

Corporate Risks

ID	Prev. ID	Risk Name	Description	Impact	Key Controls and Activities	Q1 Trending	Q4 Trending	Q3 Trending	Q4 Trending	Q1 Trending	Residual Risk Rating
7	CRR03	Operational Training and Embedded Learning	<p>Op Plato Embedding Joint Operating Principles (JOPS) 2 were introduced to WMP in December 2020. Operational officers within WMP must adopt changes within JOPS 2 and be trained in Plato response expectations. To complete the roll out there are a lot of other competing demands and the prioritisation of training competes locally.</p> <p>Failure to deliver the national Plato training and operational responder expectations with competing demand and rate of staff changes</p> <p>Due to a lack of local ownership there is a risk that annual refreshers will not be scheduled for CPD days within departments.</p>	<p>WMP and its Operational Staff failing to act in accordance with the national doctrine.</p> <p>National doctrine has changed quicker than the ability and competency of officers in adopting these changes.</p> <p>The utilisation of overtime for ORU delivering training will not be efficiently utilised with a lack of local ownership afterwards.</p>	<p>May 2023: Risk discussed at Operations Portfolio Board on 10/05/2023. Follow up action for meeting between the department, Risk Team and Performance Partners for discussion on 26th May 2023. Better organisational position from JOPS 2, local train the trainers capability needs more uplift in line with ORU staffing and LPA staffing. JOPS 3, training programme and MAI actions will pose a greater PLATO training challenge between July - October where the process will be initiated again from National Armed Policing.</p> <p>The ORU has been allocated 2 additional sergeants and 6 PCs. These roles have been offered to successful candidates. I am working through vetting and start dates with onboarding. Once in post this will be down graded to departmental, once sufficiently trained it can be closed off completely. Once I have the sergeants I will be able to get them trained up in Plato and to deliver to the new local force model.</p> <p>Separated into two risks due to risk profiles changing and to better reflect</p> <p>The risk scores can be downgraded from high to amber due to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Train the trainer being implemented •NSR monitoring the NCALT uptake •Classroom inputs being done within this space •Regional reviews suggest training is delivered differently (managed via Major Incident Readiness Board (MIRB)). •Organisational Development & Learning supporting the packages and train the trainer quality (being implemented), NCALT and classroom training 	↔	↓	↔	↔	↔	Medium
30	CRR08	Investigative and Criminal Justice Process and Outcome	<p>- There is a risk that the case backlog that exists due to COVID may result in victims and witnesses losing faith in the Criminal Justice system. The backlog also puts at risk the cost recovery from Police Led Prosecutions. There is also the risk of an additional strain on CJS resources, particularly in Witness Care, due to the new court listings process.</p> <p>- Updates to the Attorney General's Guidelines on Disclosure which sits alongside the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act ("CPIA") 1996, has an impact on the working practices of investigations officers and staff, with a short turnaround time for adhering to the guidance.</p>	<p>- The impact is that justice is not served for victims and witnesses and WMP's reputation is at risk as a reduced number of cases are being heard by the Courts (including murder trials). The reduction of Courts will also result in a significant loss of income recovery from PLP. There may also be additional welfare issue for Witness Care staff due to the supplementary work required.</p> <p>- The new guidance has implications for how the police engages with other parts of the CJS, in terms of timeliness, mandatory disclosures and digital evidence. In particular, it increases the expectations on the recording of materials in the course of an investigation - extending requirements to unused material and provision of schedules for all Pre-Charge cases. The combined effect of these changes could result in an increase in the number of bail cases and CPS rejections, creating further demands on the force.</p>	<p>FEBRUARY 2023: There is little more we can do at present, and the backlogs have continued to reduce. It is something that we are able to track through CGB using the new CJ dashboards, albeit they tend to be a lagging indicator (they are often a few months behind).</p> <p>JANUARY 2023: As of the 9/01/2023 the backlog in the Crown Court stood at 1260 cases. Of that number: 70 Class 1 (Murder / Manslaughter). 203 Committal for sentence 88 Appeals</p> <p>Pre-Covid the backlog was around 600. The backlog has stabilised now and is slowly improving, so 1260 is a better figure than it has been.</p> <p>The Magistrates Court is in a better position. Under normal operating conditions the aim is for 80% of trials to be listed within 8 weeks and 100% within 12. This is being achieved in all West Mids. Magistrates court with the exception of Coventry. Coventry are currently listing into June (rather than end of March beginning of April). Extra courts are being put on to assist with bringing this timeframe down.</p> <p>All other cases listings i.e.: GAP /NGAP etc are being listed on target.</p>	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	High
53	CRR09	Recruitment & Retention / Uplift	<p>There is a risk of being unable to recruit staff across the Force in a timely manner and aligned with the strategic workforce planning requirements.</p> <p>The uplift targets and their associated entry routes (e.g. PEOF) create significant additional demand on WMP. The failure to meet recruitment targets will impact on the forces resilience and may potentially affect future funding from the Home Office.</p> <p>There is a risk that a number of student officers have been identified as potentially being at risk of dismissal due to repeated failures of university modules.</p>	<p>- WMP will not be able to recruit and retain sufficiently skilled people to deliver our service. Risk to service provision and accreditation status in some cases (e.g. Forensics). Longer-term employee relations impact. Potential loss of confidence from WMP colleagues who were anticipating additional resources to join them.</p> <p>- Due to the sheer volume of demand and complexity of entry criteria, WMP is not able to push through the uplift recruitment pipeline quickly enough resulting in missed targets or not meeting resourcing assumptions. Reputational (and potential financial) impact on WMP from the Home Office.</p> <p>- The impact is this may be significant for WMP and the government's confidence in us.</p> <p>-The impact of a student officer repeatedly failing their modules, will lead to the student being dismissed from their university course, WMP currently has no other training programme available to see them through their probationary period.</p>	<p>Force remains on track to achieve Uplift targets with intakes scheduled through Q3 and Q4 to deliver the required number of new students. Applicant pipeline is tight due to competitive external labour market however there is a high confidence that all intakes will be full.</p> <p>Retirements and resignations for Police Officers continues to be monitored to ensure these do not exceed forecast.</p> <p>Number of student officer dismissals due to academic failure currently is extremely low but is continuing to be monitored.</p> <p>Police Staff vacancy levels are rising with some difficulty in recruiting into specialist areas, this is linked to the current position of the labour market as mentioned above and higher external salaries. Market Supplement process is in place to support the business where required</p>	↔	↓	↓	↔	↔	High
46	CRR13	Cybersecurity	<p>Failure of the Force's IT&D systems (due to cyber-attack, hardware failure, loss of IT systems via IT services provider or other data security breaches) will lead to severe disruption to service delivery and response.</p>	<p>Loss of access to IT systems due to a failure in our cyber security for an extended period of time could adversely impact WMP's ability to continue service delivery and business operations.</p> <p>This could also lead to potential data breaches, an inability to access key systems and reputational damage.</p>	<p>This risk has been approved for de escalation by the governance board and tactical board, however we have requested some assurances around this, and providing these are received into the Risk Team the risk will be de escalated.</p> <p>This risk remains the same. WMP IT&Digital department continue to work closely with the National Management Centre to monitor and mitigate where needed against any potential threat</p> <p>Monitoring and mitigation are on-going, we can always re-escalate if something changes. De-escalation approved at Commercial Board 07/03/2023 will be taken to Tactical Board for ratification</p>	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	High

