

Corporate Risks

ID	Prev. ID	Risk Name	Description	Impact	Key Controls and Activities	Q1 Trending	Q4 Trending	Q3 Trending	Q4 Trending	Q1 Trending	Q2 Trending	Q3 Trending	Q4 Trending	Residual Risk Rating
7	CRR03	Operational Training and Embedded Learning	Op Plato Embedding Joint Operating Principles (JOPS) 2 were introduced to WMP in December 2020 Operational officers within WMP must adopt changes within JOPS 2 and be trained in Plato response expectations. To complete the roll out there are a lot of other competing demands and the prioritisation of training competes locally.  Failure to deliver the national Plato training and operational responder expectations with competing demand and rate of staff changes  Due to a lack of local ownership there is a risk that annual refreshers will not be scheduled for CPD days within departments.	WMP and its Operational Staff failing to act in accordance with the national doctrine.  National doctrine has changed quicker than the ability and competency of officers in adopting these changes.  The utilisation of overtime for ORU delivering training will not be efficiently utilised with a lack of local ownership afterwards.	<b>February 2024:</b> The five multi-agency JOPSS training sessions have now been completed, this covers all required roles within WMP.  A mop up session was planned for late January 2024 to cover new FIM's and those outstanding. In line with JESIP training, there is a tried and tested package as well as the experienced trainers to draw upon should further training for new officers and staff requiring the training be needed during 2024 and beyond.  Compliance around the eLearning is being monitored through Performance Panel. ORU will further monitor eLearning uptake which will be shared with LPA SLTs at the LPA Civil Contingencies Resilience Group.  Process to be agreed for new Tactical Firearms Commanders and Force Contact Supervisors to receive training when they are new in post, once this is in place, the risk can be considered for closure. <b>November 2023 :WMP train the trainer event was held in July 2023 – with the Chief Inspector leading on multi-agency command training programme.</b> <b>JOPSS classroom learning is now directed at those in Tactical Command roles as well as the entire firearms contingent.</b> <b>All other JOPSS3 training will take the form of an eLearning package, reducing the need for local trainers.</b> <b>JOPSS3 courses concluded at the end of October with the potential for one or two mop-up classes. ORU will monitor eLearning uptake which will be shared with LPA SLTs at the LPA Civil Contingencies Resilience Group.</b> <b>The likelihood factor was reduced due to the robust audit processes that are in place to monitor training.</b> <b>August 2023:</b> WMP train the trainer event was held in July 2023 – with the Chief Inspector leading on multi-agency command training programme. In addition to this 5 dates will be set between September/October to train all firearms commanders, non-AP tactical commanders and force contact supervisors. We anticipate there will be an eLearning package for PC to Inspector later in 2023/early 2024 which will be mandatory. <b>May 2023:</b> Risk discussed at Operations Portfolio Board on 10/05/2023. Follow up action for meeting between the department, Risk Team and Performance Partners for discussion on 26th May 2023. <b>Better organisational position from JOPS 2, local train the trainers capability needs more uplift in line with ORU staffing and LPA staffing. JOPS 3, training programme and MAI actions will pose a greater PLATO training challenge between July - October where the process will be initiated again from February 2024.</b>	↔	↓	↔	↔	↔	↔	↓	↔	Low
47	CRR10	Financial Management	i. There is a risk that WMP's finances are not sustainable over the medium term and/or efficiency savings required may adversely impact the operational services. Whilst the police grant has increased for 22/23 to fund increase in officer numbers, there are still unfunded inflationary pressures.  ii - There is also a risk that as mandated/national initiatives develop (e.g. ESMCP, National Enabling Programme), the actual costs for delivery far exceed the estimated costs within the affordability envelope.	i - Impact on overall funding position. Medium term financial plan (MTFP) sets out strict budgeting envelope that must be met.  ii - The inability to finance all component projects, or needing to de-prioritise other projects within the portfolio if the national changes are mandated.	<b>February 2024:</b> The associated risks with the 2024/25 budget have now been mitigated. The 2024/24 budget is balanced, and budget reports have now been finalised and signed off by the PCCs office, the Chief Constable and Deputy Chief Constable.  2024/25 marks the final year of the 3-year funding settlement. There is still a gap in the medium term for 2025/26 and the recommendation is that this risk remains open and is amended to reflect ongoing medium-term uncertainty regarding future budgets.  Future year settlements are still to be understood, and may be impacted by 2024 electoral activity. Based on current funding assumptions, it is estimated there will be a gap of approx. £10m in 2025/26, which may increase as we move through the medium term.  Risk score reviewed in February 2024 score remains the same as previous as all the above has been taken into account when budgeting costs <b>November 2023 :</b> <b>Causes to be updated to reflect the 2023/34 position. Whilst the police grant is expected to increase for 24/25 in line with final year of the 3 year settlement there are still unfunded pressures linked to inflation, efficiency expectations and prior year one off savings. As mandated/national initiatives develop (e.g. ESMCP, National Enabling Programme), the actual costs for delivery far exceed the estimated costs within the affordability envelope.</b>  <b>TFP report and reserves strategy was taken to and presented to SCBP on the 23/10/23. The current reported gap for 2024/25 is £20.7m. This has been updated to reflect the revised estates strategy, the 7% pay award, additional grant for the pay award and some adjustments to the reserves balances to ease the pressures.</b>  <b>The plan for balancing 2024/25 is to utilise around £10.7m of reserves and to target savings of £10m from a mix of police staff vacant posts review and challenging non-pay budgets through a PBB style review.</b>  <b>Whilst the scoring hasn't reduced, this was scored high using the old risk scoring matrix, scoring now medium to reflect the new scoring matrix in use. Risk still remains: Provisional settlement from Home Office was received on 14th December. The settlement is in line with what was expected within the MTFP, the MTFP</b>	↔	↔	↔	↑	↑	↑	↔	↔	Medium
