead also manages interdependencies with other elements of the force governance structure, such as the Operation Soteria strategic board, the Vulnerability Improvement board, and the Fairness and Belonging board. In this way the WMP approach is to embed responsibility for delivery at every level of the organisation and put tackling VAIWG at the forefront of what it does. The WMP VAIWG strategic lead is also the regional VAIWG lead and chairs a forum for WMP, Warwickshire Police, West Mercia Police, and Staffordshire Police VAIWG leads. WMP is represented at the national level by the strategic and tactical leads.
90. WMP is a committed partner to the Office of the Police & Crime Commissioner's Ending Male Violence against Women and Girls (EMVAWG) Alliance, which is chaired by the Victim's Commissioner. The EMVAWG Alliance, partners with senior strategic partners across the region, to achieve broader progress for ending male violence against women and girls. While WMP and the EMVAWG Alliance



operate with a slightly different definition of violence against women and girls, this is not a barrier to effective collaboration at the strategic, tactical, or operational level. WMP recognise that the perpetrators of violence, abuse, and intimidation against women and girls are disproportionately men, and that policy setting and commissioning of services should be evidence based.

### **Child Sexual Abuse**

91. WMP have embedded officers within partnership exploitation hubs across the force area to ensure there is a multi-agency approach to reducing risk and threat to victims, effectively managing locations where offending may take place, and in disrupting and prosecuting offenders. This capability has been increased and enhanced with the investment of Serious Organised Crime and Exploitation (SOCEX) officers within intelligence, local policing areas (LPAs), and the Public Protection Unit (PPU), specifically to identify and deal with organised exploitation of children, including Child Sexual Exploitation (CSE).
92. Each LPA is aligned to a local authority equivalent and ensures that there is a senior officer at the rank of Chief Superintendent who represents WMP at the various safeguarding children partnerships under the statutory Multi-Agency Safeguarding Arrangements (MASA). They are supported by a senior leader from PPU Child Abuse, to ensure there is a robust contribution to the child safeguarding partnership.
93. A Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub (MASH) function in each local authority area and WMP have staff embedded in each of these to ensure that new safeguarding referrals are recorded, researched and allocated swiftly and with multi-agency input. Strategy discussions are attended by a WMP representative from the appropriate department to contribute towards child safety planning.
94. WMP has a dedicated Online Child Sexual Exploitation Team (OCSET) which investigates child abuse imagery offences and associated offenders who pose a risk to children. This team works closely with the WMP Digital Forensics Unit to convert intelligence into evidence to support prosecutions. Referral demand has increased year on year, which results in more enforcement activity and identification of offending.
95. The Sex Offender Manager (SOM) function has been re-aligned to PPU in April 2023 which will result in closer working between the investigation and offender management functions. There are opportunities to ensure that investigators consider a wider range of diversion and intervention tactics when implementing out of court disposals, such as conditional cautions, which can be more effectively managed by SOMs officers.
96. Under the victims code WMP must ensure that all victims of child sexual abuse are appropriately supported. WMP utilise NCA approved intermediaries to assess victims' needs to maximise evidential disclosures, as well as specialist Child Sexual Violence Advocates (CHISVA) to ensure support from a variety of agencies across the region to assist victims through the criminal justice journey.

### ***Capabilities***

97. The PPU has a dedicated Superintendent for Child Abuse investigations and safeguarding. The Central, Eastern and Western areas each have a dedicated Child Abuse Detective Chief Inspector lead who manages the Child Abuse Investigation and MASH functions for their respective geographies. All child abuse

investigators are required to be on the path to becoming a detective and then receiving Specialist Child Abuse Investigators Development Portfolio (SCAIDP) training in line with national guidance. Each geography also has a Complex Child Abuse Investigation Team with skilled and experienced officers who investigate the most serious or complex crimes.

98. The SOCEX team gather and evaluate intelligence relating to high harm offenders, high risk victims, linking offending patterns and allocate investigations and enforcement opportunities to the appropriate teams. The PPU Child Abuse Investigation Teams also benefit from the support of the Priorities Team (now embedded within the LPAs) and the Major Crime Team.
99. AWARE training is delivered to all front line officers and provides a model to capture the voice of the child and any safeguarding concerns when attending an incident with children who are present and at risk. This may lead to a referral to the MASH and/or an investigation being allocated to the Child Abuse department. All referrals undergo multi-agency research and strategy discussion if the threshold is met under the Children Act 1989. All safeguarding concerns, including those connected children such as siblings, are considered and where intervention is required by more than one agency a Joint Investigation may be commenced within the guidelines of 'Working Together to Safeguard Children' (2018). The MASH ensures that Child Social Services and Health, alongside WMP, are key to multi-agency decision making and responses.
100. The OCSET team use the Kent Internet Risk Assessment Tool (KIRAT), with additional criteria added, and have recently trained an increased number of officers in the use of the Child Abuse Image Database (CAID), as well as the Review Tool for presenting images evidentially in court.
101. SOMs officers use technology to triage devices of Registered Sex Offenders during managed visits in order to detect offences relating to child abuse or breaches of Sexual Harm Prevention Orders (SHPOs). SOMs officers have the capability to then deal with offences and prosecute identified offenders.

### ***Capacity Requirements***

102. PBB uplift is due to increase the Child Abuse 'Constable' establishment by 36 officers in 2023/24 in order to manage the predicted increases in demand. Nationally there are challenges in recruiting sufficient numbers of detectives, which is a training requirement for child abuse investigators, however, WMP have a robust plan to increase numbers this year through the detective academy.

### ***Consistency and Standards***

103. WMP follow the Authorised Professional Practice (APP) on child sexual abuse and CSE from the College of Policing (CoP), including the approved definitions. This has directly influenced the draft WMP Child Abuse policy.
104. The ROCU Tackling Organised Exploitation (TOEX) team have supported WMP CSE investigations across the region and assisted in providing intelligence products which pull together patterns of offending, vulnerable victims and identify potential organised crime networks to disrupt.

### ***Collaboration & Connectivity with Partners***

105. WMP are active in the Multi-Agency Safeguarding Arrangements (MASA) at both strategic and operational levels. Each of the 7 MASAs have identified priorities, which will typically include sexual exploitation, along with several sub groups to drive activity in regards to multi-agency learning, statutory learning reviews such as Child Safeguarding Practice Reviews (CSPRs), multi-agency audit of operational activity and tackling child exploitation. WMP are represented on all of these sub groups and contribute to setting safeguarding priorities and providing assurance that our systems and processes are protecting children from harm. WMP has a dedicated Review Team which supports statutory safeguarding reviews, conducting single agency assessments following serious harm to a child, and ensures that learning is embedded following such reviews.
106. PPU have a dedicated lead for pre-charge review of Rape and Serious Sexual Offences (RASSO), including offences against children, to ensure that files meet the evidential standard before submission to CPS. PPU also have a senior leader nominated to engage with the CPS at a monthly meeting to discuss strategic issues along with file quality. Senior Investigating Officers (SIOs) utilise the Early Investigative Advice (EIA) process with CPS, especially for complex or serious cases.

### **Cross-Cutting Capabilities**

107. Whilst the SPR treats the national threats separately, many of the threats, and the capability to respond, will overlap. The capabilities listed should not be considered in isolation or as the only capabilities required to respond to the national threats. There are some specialist capabilities that are not exclusively deployed in response to a single threat.
108. WMP have considered these capabilities as part of a continual thread throughout this report, consisting of the following elements:
  - Armed Policing
  - Digital Forensics
  - Roads Policing
  - JESIP
109. **The board is asked to take note of the contents of this report**

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