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51	CRR06	Corporate Health, Safety and Wellbeing	- There may be an increase in employee related mental health and wellbeing issues which impacts WMP's ability to deliver and recover operational services during the d post pandemic environment.	- Failure to look after the wellbeing of our staff could have a significant impact on employee confidence, poorer engagement, and increased sickness levels.	<p>MAY 2023</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The H&S Committee format was reviewed last year and attendance, including structure of quarterly committees, has improved traction around key issues we face as a Force. - H&S performance is closely monitored and we have improved the reporting of information. - Presentations have been delivered to the Performance Panel to highlight the importance of compliance in managing physical safety across the Force have been well received by FET and departmental Heads/Commanders. - Improvements have been made to the sharing of H&S data and is now set up on Microsoft Teams in a live environment. - There is more work to do to highlight the importance of safety across WMP as it has very much been in the background prior to the AD who joined the force 20 months ago. We have worked hard to spotlight the importance of this high risk area in the force. We need to focus on digitalising forms for walkthroughs and work closely with CAM around effective management of issues that arise locally and centrally. - We are working with L&D to ensure that the H&S training data is correct and regularly compliant for key roles such as First Aiders, Fire Marshalls, DSE assessors, Fire Evac Chair operators therefore Risk needs to remain Significant mitigation in place around wellbeing, mental health, trauma management and other interventions, additionally there is improvement activity starting in the Occ Health team to understand current state and design the future model. Strong focus on H&S across the force with dept performance now being discussed at senior level forums. With the current activity around the new operating model and uncertainty around impacts there may be more people requiring wellbeing support <p>Heads of Departments take the lead for their own departments well-being by introducing People and Well-being boards, which feed directly into the Well-being Manager to help manage bespoke and localised well-being initiatives. There are also working groups created which sit with the leads from the department, such as investigator well-being groups, which are represented both internally and externally from Heads of Departments.</p> <p>There are 24/7 counselling through our Employee Accessibility Programme, along with a Cognitive Behavioural Therapy service, mindfulness courses, and resilience packages through the national well-being service, that focus on sleep, breathing exercises and creating psychological safety. We also</p>	↔	↔	↓	↓	↓	Medium
52	CRR01	Vulnerability and Hidden Crimes	There is a risk that the increased identification of vulnerability in demand, and hidden crimes (includes child exploitation, modern day slavery, human trafficking, domestic abuse, missing people) poses a challenge to the Force to manage its complexity. The risk could also impact the response levels provided impacting the delivery of an effective service to those in need.	Increases in volumes or poor identification impacts on the force's capacity to prevent and respond, creating public confidence and safety concerns, and meet our overall requirement to prevent the unnecessary criminalisation of children and improve the overall quality of investigations involving vulnerable people.	<p>Risk remains the same :The force has a Vulnerability strategy that covers all strands of vulnerability. Each strand is led by a senior leader reporting into the Vulnerability Improvement Board which is chaired by the Crime ACC who monitors activity across all strands.</p> <p>All Force Contact staff now receive mandatory vulnerability training upon induction into the department. The Domestic Abuse Support Desk in the control room is being utilised to assist with Domestic Abuse related calls.</p> <p>Control Works builds in greater requirements for assessment and recording of rationale at initial contact. The Service Improvement Team in Force Contact have a revised service offer that now includes dip sampling to ascertain compliance levels across THRIVE. This evaluates that contact handling staff are performing all of the necessary checks (connect, compact etc) and then this additional information is utilised to regrade/assess the THRIVE assessment. The dip sample from 1st Feb to 12th Feb 2023 found that 98% of the cases were compliant (872 incidents 17 incidents missed the THRIVE assessment).</p>	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	High
50	CRR07	Workforce Representation	Failure to attract, recruit and retain a diverse and representative workforce across the Force and support their progression within the organisation to deliver our services to our diverse communities.	- A less representative Force may affect the level of trust and confidence in some communities. - The impact may be that the legitimacy and trust in WMP is diminished. The impact of not meeting both the PCC's and WMP's target of recruiting more female and BAME officers and staff may lead to reputational damage.	<p>Ethnic Minority representation has decreased to c15% per intake, this is due to finalising uplift and the need to offer all candidates in the process a vacancy. Female representation has also decreased to c35% again for the same reason. Outreach has recently reengaged with the ambassadors in the hope to increase internal representation and referrals into force. Targeted community events will be a priority for 2023-2024 to help increase both representation.</p>	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	Medium