141	NA	Employee Right to Work Checks	Brexit is the United Kingdom's departure from the European Union. Longer term impacts of Brexit	Visas are not effectively captured on WMP Employment systems.  Therefore people could continue to work for the force when the right to work in the UK has expired.  One case we are aware of when a PCSO went through the PC recruitment process and it was identified that her current docs are not in line with new post Brexit req's and this is not automatically picked up	<b>February 2024:</b> Following legal advice obtained by Workforce and Resourcing, a risk-based approach is being taken to address this risk.  Workforce and Resourcing are currently contacting departments where Right to Work (RTW) checks are missing. There are currently 80 (reduction in 10 since last reporting) missing this information. Line management have now been given the responsibility to check and review the lists that have been sent out from the team. The expectation is that line managers will send through any evidence to the central team for review and action.  Scoring remains unchanged as assurance is required by workforce and resourcing that this process is working and sufficient evidence is being received into the team. <b>November 2023:WMP Professional Standards Department have produced a report of individuals who commenced employment with WMP since 2012 who did not identify as a British citizen. The recruitment and vetting team have checked the right to work (RTW) status of 538 employees and have found that 90 individuals require further checks, as we have been unable to determine their RTW status.</b>  <b>40 employees have copies of their passports that are from an EU country along with a valid UK national insurance number. Joint Legal Services have been contacted for clarity, as it is unclear at this stage whether this is suitable evidence of RTW status. 2 employees are EEA nationals, 6 employees have an expiry date in the future and 1 employee has RTW that expired in 2021. There are a further 41 employees who have no documents saved on the CoreVet system.</b>  <b>Next steps are to check with Shared Services/During Employment. Joint Legal Services have been contacted for advice and some scenarios around who should be checked retrospectively. An options/recommendations paper is being written for FET.</b>  <b>Whilst the scoring has not reduced, the scoring is now reflective of the new matrix and therefore showing as medium.</b> <b>August 2023:</b> This risk is still being managed, numbers are lower than thought it is just a case of working through each one that has a missing document. The team are assured that the risk to the force is not great. Essentially, it is a case of each individual sharing their documentation with their line management and then forwarding to Workforce & Resourcing.	↔	↔	↔	↔	New Risk	New Risk	↔	↔	Medium
76	NA	Mental Health detentions	Shortage in provision of mental health care which results frequently in the lack of available: * Professionals to make mental health assessments and * Care placements into which the individuals can be transferred.	Legally permissible detention times are expiring before transfer to healthcare can be completed.  WMP will be forced - frequently - to choose whether to Breach the law by exceeding the legally limitations established under the Mental Health Act (MHA) or Comply with the law and release an individual who may pose a risk to themselves or others.  No legal power for "the right thing to do".  After the 24hour detention period it is unclear what powers we can use for use of force. Risk of corporate and personal liability for the officers involved.	<b>February 2024:</b> Continued detentions are still being authorised, there are concerns around the use of force and powers after the 24 hours have passed.  However, this is a national issue that is being dealt with at ministerial and NPCC level to formulate a nationally policing and health service response.  To help mitigate and treat this risk the Right Care Right Person programme will go some way to address certain aspects of the problem but that will only be the start of treating the current acute position.  The shortage of Mental Health Placements has been raised at a national level and working groups have been set up to provide recommendations at a ministerial level on how to best manage those with Mental Health including considerations in relation to legislation changes. The hope is that this will produce clarity, changes in law and national guidance.  We are working with partners to identify possible alternatives to detention under the Mental Health Act, to ensure alternative pathways are available with the hope that a person's needs will be met before they reach the point of crisis negating the need for detention in the first place and Right Care and Right Person will allow us to do this.  We are working closely with Health Partners and local Authorities to change practices to enable patients to be legally transferred to health colleagues in a timely fashion with the hope that the Police will only be with such patients for one hour. This is in line with the current Mental Health Act codes of practice and should reduce the involvement of the Police in detentions which exceed the legal framework.  We have changed our practices in the custody environment to maximise the amount of time we have available in law to arrange ongoing care or control by running two powers concurrently.  We have put in place a robust escalation process to hold our partners to account and to evidence from a police perspective due diligence.  Additionally, Joint Legal Services have approved an operational guidance document which addresses the conflict between Section 136 and PACE which has been shared with the department to ensure that officers have a good understanding of the legal position on the Mental Health Act. Work is progressing to identify partnership stakeholders with view to forming Section 136 working group.	↔	↔	↔	↔	New Risk	New Risk	↓	↔	Medium

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270	NA	PCC Transition to Mayoral Governance	<p>There is an overall arching risk to WMP that business continuity could be disrupted by the process of transitioning from PCC to mayoral governance because the PCC owns our assets/estates, has control of funding, and is integrated into our governance frameworks etc. All of this is required to be moved across to the West Midlands Combined Authority (WMCA).</p> <p>Home Secretary approved request for transfer on 06/12/2023. Public consultation announced 22/12/2023 and will close 31/01/2024.</p>	<p>Incorrect VAT registration would have an adverse impact on all departments across the force. Purchases would be unable to be made until it was resolved.</p> <p>If the necessary structures and systems are not in place, we will be unable to pay contractors, purchase new goods or contracts.</p> <p>When West Yorkshire went through this process, the West Yorkshire Combined Authority did not want to take on the 'risk' of NPAS. Without appropriate safeguards, there is a potential risk to force funding of regional and national functions such as NABIS, ROCU and CTU.</p> <p>Disruption to policing governance structures and processes.</p>	<p><b>February 2024:</b> The West Midlands Combined Authority are leading on this project and have put in place a role of Senior Responsible Officer (SRO), a Senior Project Manager, Project Manager and Analyst. To further support this transition the OPCC office have put in resources to support and Chief Superintendent to oversee the process from West Midlands Police perspective.</p> <p>The PCC's office, WMCA and SD&amp;A are reviewing existing policies and governance structures to build a post 7th May risk management structure and governance process.</p> <p>Effective working relationships and governance structures are key to mitigating this risk and work in ongoing with key stakeholders to progress mitigation activity.</p> <p>There are a number of working groups in place that relate incorporate Communications, Finance, Procurement/ Contracts, HR/ Well-being, Legal and Governance, Asset Management, IT &amp; D and Information Management and Data.</p> <p>The force has engaged with Greater Manchester and West Yorkshire who have already transitioned to this governance model to help understand needs and requirements. We are currently working with South Yorkshire and North Yorkshire who both through slightly different models will be trying to achieve the same end goal for the 7th May 2024.</p> <p>External publicity regarding the transition is creating challenges.</p> <p>The statutory instrument been laid and will go through scrutiny panels in the House of Lords and the House of Commons.</p> <p>On the 14th February, the PCC submitted papers for an urgent judicial review hearing. WMP should hear by end of February as to whether a hearing will take place or not.</p> <p>If a hearing does take place, it should be scheduled for w/c 4th March. This is the same week it is anticipated that the legislation will be passed in parliament. Deadline for all of this activity is 21st March when campaigning for the local elections in May officially begins.</p>	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔		New Risk	↑	High

Risk Trend key - Improved (↓), Worsened (↑) or is Unchanged (↔)