47	CRR10	Financial Management	<p>i. There is a risk that WMP's finances are not sustainable over the medium term and/or efficiency savings required may adversely impact the operational services. Whilst the police grant has increased for 22/23 to fund increase in officer numbers, there are still unfunded inflationary pressures.</p> <p>ii - There is also a risk that as mandated/national initiatives develop (e.g. ESMCP, National Enabling Programme), the actual costs for delivery far exceed the estimated costs within the affordability envelope.</p>	<p>i - Impact on overall funding position. Medium term financial plan (MTFP) sets out strict budgeting envelope that must be met.</p> <p>ii - The inability to finance all component projects, or needing to de-prioritise other projects within the portfolio if the national changes are mandated.</p>	<p>Risk still remains: Provisional settlement from Home Office was received on 14th December. The settlement is in line with what was expected within the MTFP, the MTFP has been updated and following some minor changes the gap for 2023/24 remains at £28.8m. We have made some initial decisions to freeze non operational police staff recruitment for the rest of 2022/23 and departments have been asked to review and limit use of overtime and non-pay spend. We currently have an underspend in 2022/23 of £5.6m to be used to mitigate the £28.8m, along with a decision to borrow £7m to fund part of the capital programme in 2023/24. A PBB style budget setting process is underway with all departments, looking for options of strength, 8% and 12% funding drop. Panel's will commence in mid-January. This then may be an opportune time to review the risk score</p>	↔	↔	↔	↑	↑	High
45	CRR/25	Lack of Briefing Functionality in CONNECT	<p>Implementation of CONNECT and lack of functionality for officer briefings</p> <p>Briefing system within CONNECT since go live does not meet the business requirement and is unworkable with over 150+ individual entries - this cannot be objectively viewed in timescale for a briefing for staff</p> <p>The number of interventions and Civil Orders recorded on Connect (Person Card) continue to increase. Progress is being made to store orders but we are not able to brief officers of persons with orders living on the local area and therefore enforcement is not where it should be..</p> <p>Tasking from LTDB is reliant upon local briefings rather than corporate system.</p> <p>There is a risk that via CONNECT we are unable to effectively brief our officers for their tours of duty, therefore, we are unable to supply them with the required knowledge and updates.</p>	<p>Ineffective and inefficient tasking of officers for tours of duty due to lack of briefing.</p> <p>Lack of knowledge of persons with orders/interventions therefore lack of enforcement of them.</p> <p>Officers are not equipped with latest knowledge, updates, priorities prior to beginning ToD.</p> <p>Tasking from LTDB will be uninformed/potentially incorrect due to reliance upon local briefings.</p>	<p>SEEKING APPROVAL AT NEXT BOARD FOR DEESCALATION</p> <p>Briefings via CONNECT to be improved through configuration and light training. CONNECT is only to be used for audit and storage of items (i.e. DV arrest and suspect ID). Officers and staff will be able to search for items but it is not fit for purpose as a briefing module.</p> <p>All critical daily briefings will be delivered through a new Briefing App designed and produced by Force Intelligence and IT&D. It was piloted in Coventry NPU and received positive feedback from users. Force-wide roll out of the app commenced on the 1st of March and is available across all desktops and mobility devices. The app has been developed at pace and is a first version of the product, updates are planned to enhance its capabilities which will incorporate feedback received from the force-wide rollout.</p> <p>In light of the launch of the new app, this risk will be recommended for de-escalation to departmental governance in the April Security Portfolio Board. This risk will be further monitored at departmental level to ensure the app mitigates the risk, however, it can be re-escalated to corporate governance if deemed appropriate at any point.</p>	↔	New Risk	↔	↔	↔	High
1	CRR/26	ORU Resilience	<p>Due to the proportion of vacancies within the department and industry standard wage for resilience officer or resilience manager police staff roles not being matched.</p> <p>There is a risk of severe limitations to:</p> <p>WMP's ability to meet statutory obligations under the Strategic Police and Crime Plan, CONTEST, Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and National Guidance.</p> <p>Manchester Arena Inquiry recommendations are key delivery and current capacity does not allow for these to be actioned in a timely way.</p> <p>A lack of robust planning updates and proactive approach to learning lessons from testing & exercising.</p> <p>Some ORU functions have single staffing therefore creating a single point of failure and no resilience e.g. Testing & Exercising Manager; CBRN officer.</p> <p>Transient workforce resulting in a lack of experience, mature knowledge of portfolios and understanding of the wider WMP response to incidents.</p>	<p>Leading to:</p> <p>Reputational damage and litigation as Manchester Arena Inquiry's demonstrated into GMPs preparations ahead of the Arena Inquiry</p> <p>Responding to and preparation for Major Incidents and Civil Emergencies will be impacted which has significant consequences for public confidence.</p> <p>The inability to perform critical core functions within ORU and delivery of critical business.</p>	<p>ORU up to strength - seeking training. £29K in place. Risk down from Critical to High</p> <p>Risk to be reviewed final quarter of 2023, pending any further updates / developments to the risk.</p> <p>Utilisation of restricted officers to keep demand at sufficient level, however, lack of specialist knowledge.</p> <p>The ORU has been allocated 2 additional sergeants and 6 PCs. These roles have been offered to successful candidates. Working through vetting and start dates with onboarding.</p> <p>Once in post this will be down graded, once sufficiently trained it can be taken off.</p>	↔	New Risk	↔	↔	↓	High