**Closed Risks**

ID	Risk Name	Description	Impact	Key Controls and Activities	Closed Rationale	Closed Date	Closure reported @ JAC
CRR04	CONNECT Legacy/BRC Data	Data migration into CONNECT could lead to loss of relevant information transferring over from legacy systems into CONNECT. Data loss/gaps could lead to the Force being unable to accurately access historic audit data.	<p>-The impact of this risk may be that data in the back records is missing from the transfer to CONNECT. This could lead to certain data fields in things like DBS historic checks being excluded – e.g. crime reference numbers.</p> <p>-The impact of this risk could lead to potential reputational damage if information provided in DBS certificates do not adequately reflect all current and historic data.</p> <p>-CONNECT Legacy/ BRC Data- Significant issues with this content- not all relevant information has been brought over into CONNECT, plus there are gaps in some outcomes/ markers that did not exist on legacy systems- for example, over 140K post 2018 DA records are no longer identified correctly, and there is currently no solution for accessing audit data.</p>	<p>- CONNECT implementation &amp; assurance board involving a wide range of internal stakeholders (mostly departmental heads) overseeing implementation of system.</p> <p>- CONNECT team continuing to work through system architecture and integration issues with Northgate as part of usual programme management business.</p> <p>- DBS staff and others involved in investigation and disclosure are aware and are currently checking legacy systems to ensure all relevant information is considered.</p> <p>- Issue is under investigation by the Project/ IT&amp;D/ Northgate as a whole and will need to be raised with CONNECT Gold/ Silver &amp; SIMB- until this is resolved WMP cannot delete legacy data.</p> <p>- Second BRC load has completed and is due to be signed off imminently. Some manual migration is still underway to complete the migration of a small number of records. Risk of missing P1 data is now substantially reduced, risk of missing P2 and P3 data is being monitored and a fix/ migration is in progress.</p>	<p><b>Second BRC load has completed and is due to be signed off imminently. Some manual migration is still underway to complete the migration of a small number of records. Risk of missing P1 data is now substantially reduced, risk of missing P2 and P3 data is being monitored and a fix/ migration is in progress.</b></p> <p><b>Manual work is complete - this risk can be closed. Closure approved by Director of Commercial Services Peter Gillett</b></p>	15/08/2022	29th September 2022
CRR15	S22 Governance	<p><b>ROCU</b> - If the current model - ARIS (Asset Recovery Incentivisation Scheme) is altered and assets seized were distributed across the region e.g. as per the current funding formula WMP OPCC would stand to lose 47% of current ARIS funding. There is a risk that if ARIS funding is not provided to other forces they may withdraw resource from the ROCUWM as they are not seeing equitable benefits from the regional agreement.</p> <p><b>CTU</b> – There are two proposed options for the method of transferring Special Branch funding into CT Policing as part of the national SB Reform project. There is a risk that if Option 1 is chosen the transfer of SB funding into CT Grant will result in a 'top slice' from forces across the region that is not consistent with the actual spend of Special Branch. Option 2 would be a one-time adjustment. Based on this information, there is a risk that WMP will see their budget reduced by more than the actual cost of Special Branch.</p>	<p><b>ROCU</b> - If the current model was altered and assets seized were distributed across the region e.g. as per the current funding formula WMP OPCC would stand to lose approximately 47% of current ARIS funding. This would have a significant impact on the funding of the WMP Economic Crime Team (ECT) and funds available for POCA initiatives.</p> <p><b>CTU</b> - The impact of option 1 is that there is a possibility that the force will see their budget reduced by more than the current expenditure for Special Branch. Option 2 would be a one-time adjustment meaning that forces' individual funding only decreases by their expenditure on Special Branch.</p>	<p>ROCU With respect to the ROCU and ARIS – The WMP Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) has written to regional PCCs outlining the position and the funding formula will not be changed.</p> <p>CTU - Following an extensive engagement and consultation process with Chief Constables, Police &amp; Crime Commissioners and Ministers, with strong endorsement from the CT Policing Network, the decision was taken by Ministers to approve Option 2 and this is currently being actioned. - All funding and the MOU has now been approved and this has no impact on the current CTU funding. Regionally we have a finance group that will review expenditure across the whole region to ensure we are in line with the budget.</p> <p>Recommended that risk is closed off.</p>	<p><b>Discussed at Security Governance Board and ACC Meir has happy to downgrade/close from the CRR.</b></p> <p>ROCU WMP and the OPCC are currently in discussions to provide a regional solution to the current arrangement. A plan is being developed to discuss a way forward.</p> <p>CTU - Following an extensive engagement and consultation process with Chief Constables, Police &amp; Crime Commissioners and Ministers, with strong endorsement from the CT Policing Network, the decision was taken by Ministers to approve Option 2 and this is currently being actioned. - All funding and the MOU has now been approved and this has no impact on the current CTU funding. Regionally we have a finance group that will review expenditure across the whole region to ensure we are in line with the budget.</p>	30/09/2022	15th December 2022
CRR02	Serious Violence in Under 25s	There is a risk that interventions to address multiple risk factors/indicators are not impactful or effective. The increase in volume of serious youth crime and serious violence (gun and knife crime) in the under 25s could lead to the cumulative risk around community safety. There could be a perceived failure that the Force is not responding adequately to prevent and respond to crime involving young people.	<p>- Increases in volumes impacts on the force's capacity to prevent and respond to increased demand.</p> <p>- Increases in serious youth violence reporting in the media could undermine community confidence in policing and contribute to safety concerns.</p> <p>- Demand pressures could have an impact on crime prevention initiatives. Force response becomes more reactive than preventative.</p>	<p>Grip funding grant been agreed with Home Office. Circa - £3m p/a for 3 years. Match funding requirement. A number of posts are now being actively recruited into Analytical Systems and Activity</p> <p>- Following geofencing / crime mapping capability now confirmed (and resolution of some Connect data issues) the Data Lab are refreshing our hotspots overlaid with OCG activity and predictive knife crime data.</p> <p>Using grip funds we are enhancing our analytical capacity to include</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Higher Analyst drawing Serious Youth Violence (SYV) themes and opportunities from across violence portfolios - pending recruitment</li> <li>o Enhanced regional analytical support to include tracking our Targeted Guardian Patrols - Pending Recruitment</li> <li>o Dashboard development - ongoing</li> <li>o Data scientist time to support Randomised patrol methodology - Pending recruitment</li> <li>o Specialist knife crime analyst to support a CAPTIVA Knife crime meeting – tracking knife assaults, intelligence and interventions led by D.Supt</li> </ul> <p>Operational Hotspot Activity - Pending recruitment</p> <p>- Paper submitted to expand taskforce through 2023 uplift</p> <p>- App in development with Thames Valley to deliver Randomised Patrol Methodology has been found not compatible with WMP - so WMP IT have commenced development of a new system</p> <p>- NPU refresh of Serious Youth Violence Plans – to launch internal comms programme including Target Guardian Patrols to frontline staff and Rimush community engagement principles – to commence 1/9/22 post CWG</p> <p><u>Problem-Orientated Policing</u></p> <p>- Investment in investigations resources (PSI,PSIOS to enhance OOC and outcomes)</p> <p>- NPU SYV Reduction Plans to include Public Health and Multi Agency SARA approach underpinned by CSP Violence Board structures.</p> <p>- Round Midnight Virtual Reality Schools program wider roll out being scoped with County Lines lead</p>	<p><b>During Sept LPGB ACC Ward authorised for this risk to be closed off CRR</b></p>	September 2022	15th December 2022
CRR12	Mutual Aid & Resourcing	There is a risk that significant resources abstractions (police officers and staff) will be required from operational business and duties during the operational period of the Commonwealth Games. There is a risk that a local, regional or national critical incident could see Mutual Aid and / or WMP officers and / or vehicles abstracted to resource the incident response.	The impact of this risk may be that WMP will have gaps in the Games staffing model, potentially causing a security / public safety risk. Should vehicles be unavailable, then officers' ability to perform their roles may be impacted and / or alternative transport may need to be found at short notice and with additional cost.	<p>Risk can close:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1.Mutual Aid agreed to not be deployed to any WMP BaU operation/incidents.</li> <li>2.Changes to CWG resourcing models agreed with BaU Gold Command in the lead up to the Opening Ceremony/Closing Ceremony.</li> <li>3.Commonwealth Games has taken place; the operation and BaU managed successfully – Military deployment worked well and CVAF enacted 01/08 to mitigate PCS shortfall.</li> <li>4.Formal de-brief sessions planned for September – October to identify key learning.</li> </ol>	<p><b>Risk can close:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1.Mutual Aid agreed to not be deployed to any WMP BaU operation/incidents.</li> <li>2.Changes to CWG resourcing models agreed with BaU Gold Command in the lead up to the Opening Ceremony/Closing Ceremony.</li> <li>3.Commonwealth Games has taken place; the operation</li> </ol>	19/08/2022	15th December 2022
CRR22	Non-Compliance with CPIA biometric data retention	A previous Biometric Commissioner's Office audit in 2019 highlighted the need for WMP to ensure a cohesive and robust audit process for CPIA samples. These recommendations have not been fully implemented and it is likely the Force will be subject to an audit later this year as part of the national cyclical audit plan. There is a risk that WMP may not be fully compliant with the CPIA. There is a risk that a new audit by the Biometric Commissioner's Office could highlight weaknesses in WMP's management of the relevant data.	<p>- Significant weaknesses highlighted in an audit by the Biometric Commissioner's Office.</p> <p>- Trust and confidence of our stakeholders in relation to our processes around biometric information.</p> <p>- Non- compliance with the CPIA and the potential notification to the Home Office.</p>	<p>- A working group has been set up and the terms of reference is being finalised. The group aims to bring together key stakeholders to develop a procedure to ensure a compliant and ethical biometric data storage process.</p> <p>- Working group will work to implement Biometric Commissioner's recommendations made as a result of findings from a recent national report.</p> <p>Following discussions at the June Crime Governance Board (CGB) last quarter, it was highlighted that due to the mitigating actions now in place, this risk can now be managed at Portfolio level. Risk will be put for closure during Quarter 3</p>	<p><b>Following discussions at the June Crime Governance Board (CGB) last quarter, it was highlighted that due to the mitigating actions now in place, this risk can now be managed at Portfolio level. Risk will be put for closure during Quarter 3</b></p>	12/09/2022	15th December 2022