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48	CRR/27	Overtime App	<p>The Overtime App is not an end to end process and still requires manual checking and data input to the payroll system. Correctly coded OT entered by officers within the App should have been coded to other cost codes, yet has defaulted to home budgets/cost codes or the manual input is not being entered with the cost code correctly.</p> <p>Pay files are taking too long to come back to Accountancy to check, which causes a number of issues. Files sent back to payroll to be re-input to produce the pay file seems to be having an impact on when we receive the whole payroll file for checking causing basic pay to be incorrect at times and requires additional work in Accountancy to correct this.</p> <p>There is a risk that OT is not being allocated to the correct cost code (either through user error, manual input error or automatic default by App to home cost code). Officers can submit OT claims and be paid for the same OT multiple times.</p>	<p>Reduced confidence in the information held in the finance system. This then impacts the accuracy of management information that we report to Heads of Dept. Overtime spend is putting pressure on overall force finances and is a very important area of expenditure for the force to control.</p>	<p>We are managing P3 with IT&D at the moment so I have asked for the drop down pre-loaded with the cost code in there which should reduce errors.</p> <p>Developer time is being prioritised around the new Briefing App and other priority activity. This appears to have been complicated by reduced developer capacity.</p>	↔	New Risk	↔	↔	↔	Medium
141	NA	Employee Right to Work Checks	<p>Brexit is the United Kingdom's departure from the European Union. Longer term impacts of Brexit</p>	<p>Visas are not effectively captured on WMP Employment systems.</p> <p>Therefore people could continue to work for the force when the right to work in the UK has expired.</p> <p>One case we are aware of when a PCSO went through the PC recruitment process and it was identified that her current docs are not in line with new post Brexit req's and this is not automatically picked up</p>	<p>RISK WAS APPROVED FOR CORPORATE ESCALATION AT TACTICAL BOARD IN APRIL.</p> <p>Risk was re-named to not include 'Brexit' as this implies this risk only applies to those with EU nationality which is not the case. Title changed from 'BREXIT - Right to Work Position' to 'Employee Right to Work Checks'</p> <p>CoreVet data in march showed the following: 346 employees who were not born in the UK and do not have a full British passport 64 hold a dual passport e.g. British & Pole, British & Indian. These would be classified as low risk but recommend we still check their right to work documentation. 191 hold European passports – These would be individuals we would need to confirm their settled status and right to work. 1st priority 67 hold non-EU passports and therefore at the time of employment would of needed to supply their RTW e.g. tier 2 visa. As we do not know if any of these visa had expiry dates we would still recommend a compliance check against what we have on file to ensure all are still valid. 24 Not specified</p> <p>Department over the coming weeks to check RTW documentation we have against these candidates to either rule out the risk, highlight any expired visas etc, highlight where we do not have documentation on file etc.</p>	↔	↔	↔	↔	New Risk	High
76	NA	Mental Health detentions	<p>Shortage in provision of mental health care which results frequently in the lack of available: * Professionals to make mental health assessments and * Care placements into which the individuals can be transferred.</p>	<p>Legally permissible detention times are expiring before transfer to healthcare can be completed.</p> <p>WMP will be forced - frequently - to choose whether to Breach the law by exceeding the legally limitations established under the Mental Health Act (MHA) or Comply with the law and release an individual who may pose a risk to themselves or others.</p> <p>No legal power for "the right thing to do".</p> <p>After the 24hour detention period it is unclear what powers we can use for use of force. Risk of corporate and personal liability for the officers involved.</p>	<p>Continued detentions are still being authorised</p> <p>Concerns around use of force and the powers to do so after the 24 hours. Is this opening us up to corporate and personal liability for the officer involved - no legal powers for the "right thing to do", legal have approved a operational guidance document which addresses the conflict between Section 136 and PACE which has been shared with department - partnership engagement work is still ongoing where a working group will be set up to develop some of the partnership working.</p>	↔	↔	↔	↔	New Risk	High