**Closed Risks**

ID	Risk Name	Description	Impact	Key Controls and Activities	Closed Rationale	Closed Date	Closure reported @ JAC
CRR21	Cannabis Disposal Storage Capacity	Due to a substantial increase in cannabis growth in the region, there has been an increase in the quantity of cannabis seized by Officers. The rapid increase could lead to a inability to manage the disposal capacity effectively.	This has led to insufficient cannabis storage capacity to manage the increased quantity seized. Increase in the health and safety risk to staff with excessive quantities being held on site.	-Extensive work has been completed between Shared Services, Corporate Asset Management and Operations Cannabis Disposal Team (CDT) to implement a clearer communication structure, prioritised, planned and regular collection cycle and an upgrade in disposal capacity at Smethwick. -There has been a marked and sustained improvement in collections from local NPU-based stores and essentially ensures that cannabis is collected and moved to the central disposal store within twenty four hours of a NPU store nearing capacity. It has also reduced the risk of theft of seized cannabis and reduced complaints/health and safety incident reports. -Conducted a thorough review of DP processes, individual bags of cannabis handled by CDT can now be recorded and tracked on the DP system and confirmed as disposed of, removing any risk of cannabis going missing or unaccounted for in the collection process. -Following the Gold group meeting on 18/08/22, it was agreed by all stakeholders to reduce residual risk scores to 'Green' status.  It has been recommended to remove this risk from the CRR and monitor at portfolio level.	Following the Gold group meeting on 18/08/22, it was agreed by all stakeholders that this risk to the force has now been reduced adequately to return to 'Green' status on the risk register.  Recommended for closure off CRR and to monitor on portfolio register	19/08/2022	15th December 2022
40	Demand Management	The increase in volume and complexity in demand and resourcing constraints. Return to 'new normal' at the tail-end of the pandemic creating additional complexity/uncertainty. Identified problems with the ability of WMP to manage incoming demand through 999, 101 and digital channels. Failure to manage calls for service from the public and the Force may fail to respond to and manage the effective/efficient policing requirements of the region . Significant strategic review of the operating model, resourcing arrangements and systems and processes.	Threat/Risk/Harm to the community & victim support  Inability to create and execute effective plans for effective and efficient delivery of policing.  Negative impact on wellbeing and stress to WMP staff.	Numerous projects and Gold groups actively targeting this and it is having an impact.  Project Manager - Agree with the comments – this is being tracked under FCOP Silver and FCOP Gold and has workstreams to address this. • The bank scheme now sees the utilisation of officers backfilling into CH on a daily basis, particularly during hours of peak demand (16:00x22:00) and enables them to flex their hours when it suits them. • Development and Implementation of the eboards for CH and overall force demand+AL39month for the last four consecutive months  The 'Support Desk' went live in June 2022 which aims to remove demand from Contact Handling linked to domestic abuse, missing and mental health. The desk was not fully established from the outset and as of 2 September, Force Contact continue to work with POD and other key stakeholders to bring the 'strength' levels up to the agreed establishment, wherein the desk can then aim to take on all of the agreed work  Exploring opportunities to increase the sophistication of our demand modelling and forecasting approach. Increased understanding of resource levels, however further work required to understand resource to demand capacity especially on late turn. Review being undertaken into baseline responsibilities for Force Contact staff and where ownership of the P2 risk and demand should be.	New ACC of Contact Portfolio has authorised closure of risk due to the current mitigation and monitoring in place through projecy and gold groups.	15/05/2023	Jun-23