Risk Trend key - Improved (↓), Worsened (↑) or is Unchanged (↔)

Closed Risks

ID	Risk Name	Description	Impact	Key Controls and Activities	Closed Rationale	Closed Date	Closure reported @ JAC
CRR04	CONNECT Legacy/BRC Data	Data migration into CONNECT could lead to loss of relevant information transferring over from legacy systems into CONNECT. Data loss/gaps could lead to the Force being unable to accurately access historic audit data.	<p>-The impact of this risk may be that data in the back records is missing from the transfer to CONNECT. This could lead to certain data fields in things like DBS historic checks being excluded – e.g. crime reference numbers.</p> <p>-The impact of this risk could lead to potential reputational damage if information provided in DBS certificates do not adequately reflect all current and historic data.</p> <p>-CONNECT Legacy/ BRC Data- Significant issues with this content- not all relevant information has been brought over into CONNECT, plus there are gaps in some outcomes/ markers that did not exist on legacy systems- for example, over 140K post 2018 DA records are no longer identified correctly, and there is currently no solution for accessing audit data.</p>	<p>- CONNECT implementation & assurance board involving a wide range of internal stakeholders (mostly departmental heads) overseeing implementation of system.</p> <p>- CONNECT team continuing to work through system architecture and integration issues with Northgate as part of usual programme management business.</p> <p>- DBS staff and others involved in investigation and disclosure are aware and are currently checking legacy systems to ensure all relevant information is considered.</p> <p>- Issue is under investigation by the Project/ IT&D/ Northgate as a whole and will need to be raised with CONNECT Gold/ Silver & SIMB- until this is resolved WMP cannot delete legacy data.</p> <p>- Second BRC load has completed and is due to be signed off imminently. Some manual migration is still underway to complete the migration of a small number of records. Risk of missing P1 data is now substantially reduced, risk of missing P2 and P3 data is being monitored and a fix/ migration is in progress.</p>	<p>Second BRC load has completed and is due to be signed off imminently. Some manual migration is still underway to complete the migration of a small number of records. Risk of missing P1 data is now substantially reduced, risk of missing P2 and P3 data is being monitored and a fix/ migration is in progress.</p> <p>Manual work is complete - this risk can be closed. Closure approved by Director of Commercial Services Peter Gillett</p>	15/08/2022	29th September 2022
CRR15	S22 Governance	<p>ROCU - If the current model - ARIS (Asset Recovery Incentivisation Scheme) is altered and assets seized were distributed across the region e.g. as per the current funding formula WMP OPCC would stand to lose 47% of current ARIS funding. There is a risk that if ARIS funding is not provided to other forces they may withdraw resource from the ROCUWM as they are not seeing equitable benefits from the regional agreement.</p> <p>CTU – There are two proposed options for the method of transferring Special Branch funding into CT Policing as part of the national SB Reform project. There is a risk that if Option 1 is chosen the transfer of SB funding into CT Grant will result in a 'top slice' from forces across the region that is not consistent with the actual spend of Special Branch. Option 2 would be a one-time adjustment. Based on this information, there is a risk that WMP will see their budget reduced by more than the actual cost of Special Branch.</p>	<p>ROCU - If the current model was altered and assets seized were distributed across the region e.g. as per the current funding formula WMP OPCC would stand to lose approximately 47% of current ARIS funding. This would have a significant impact on the funding of the WMP Economic Crime Team (ECT) and funds available for POCA initiatives.</p> <p>CTU - The impact of option 1 is that there is a possibility that the force will see their budget reduced by more than the current expenditure for Special Branch. Option 2 would be a one-time adjustment meaning that forces' individual funding only decreases by their expenditure on Special Branch.</p>	<p>ROCU With respect to the ROCU and ARIS – The WMP Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) has written to regional PCCs outlining the position and the funding formula will not be changed.</p> <p>CTU - Following an extensive engagement and consultation process with Chief Constables, Police & Crime Commissioners and Ministers, with strong endorsement from the CT Policing Network, the decision was taken by Ministers to approve Option 2 and this is currently being actioned. - All funding and the MOU has now been approved and this has no impact on the current CTU funding. Regionally we have a finance group that will review expenditure across the whole region to ensure we are in line with the budget.</p> <p>Recommended that risk is closed off.</p>	<p>Discussed at Security Governance Board and ACC Meir has happy to downgrade/close from the CRR.</p> <p>ROCU WMP and the OPCC are currently in discussions to provide a regional solution to the current arrangement. A plan is being developed to discuss a way forward.</p> <p>CTU - Following an extensive engagement and consultation process with Chief Constables, Police & Crime Commissioners and Ministers, with strong endorsement from the CT Policing Network, the decision was taken by Ministers to approve Option 2 and this is currently being actioned. - All funding and the MOU has now been approved and this has no impact on the current CTU funding. Regionally we have a finance group that will review expenditure across the whole region to ensure we are in line with the budget.</p>	30/09/2022	15th December 2022
CRR02	Serious Violence in Under 25s	There is a risk that interventions to address multiple risk factors/indicators are not impactful or effective. The increase in volume of serious youth crime and serious violence (gun and knife crime) in the under 25s could lead to the cumulative risk around community safety. There could be a perceived failure that the Force is not responding adequately to prevent and respond to crime involving young people.	<p>- Increases in volumes impacts on the force's capacity to prevent and respond to increased demand.</p> <p>- Increases in serious youth violence reporting in the media could undermine community confidence in policing and contribute to safety concerns.</p> <p>- Demand pressures could have an impact on crime prevention initiatives. Force response becomes more reactive than preventative.</p>	<p>Grip funding grant been agreed with Home Office. Circa - £3m p/a for 3 years. Match funding requirement. A number of posts are now being actively recruited into Analytical Systems and Activity</p> <p>- Following geofencing / crime mapping capability now confirmed (and resolution of some Connect data issues) the Data Lab are refreshing our hotspots overlaid with OCG activity and predictive knife crime data.</p> <p>Using grip funds we are enhancing our analytical capacity to include</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Higher Analyst drawing Serious Youth Violence (SYV) themes and opportunities from across violence portfolios - pending recruitment o Enhanced regional analytical support to include tracking our Targeted Guardian Patrols - Pending Recruitment o Dashboard development - ongoing o Data scientist time to support Randomised patrol methodology - Pending recruitment o Specialist knife crime analyst to support a CAPTIVA Knife crime meeting – tracking knife assaults, intelligence and interventions led by D.Supt <p>Operational Hotspot Activity - Pending recruitment</p> <p>- Paper submitted to expand taskforce through 2023 uplift</p> <p>- App in development with Thames Valley to deliver Randomised Patrol Methodology has been found not compatible with WMP - so WMP IT have commenced development of a new system</p> <p>- NPU refresh of Serious Youth Violence Plans – to launch internal comms programme including Target Guardian Patrols to frontline staff and Rimush community engagement principles – to commence 1/9/22 post CWG</p> <p><u>Problem-Orientated Policing</u></p> <p>- Investment in investigations resources (PSI,PSIOS to enhance OOC and outcomes)</p> <p>- NPU SYV Reduction Plans to include Public Health and Multi Agency SARA approach underpinned by CSP Violence Board structures.</p> <p>- Round Midnight Virtual Reality Schools program wider roll out being scoped with County Lines lead</p>	<p>During Sept LPGB ACC Ward authorised for this risk to be closed off CRR</p>	September 2022	15th December 2022
CRR12	Mutual Aid & Resourcing	There is a risk that significant resources abstractions (police officers and staff) will be required from operational business and duties during the operational period of the Commonwealth Games. There is a risk that a local, regional or national critical incident could see Mutual Aid and / or WMP officers and / or vehicles abstracted to resource the incident response.	The impact of this risk may be that WMP will have gaps in the Games staffing model, potentially causing a security / public safety risk. Should vehicles be unavailable, then officers' ability to perform their roles may be impacted and / or alternative transport may need to be found at short notice and with additional cost.	<p>Risk can close:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1.Mutual Aid agreed to not be deployed to any WMP BaU operation/incidents. 2.Changes to CWG resourcing models agreed with BaU Gold Command in the lead up to the Opening Ceremony/Closing Ceremony. 3.Commonwealth Games has taken place; the operation and BaU managed successfully – Military deployment worked well and CVAF enacted 01/08 to mitigate PCS shortfall. 4.Formal de-brief sessions planned for September – October to identify key learning. 	<p>1.Mutual Aid agreed to not be deployed to any WMP BaU operation/incidents.</p> <p>2.Changes to CWG resourcing models agreed with BaU Gold Command in the lead up to the Opening Ceremony/Closing Ceremony.</p> <p>3.Commonwealth Games has taken place; the operation and BaU managed successfully. Military deployment</p>	19/08/2022	15th December 2022
CRR22	Non-Compliance with CPIA biometric data retention	A previous Biometric Commissioner's Office audit in 2019 highlighted the need for WMP to ensure a cohesive and robust audit process for CPIA samples. These recommendations have not been fully implemented and it is likely the Force will be subject to an audit later this year as part of the national cyclical audit plan. There is a risk that WMP may not be fully compliant with the CPIA. There is a risk that a new audit by the Biometric Commissioner's Office could highlight weaknesses in WMP's management of the relevant data.	<p>- Significant weaknesses highlighted in an audit by the Biometric Commissioner's Office.</p> <p>- Trust and confidence of our stakeholders in relation to our processes around biometric information.</p> <p>- Non- compliance with the CPIA and the potential notification to the Home Office.</p>	<p>- A working group has been set up and the terms of reference is being finalised. The group aims to bring together key stakeholders to develop a procedure to ensure a compliant and ethical biometric data storage process.</p> <p>- Working group will work to implement Biometric Commissioner's recommendations made as a result of findings from a recent national report.</p> <p>Following discussions at the June Crime Governance Board (CGB) last quarter, it was highlighted that due to the mitigating actions now in place, this risk can now be managed at Portfolio level. Risk will be put for closure during Quarter 3</p>	<p>Following discussions at the June Crime Governance Board (CGB) last quarter, it was highlighted that due to the mitigating actions now in place, this risk can now be managed at Portfolio level. Risk will be put for closure during Quarter 3</p>	12/09/2022	15th December 2022