**RISK SCORING GUIDANCE**

Risk Scoring = Impact x Probability

Impact	Service	Performance	Finance	Reputation	Legal	Safety	Human Rights / Diversity	Wellbeing
5	Major impact on a critical service area or multiple service areas with widespread and sustained disruption	Significant impact on performance resulting in not achieving more than one of the key Force performance objectives	Costs over £2m	Sustained national media coverage over sustained period / Removal of Command Team member / External inquiry	Prosecution. Major Claims/fines against the Force.	Multiple fatalities or multiple permanent injuries	Major unjustified impacts or interference	Very likely to have a significant impact on officer/staff wellbeing and will require coordinated response and referral to support services.
4	Serious impact on key services with a noticeable impact for the public	Large impact on performance resulting in not achieving a key Force performance objectives	Costs of between £1m and £2m	Sustained adverse local media coverage	Serious Claims/fines against the Force.	Single Fatality or severe injury to several people	Serious unjustified impacts or interference	Likely to have a serious impact on officer/staff wellbeing and will require coordinated response and referral to support services.
3	Impact on non-critical service or short term disruption	Impact on performance resulting in potential difficulties in achieving key Force performance objectives but where corrective action can still be taken	Costs of between £500k and £1m	Some local adverse publicity	Significant Litigation /claims against the Force. Within insurance cover	Major injury	Some limited unjustified impact or interference	Likely to impact officer/staff wellbeing and require referral to support services.
2	Slight impact on service delivery	Impact on performance resulting in small impact on key Force performance objectives but which can be managed	Costs of between £100k and £500k	Short term customer dissatisfaction	Claims, minor complaints Within insurance cover	Minor or slight injury	Impact of interference is manageable with existing resources	May impact officer/staff wellbeing and could require referral to support services.
1	Impact is easily manageable or is of little concern to public	Short Term impact on performance but not to the extent where the achievement of key force performance objectives are impacted	Costs of below £100k	Manageable customer dissatisfaction	Unlikely to lead to a claim	Unlikely to have any safety implications	No impact on diversity / human rights	Negligible impact on officer/staff wellbeing and unlikely to require referral to support services.

Probability	Description	Detailed Description	% Chance	Relative	Frequency
5	Very Likely	Has regularly occurred within the Force / Area / Department or there are strong indications that the risk will happen	80% or more	As certain as we can be that it will happen	More than once a year
4	Likely	Has previously occurred within the Force / Area / Department or there are indications that the risk will happen	50% - 80%	More likely to happen than not to happen	Once every 1 to 2 years occurrence
3	Some likelihood	Some indications that the risk will happen	20% - 50%	More likely not to happen than to happen	Once every 2 to 5 years occurrence
2	Unlikely	Limited indications at this point that the risk will happen	5% - 20%	Unlikely to happen but possible	Once every 5 to 10 years occurrence
1	Remote	No indications at this point that the risk will happen	0% - 5%	Extremely Unlikely	Once every 10 years or more occur

Risk Scores

	5	10	15	20	25
Probability	4	8	12	16	20
	3	6	9	12	15
	2	4	6	8	10
	1	2	3	4	5
		Impact			

For grading risk, the scores obtained from the risk matrix are assigned grades as follow:

1 - 4	Low risk
5 - 10	Medium risk
12 -16	High risk
20 - 25	Critical risk

Calculate the risk rating by multiplying the impact score by the probability score:

$Impact \times Probability = risk\ rating/score$