Closed Risks

ID	Risk Name	Description	Impact	Key Controls and Activities	Closed Rationale	Closed Date	Closure reported @ JAC
CRR21	Cannabis Disposal Storage Capacity	Due to a substantial increase in cannabis growth in the region, there has been an increase in the quantity of cannabis seized by Officers. The rapid increase could lead to a inability to manage the disposal capacity effectively.	This has led to insufficient cannabis storage capacity to manage the increased quantity seized. Increase in the health and safety risk to staff with excessive quantities being held on site.	<p>-Extensive work has been completed between Shared Services, Corporate Asset Management and Operations Cannabis Disposal Team (CDT) to implement a clearer communication structure, prioritised, planned and regular collection cycle and an upgrade in disposal capacity at Smethwick.</p> <p>-There has been a marked and sustained improvement in collections from local NPU-based stores and essentially ensures that cannabis is collected and moved to the central disposal store within twenty four hours of a NPU store nearing capacity. It has also reduced the risk of theft of seized cannabis and reduced complaints/health and safety incident reports.</p> <p>-Conducted a thorough review of DP processes, individual bags of cannabis handled by CDT can now be recorded and tracked on the DP system and confirmed as disposed of, removing any risk of cannabis going missing or unaccounted for in the collection process.</p> <p>-Following the Gold group meeting on 18/08/22, it was agreed by all stakeholders to reduce residual risk scores to 'Green' status.</p> <p>It has been recommended to remove this risk from the CRR and monitor at portfolio level.</p>	<p>Following the Gold group meeting on 18/08/22, it was agreed aby all stakeholders that this risk to the force has now been reduced adequately to return to 'Green' status on the risk register.</p> <p>Recommended for closure off CRR and to monitor on portfolio register</p>	19/08/2022	15th December 2022
40	Demand Management	<p>The increase in volume and complexity in demand and resourcing constraints. Return to 'new normal' at the tail-end of the pandemic creating additional complexity/uncertainty.</p> <p>Identified problems with the ability of WMP to manage incoming demand through 999, 101 and digital channels.</p> <p>Failure to manage calls for service from the public and the Force may fail to respond to and manage the effective/efficient policing requirements of the region . Significant strategic review of the operating model, resourcing arrangements and systems and processes.</p>	<p>Threat/Risk/Harm to the community & victim support</p> <p>Inability to create and execute effective plans for effective and efficient delivery of policing.</p> <p>Negative impact on wellbeing and stress to WMP staff.</p>	<p>Numerous projects and Gold groups actively targeting this and it is having an impact.</p> <p>Project Manager - Agree with the comments – this is being tracked under FCOP Silver and FCOP Gold and has workstreams to address this.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The bank scheme now sees the utilisation of officers backfilling into CH on a daily basis, particularly during hours of peak demand (16:00x22:00) and enables them to flex their hours when it suits them. Development and Implementation of the eboards for CH and overall force demand+AL39month for the last four consecutive months <p>The 'Support Desk' went live in June 2022 which aims to remove demand from Contact Handling linked to domestic abuse, missing and mental health. The desk was not fully established from the outset and as of 2 September, Force Contact continue to work with POD and other key stakeholders to bring the 'strength' levels up to the agreed establishment, wherein the desk can then aim to take on all of the agreed work</p> <p>Exploring opportunities to increase the sophistication of our demand modelling and forecasting approach. Increased understanding of resource levels, however further work required to understand resource to demand capacity especially on late turn.</p> <p>Review being undertaken into baseline responsibilities for Force Contact staff and where ownership of the P2 risk and demand should be.</p>	<p>New ACC of Contact Portfolio has authorised closure of risk due to the current mitigation and monitoring in place through projecy and gold groups.</p>	15/05/2023	Jun-23

RISK SCORING GUIDANCE

Risk Scoring = Impact x Probability

Impact	Service	Performance	Finance	Reputation	Legal	Safety	Human Rights / Diversity	Wellbeing
5	Major impact on a critical service area or multiple service areas with widespread and sustained disruption	Significant impact on performance resulting in not achieving more than one of the key Force performance objectives	Costs over £2m	Sustained national media coverage over sustained period / Removal of Command Team member / External inquiry	Prosecution. Major Claims/fines against the Force.	Multiple fatalities or multiple permanent injuries	Major unjustified impacts or interference	Very likely to have a significant impact on officer/staff wellbeing and will require coordinated response and referral to support services.
4	Serious impact on key services with a noticeable impact for the public	Large impact on performance resulting in not achieving a key Force performance objectives	Costs of between £1m and £2m	Sustained adverse local media coverage	Serious Claims/fines against the Force.	Single Fatality or severe injury to several people	Serious unjustified impacts or interference	Likely to have a serious impact on officer/staff wellbeing and will require coordinated response and referral to support services.
3	Impact on non-critical service or short term disruption	Impact on performance resulting in potential difficulties in achieving key Force performance objectives but where corrective action can still be taken	Costs of between £500k and £1m	Some local adverse publicity	Significant Litigation /claims against the Force. Within insurance cover	Major injury	Some limited unjustified impact or interference	Likely to impact officer/staff wellbeing and require referral to support services.
2	Slight impact on service delivery	Impact on performance resulting in small impact on key Force performance objectives but which can be managed	Costs of between £100k and £500k	Short term customer dissatisfaction	Claims, minor complaints Within insurance cover	Minor or slight injury	Impact of interference is manageable with existing resources	May impact officer/staff wellbeing and could require referral to support services.
1	Impact is easily manageable or is of little concern to public	Short Term impact on performance but not to the extent where the achievement of key force performance objectives are impacted	Costs of below £100k	Manageable customer dissatisfaction	Unlikely to lead to a claim	Unlikely to have any safety implications	No impact on diversity / human rights	Negligible impact on officer/staff wellbeing and unlikely to require referral to support services.

Probability	Description	Detailed Description	% Chance	Relative	Frequency
5	Very Likely	Has regularly occurred within the Force / Area / Department or there are strong indications that the risk will happen	80% or more	As certain as we can be that it will happen	More than once a year
4	Likely	Has previously occurred within the Force / Area / Department or there are indications that the risk will happen	50% - 80%	More likely to happen than not to happen	Once every 1 to 2 years occurrence
3	Some likelihood	Some indications that the risk will happen	20% - 50%	More likely not to happen than to happen	Once every 2 to 5 years occurrence
2	Unlikely	Limited indications at this point that the risk will happen	5% - 20%	Unlikely to happen but possible	Once every 5 to 10 years occurrence
1	Remote	No indications at this point that the risk will happen	0% - 5%	Extremely Unlikely	Once every 10 years or more occur

Risk Scores

	5	10	15	20	25
Probability	4	8	12	16	20
	3	6	9	12	15
	2	4	6	8	10
	1	2	3	4	5
		Impact			

For grading risk, the scores obtained from the risk matrix are assigned grades as follow:

1 - 4	Low risk
5 - 10	Medium risk
12 -16	High risk
20 - 25	Critical risk

Calculate the risk rating by multiplying the impact score by the probability score:

$Impact \times Probability = risk\ rating/score$